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Overview of Thesis 
 
This thesis follows the portfolio format and the following information provides a brief 
summary of the main chapters of the thesis: 
Chapter 1 is a systematic review and meta-analysis of the research literature testing key 
predictions of the widely-studied ‘paranoia as defence’ model (more formally known as the 
‘attribution–self-representation cycle’) proposed by Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, 
and Kinderman (2001), as applied to people with psychosis with persecutory delusions. 
Chapter 2 presents an empirical journal article which is designed to examine the feasibility and 
acceptability of collaborative psychological assessment and formulation of impaired treatment 
decision-making capacity (TDMC) among patients with psychosis, and produce preliminary 
data on safety and efficacy.  
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 were written for submission to Clinical Psychology Review and 





























Thesis Abstract  
 
Purpose: A systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted to test key predictions of the 
widely-studied ‘paranoia as defence’ model (more formally known as the ‘attribution–self-
representation cycle’) proposed by Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, and Kinderman 
(2001), as applied to people with psychosis with persecutory delusions. A novel case series 
was also conducted to examine the feasibility and acceptability of collaborative psychological 
assessment and formulation of impaired treatment decision-making capacity (TDMC) among 
patients with psychosis, and produce preliminary data on safety and efficacy. 
Methods: With regard to the systematic review and meta-analysis, people with psychosis with 
persecutory delusions were compared to healthy controls, people with depression and people 
with psychosis without persecutory delusions (and, if specified, grandiose delusions) on a 
number of outcomes: externalising attributional bias, explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem 
and discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Correlations between paranoia 
severity and each of these outcomes and self-esteem instability were also examined. In regards 
to the case series, a formulation of impaired TDMC for 5 patient participants was developed 
and shared with 13 clinician participants. Acceptability, utility, working alliance and safety 
were assessed through pre and post self-report and interview measures.  
Results: Sixty-three studies were included in the meta-analysis and systematic review, of 
which 33, 36, 10, 10 and 4 were used to test hypotheses on externalising attributional bias, 
explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem, implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy and self-
esteem instability, respectively. Key model-consistent findings included the following: people 
with psychosis with persecutory delusions had a greater externalising attributional bias 
compared to all the other groups and a greater implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy than 
people with depression, and paranoia severity was positively correlated with externalising 
attributional bias and self-esteem instability. Key model-inconsistent findings included the 
following: people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had lower explicit self-esteem 
than healthy controls, and paranoia severity was negatively correlated with explicit self-esteem. 
There were also some model-inconclusive findings. Regarding the case series, 3 of the patient 
participants collaborated in the development of their formulation. They found the intervention 
safe and acceptable, following which they provided a much richer understanding of the factors 
that may impair their TDMC (Cohen’s d = 2.16). Two patient participants only partially 
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adhered to the intervention protocol, but a psychological formulation was still feasible to 
produce and no adverse effects were reported. Clinician participants provided a much richer 
understanding of the factors that may impair the patient participants’ TDMC (Cohen’s d = 1.36; 
95% CI = 0.63 to 2.07) after the presentation of the case formulations. Increases in knowledge, 
confidence and positive attitudes regarding supporting the TDMC of patients were observed. 
They strongly believed that the formulations cohered with their knowledge of the patient 
participants and were comprehensive and accurate. 
Conclusions: The findings of the systematic review and meta-analysis support a ‘weak’ 
version of the paranoia as defence model, which suggests persecutory delusions are only 
partially effective at protecting low implicit self-esteem from reaching awareness. The findings 
of the case series suggest that patients with psychosis, and their clinicians, can be engaged in a 
collaborative psychological assessment and formulation of factors that may impair their 
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Aims: To test key predictions of the widely-studied ‘paranoia as defence’ model (more 
formally known as the ‘attribution–self-representation cycle’) proposed by Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood, and Kinderman (2001), as applied to people with psychosis with 
persecutory delusions. 
Method: We did a systematic review and meta-analysis. We compared people with psychosis 
with persecutory delusions to healthy controls, people with depression and people with 
psychosis without persecutory delusions (and, if specified, grandiose delusions) on a number 
of outcomes: externalising attributional bias, explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem and 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem. We also examined the correlation 
between paranoia severity and these outcomes and self-esteem instability in people with 
psychosis. 
Results:  We identified 63 relevant studies, of which 33, 36, 10, 10 and 4 were used to test 
hypotheses on externalising attributional bias, explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem, 
implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy and self-esteem instability, respectively. Key model-
consistent findings included the following: people with psychosis with persecutory delusions 
had a greater externalising attributional bias compared to all the other groups and a greater 
implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy than people with depression, and paranoia severity 
was positively correlated with externalising attributional bias and self-esteem instability. Key 
model-inconsistent findings included the following: people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had lower explicit self-esteem than healthy controls, and paranoia severity was 
negatively correlated with explicit self-esteem. There were also some model-inconclusive 
findings.  
Conclusions: The findings support a ‘weak’ version of the paranoia as defence model, which 
suggests persecutory delusions are only partially effective at protecting low implicit self-






Persecutory (paranoid) delusions, which are characterised by unfounded beliefs that others are 
trying to harm the self (Freeman & Garety, 2000), are a major psychiatric problem. Indeed, 
they are present in over 70% of patients presenting with a first episode of psychosis (Coid et 
al., 2013), often result in psychiatric hospital admission (Castle, Phelan, Wessely, & Murray, 
1994), and are linked to increased risk of violence (Coid et al., 2013).   
In order to understand the aetiology and maintenance of persecutory delusions, different 
cognitive models have been put forward. One such model, which has initiated abundant 
research, is the attribution–self-representation cycle (ASRC) by Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, 
Blackwood, and Kinderman (2001), an extension of an earlier model (Bentall, Kinderman, & 
Kaney, 1994). This model, also referred to as the ‘paranoia as defence’ model, postulates that 
persecutory delusions reflect an attributional defence against low self-esteem reaching 
consciousness. In this respect, people with persecutory delusions are thought to have 
unconscious low self-esteem that is similar to people with depression. However, unlike people 
with depression, people with persecutory delusions are hypothesised to defend against low self-
esteem reaching consciousness by making external-personal (other-blaming) attributions for 
negative events, in preference for either internal attributions or external-situational attributions. 
Therefore, according to the paranoia as defence model, people with persecutory delusions 
should have a discrepancy between implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) self-esteem 
(with the latter being higher) as well a tendency to make external-personal attributions for 
negative events. Moreover, the most recent revision of the model (Bentall et al., 2001) suggests 
that persecutory delusions do not provide a complete defence against low self-esteem reaching 
consciousness and therefore self-esteem instability is expected to occur in people with 
persecutory delusions. 
The paranoia as defence model has not been left unchallenged. Three recent systematic reviews 
on different domains of this model found that explicit self-esteem was largely skewed towards 
the negative in people with persecutory delusions (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & 
Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan, Tracey, & Shannon, 2014). This discovery, it has been argued, does 
not fit well with a defence account, in which relative preservation of explicit self-esteem might 
be expected (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 2014). 
However, finding evidence of low explicit self-esteem does not preclude the ‘weaker’ version 
of the paranoia as defence model in which persecutory delusions are only partially successful 
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(i.e., they do not fully preserve explicit self-esteem but prevent explicit self-esteem falling as 
low as implicit self-esteem) (Garety & Freeman, 1999). A test of this rests on evidence of a 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem in people with persecutory delusions 
(Garety & Freeman, 1999). Of note, the three systematic reviews found that only a minority of 
studies supported such a discrepancy (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; 
Tiernan et al., 2014). However, two of these systematic reviews found support for an 
association between persecutory delusions and self-esteem instability (Kesting & Lincoln, 
2013; Tiernan et al., 2014), a finding which may explain some of the hypothesised failures of 
the defence (Bentall et al., 2001). Moreover, one of these systematic reviews found that there 
was mixed evidence that people with persecutory delusions had an exaggerated externalising 
attributional bias for negative events (hereafter referred to, for short, as ‘externalising 
attributional bias’) (i.e., a tendency to attribute negative events to external causes) (Garety & 
Freeman, 2013). While this finding contrasts with that of a recent meta-analysis on domains of 
social cognition in schizophrenia, which indicated that there were no significant differences in 
externalising attributional biases among a subset of people with persecutory delusions and 
healthy controls (Savla et al., 2013), it was based on a much larger number of studies (37 
clinical studies vs 3 clinical studies). Therefore, it has been suggested that an externalising 
attributional bias would plausibly be thought to occur in people with persecutory delusions but 
that it does not need to be tied to the further hypothesis of defending against low-esteem 
reaching consciousness (Garety & Freeman, 2013). This conclusion is consistent with the 
model by Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, and Bebbington (2002) which incorporates the 
attributional bias element of the paranoia as defence model but which suggests that persecutory 
delusions are a direct reflection of low self-esteem and associated emotional processes of the 
individual and not a defence.     
While the systematic reviews described above have provided an overall picture of trends in 
significant and non-significant findings in relation to the predictions of the paranoia as defence 
model, they had two notable limitations. First, they did not employ a meta-analysis. This may 
be problematic as many of the studies were small and therefore perhaps under-powered for 
detecting relationships that might have in fact existed (Maxwell, 2004). Indeed, the use of a 
meta-analysis can overcome the low power of small studies and therefore reconcile inconsistent 
and divergent findings (Berman & Parker, 2002). Second, the results of studies on 
discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem were based on the comparison of the 
results between groups for each type of self-esteem separately, with just two exceptions 
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(Kesting, Mehl, Rief, Lindenmeyer, & Lincoln, 2011; Vazquez, Diez-Alegria, Hernandez-
Lloreda, & Moreno, 2008). However, it has been argued that to adequately test the hypothesis 
of discrepancy, it is necessary to analyse the difference between implicit and explicit self-
esteem within each group as well as differences between groups (Kesting et al., 2011; Vazquez 
et al., 2008). Therefore, the aim of this study was to conduct a systematic review and meta-
analysis to test key predictions of the paranoia as defence model while employing a method for 
calculating the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem that allowed for the 
analysis of both within and between group differences.  
Specifically, it was predicted that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions would have 
a greater externalising attributional bias and discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-
esteem compared to healthy controls as well as people with depression and those with 
psychosis without persecutory delusions (and, if specified, grandiose delusions). While it was 
predicted that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions would have greater explicit 
self-esteem compared to people with depression and those with psychosis without persecutory 
delusions, it was predicted that they would have either similar or greater explicit self-esteem 
compared to healthy controls. As for implicit self-esteem, it was predicted that people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions would have similar implicit self-esteem compared to 
people with depression but lower implicit self-esteem compared to healthy controls and people 
with psychosis without persecutory delusions. Moreover, it was predicted that the degree of 
externalising attributional bias, implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy, explicit self-esteem 
and self-esteem instability would be positively correlated with paranoia severity in people with 
psychosis. By contrast, a negative correlation between implicit self-esteem and paranoia 
severity in people with psychosis was expected. Finally, a number of pre-specified moderator 
analyses were explored to examine the effect of depression and study quality variables on the 
overall estimates of effect.      
 
2. Methods 
This study adhered to the statement of Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and 





2.1. Search Strategy 
The search strategy was developed in consultation with a research librarian. The reports 
identified in three previous systematic reviews of the relevant literature published in 2013 and 
2014 (including one involving DF) (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; 
Tiernan et al., 2014) were firstly collated. Electronic databases (i.e., PsycINFO, MEDLINE, 
EMBASE and Web of Science) were then searched by PM (in consultation with PH as well as 
the research librarian) from 2012 to September 2016. Search terms related to psychosis, 
delusions, externalising attributional bias and self-esteem were used. The reference lists of all 
included full-text articles were subsequently searched to identify any studies missed in the 
initial search. In every case where useable but unpublished data were thought to exist the 
relevant authors were contacted. As a final step, all corresponding authors of included studies 
were contacted for any further unpublished data. Further details of the search strategy are 
provided in Appendix C.   
 
2.2. Study Selection 
Studies were eligible for inclusion in the group comparison analyses if they measured 
externalising attributional bias or self-esteem (in one of the various forms) in (1) people 
diagnosed with a schizophrenia spectrum condition (hereafter referred to as “psychosis”) of 
whom ≥50% had current persecutory delusions and (2) people with depression or healthy 
controls. Studies comparing people with psychosis with current persecutory delusions to people 
with psychosis without persecutory delusions were also eligible for inclusion in the group 
comparison analyses providing <50% of the latter group had current persecutory delusions 
(and, if specified, grandiose delusions). Studies without control group data were eligible for 
inclusion in the correlation analyses if (1) ≥50% of the sample had psychosis and (2) correlation 
or regression data was reported between a measure of paranoia/persecutory ideation and a 
measure of externalising attributional bias or self-esteem. Studies comparing people with 
psychosis with current persecutory delusions to people with psychosis without persecutory 
delusions (irrespective of the presence of grandiose delusions in the latter group) were also 
eligible for inclusion in the correlation analyses. Cross-sectional data (including baseline data 
from longitudinal studies, experimental manipulation studies and trials of interventions) were 
eligible for inclusion in the different analyses, with the exception of the analyses involving 
self-esteem instability for which only longitudinal data were eligible.   
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Studies were excluded where ≥50% of the persecutory delusional/psychosis sample had bipolar 
disorder, learning disability, a primary diagnosis of substance-induced psychosis or psychosis 
secondary to a general medical condition or organic pathology. Studies where samples 
overlapped by ≥25% were also excluded except for the study that reported on the largest 
number of participants. Only studies published in English were considered. Selection of studies 
were conducted by PM in consultation with PH against the inclusion/exclusion criteria.    
 
2.3. Outcome Measures and Data Extraction  
Different outcomes were selected corresponding to the different domains of the paranoia as 
defence model. The first outcome was the magnitude to which negative events were attributed 
to external causes, especially other people (i.e., externalising attributional bias). With regard 
to this, the following ‘data extraction hierarchy’ (which specifies what data is preferable, and 
what data would be used if this could not be acquired) was chosen: the external-personal 
attribution score for negative events (a measure of the tendency to attribute negative events to 
other people – rather than to oneself or situational factors) > the personalising bias score (PB) 
(a measure of the tendency to attribute negative events to other people rather than to situational 
factors) > the internality attribution score for negative events (a measure of the tendency to 
attribute negative events to oneself – rather than to other people or situational factors) > the 
externalising bias score (EB) (a measure of the tendency to attribute negative, as opposed to 
positive events, to external causes – either to other people or situational factors). A decision 
had also been made to choose the Internal, Personal, and Situational Attributions Questionnaire 
(IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) (which can be used to calculate all four indices in the 
hierarchy above) over the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) 
(which can only be used to calculate the bottom two indices in the hierarchy above) if a study 
contained both of these measures. Moreover, participants’ self-ratings (rather than independent 
judges’ ratings) as to the extent to which their attributional statements represented an 
externalising/internalising attributional bias were prioritised.   
 The second outcome was the magnitude of explicit self-esteem, which was assessed in the first 
instance by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965); if data from this scale 
were not available, a conceptually equivalent variant was used. A decision had also been made 
to prioritise negative explicit self-esteem over positive explicit self-esteem if a total explicit 
self-esteem score was not reported or easily calculated. The third outcome was the magnitude 
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of implicit self-esteem, which was derived using a measure pertaining to the following data 
extraction hierarchy: the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998); the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; Stroop, 1935; Williams, Matthews, & MacLeod, 
1996); the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). If data from one of 
these measures were not available, a conceptually equivalent variant was used. The fourth 
outcome was the magnitude of the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem (i.e., 
discrepancy score). This was calculated from the choice of implicit and explicit self-esteem 
indices above using a method that allowed for the analysis of both within and between group 
differences, unless this was already reported. The fifth outcome was the magnitude of self-
esteem instability, which was assessed by the Experience Sampling Method (ESM; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) or the repeated application of a self-esteem measure such 
as the RSES. Further details of the data extraction hierarchies/procedures and the method for 
calculating discrepancy scores are provided in Appendices E and F, respectively. 
A spreadsheet piloted in a previous meta-analysis was used for data extraction. Data were 
extracted by PM who cross-checked with PH when necessary (e.g., both PM and PH 
independently extracted the data related to discrepancy scores following which any 
disagreements were adjudicated by consensus). For the analyses of group differences, means 
and associated standard deviations (SDs) related to the outcomes were extracted. Missing SDs 
were, where possible, calculated from t test values, P-values, F-values, standard errors (SEs) 
or confidence intervals (CIs) using equations specified in the Cochrane Handbook (Higgins & 
Green, 2011) or by Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2009). Alternatively, missing 
SDs were estimated from the mean SD of the other included studies (Furukawa, Barbui, 
Cipriani, Brambilla, & Watanabe, 2006). Correlation coefficients and related variance 
parameters were extracted for the analyses of paranoia severity and the different outcomes. 
Missing correlation coefficients were, where possible, calculated from regression coefficients 
(Kelley & Maxwell, 2003; Peterson & Brown, 2005) or from group differences between people 
with psychosis with and without current persecutory delusions using an online effect size 
calculator (Wilson, 2017). In all cases of missing data, however, corresponding authors were 






2.4. Meta-Analytic Calculations 
Meta-analyses were conducted using MetaXL software. For each meta-analysis of group 
differences, means and associated SDs were used to calculate the Hedges’ g standardised mean 
difference (SMD) and 95% CI. When a study had two or more relevant persecutory delusional 
groups (or two or more relevant control groups), these were combined into one using methods 
described in the Cochrane Handbook (Higgins & Green, 2011).   
For each meta-analysis of correlations, Pearson’s correlations were converted into Fisher’s Z 
and 95% CI. When Spearman correlations were reported, these were firstly converted into 
approximate Pearson’s correlations (Rupinski & Dunlap, 1996). Fisher’s Z estimates were then 
back-transformed to Pearson’s correlations to allow interpretation according to Cohen’s (1988) 
conventions. 
Using Cohen’s (1988) conventions for interpreting effect sizes, a Hedges’ g of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 
represent small, moderate, and large differences between groups, respectively, and a Pearson’s 
r of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 represent small, moderate, and large correlations, respectively. Expanding 
on these conventions, a Hedges’ g of 0.35 – 0.49 and a Pearson’s r of 0.2 – 0.29 was considered 
to represent a small-moderate effect size for the purpose of this study.   
Random-effects meta-analyses using the DerSimonian and Laird method (1986) were 
conducted for all outcomes, since these allow for true heterogeneity in effect size magnitude 
(due to differences in measurement, sample, etc.) (Borenstein et al., 2009). When there was 
less than moderate heterogeneity (i.e., I2 <40%), a sensitivity analysis using a fixed effect 
analysis was carried out but this made no substantive difference to the results. Moreover, 
publication bias was assessed through the Doi plot and LFK index for outcomes with at least 
10 studies (Higgins & Green, 2011), and, if potential publication bias was indicated (i.e., LFK 
index >2, which indicates major asymmetry), this was adjusted for using the ‘trim and fill’ 
method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000).  
 
2.5. Moderator Analyses 
Two prespecified moderators of effect size were examined: (1) matching of groups on 
demographics [age, gender, education (or IQ or a measure of intelligence if education was not 
reported), ethnicity]; (2) group differences in depression (operational definitions are given in 
Appendix G). Random effects meta-regression was used to test these moderator effects via 
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Comprehensive Meta-Analysis version 3 software, but not when fewer than 10 studies in a 
meta-analysis contained data related to the moderator of interest (Higgins & Green, 2011). Two 
prespecified moderator analyses were abandoned due to insufficient data, namely, the blinding 
of the outcome assessor and the stage of psychosis (early vs chronic). 
 
2.6. Risk of Bias and Study Quality 
In line with previous research (Larkin & Hutton, 2017), the methodological quality of all 
studies was assessed using an adapted version of the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality assessment tool (AHRQ; Williams, Plassman, Burke, Holsinger, & Benjamin, 2010) 
(see Appendix J). This tool allows for the consistent and transparent judgement of study quality 
parameters such as recruitment procedures, adequate reporting, degree of participant matching 
and sample size.  
The quality of the meta-analytical outcomes was assessed using an adapted version of the 
Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach 
(Guyatt et al., 2008) (see Appendix L). The overall GRADE rating (whether high, moderate, 
low or very low quality) incorporated considerations of the methodological quality of the 
studies, publication bias, inconsistency and imprecision.   
The methodological quality of all studies and meta-analytical outcomes were assessed by PM 
and checked by PH. Both PM and PH had completed the GRADE online learning modules 
(2017). 
 
2.7. Registration of Review Protocol and Subsequent Changes/Specifications 
The review protocol was registered in advance with the PROSPERO International Prospective 
Register of Systematic Reviews (registration number: CRD42016032782) (see Appendix A). 
A subsequent change was the decision to compare people with psychosis with current 
persecutory delusions to people with psychosis without persecutory delusions (and, if 
specified, grandiose delusions) rather than to people with psychosis without delusions in 
general. Another change was the decision to restrict non-psychotic psychiatric controls to 
people with depression. Additional changes included using meta-regression to assess whether 
group differences in depression moderated the different effect sizes, rather than using a ‘data 
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extraction hierarchy’ to prioritise the extraction of data where depression was adequately 
controlled, asssessing publication bias through the Doi plot and LFK index rather than using 
funnel plots (Barendregt & Doi, 2016), and modifying the data extraction procedures with 
regard to externalising attributional bias and explicit self-esteem. Two planned moderator 
analyses (namely, the blinding of the outcome assessor and the stage of psychosis) and an 
analysis of group comparisons in relation to self-esteem instability were abandoned due to 
insufficient data, and comparisons of group differences and correlations in implicit self-esteem 
were added. All of these decisions were made prior to analyses being undertaken. Further 
details are provided in Appendix B.    
 
3. Results 
As shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1, 63 studies were included in the analysis, of which 33, 36, 10, 
10 and 4 were used to test hypotheses on externalising attributional bias, explicit self-esteem, 
implicit self-esteem, discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem, and self-esteem 
instability, respectively. A list of excluded studies, with reasons for exclusion, and a detailed 
description of the characteristics of included studies are provided in Tables D.1 and H.1 in 
Appendices D and H, respectively. Of the included studies, 6 contained additional data that 
were not included in the original article; these data were obtained through contact with authors 
(Berry, Bucci, Kinderman, Emsley, & Corcoran, 2015; Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2009; 
McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005, 2007; Mehl et al., 2014; Sundag, Lincoln, Hartmann, & 
Moritz, 2015). Just over half of the studies (k = 32) took place in the United Kingdom, with 
the remainder occurring in Germany (k = 9), United States (k = 7), Australia (k = 5), Spain (k 
= 4), Canada (k = 3), Netherlands (k = 2) and Norway (k = 1). Dates of publication ranged 

















Independent datasets with useable data (n = 63) 
Datasets identified through previous reviews (n = 47) and additional searches (n = 16) 
To test hypotheses on: 
1. Externalising attributional bias (n = 33) 
2. Explicit self-esteem (n = 36) 
3. Implicit self-esteem (n = 10) 
4. Discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem (n = 10) 
5. Self-esteem instability (n = 4) 
(Several studies focused on more than one of these domains) 
Records identified through 
previous reviews (Garety & 
Freeman, 2013; Kesting & 
Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 
2014): (n = 74) 
Records identified through 
database search: 2012 to 10th 
September 2016 
(n = 2969) 
Additional records identified 
through other sources:  
Parallel literature search (n = 2) 
Reference searches (n = 1) 
Provided by authors (n = 6) 
Records remaining after 
screening (n = 103) 
Records excluded  
(n = 2949) 
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility (n = 103) 
Full-text articles excluded, with reasons: 
Sample not suitable (n = 9) 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem (n = 7) 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis (n = 7) 
No useable cross-sectional data (n = 3) 
No full-text available (n = 3) 
Potential independent 
datasets (n = 74) 
Useable data not provided or made available upon 
request (n = 4) 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants (n = 7) 
20 
 
   Table 1. Studies Included in the Meta-Analysisa 
Study Ref 
(First Author, Year) Participant Group/sb (N in Parentheses) 
Relevant 
Domain/s 
Aakre, 2009 Current PDs (18); Remitted PDs (30); Remitted non-PD delusions 
(17); Healthy (29) 
EAB 
Bentall, 1991 Current PDs (17); Depression (17); Healthy (17) EAB 
Bentall, 2005 Current PDs (16); Depression (16); Healthy (16) EAB 
Bentall, 2008 Current PDs (39); Remitted PDs (29); Depression (27); Healthy 
(33) 
ESE 
Ben-Zeev, 2009 Psychosis (194) ESE 
Berry, 2015c Current PDs (25); Healthy (25) EAB 
Candido, 1990 Non-depressed PDs (15); Depressed PDs (15); Depression (15) EAB; ESE 
Carlin, 2005 Current PDs (31); Non-PD psychosis (34) EAB 
Collett, 2016 Current PDs (21); Healthy (21) ESE 
Combs, 2009 Current PDs (32); Non-PD delusions (28); Healthy (50) EAB; ESE 





Psychosis (57) ESE; SEI 
Espinosa, 2014 
 








Current PM PDs (20); Depression (21); Healthy (32) EAB; ESE 
Freeman, 1998 Current PDs (28); Non-PD delusions (25); ESE 
Freeman, 2012 
 
Psychosis (130) ESE 
Garety, 2013 
 
Current PDs (118); Current PGDs (52); Non-PGD psychosis (43) ESE 
Humphreys, 2006 
 
Current PDs (15); Non-PD psychosis (20) EAB; ESE 
Janssen, 2006 
 
Psychosis (23) EAB 
Jolley, 2006 
 
Current PDs (7); Current PGDs (7); Non-PD psychosis (34) EAB 
Jones, 2010 Psychosis (87) ESE 
Kesting, 2011 
 



















Current PDs (13); Depression (11); Healthy (13) ESE 
Langdon, 2006 
 
Current PDs (19); Non-PD psychosis (15); Healthy (21) EAB 
Langdon, 2010 
 
Current PDs (35); Healthy (34) EAB 
Langdon, 2013 
 
Current PDs (23); Healthy (19) EAB 
Lee, 2004 
 
Current PDs (12); Healthy (12) EAB 
Lincoln, 2010 
 
Current PDs (25); Remitted PDs (25); High (25) & low (25) 
subclinical paranoia 
EAB; ESE 
Lyon, 1994 Current PDs (14); Depression (14); Healthy (14) EAB; ESE 
MacKinnon, 2011 
 




Current PDs (15); Non-PD psychosis (15); Healthy (16) EAB 
McCulloch, 2006 
 




Current PDs (13); Remitted PDs (12); Healthy (19) EAB 
McKay, 2007c 
 




Current PDs (23); Remitted PDs (18); Healthy (22) EAB 
Mehl, 2014c Psychosis (258); Healthy (51) EAB 
Melo, 2006 
 
Current PM PDs (26); Current BM PDs (18); Healthy (21) EAB 
Melo, 2013 
 
Current PM PDs (32); Current BM PDs (12); Healthy (25) EAB; ESE 
Menon, 2013 
 
Current delusions of reference (18); Healthy (17) EAB 
Merrin, 2007 
 
Current PDs (24); Depression (24); Healthy (24) EAB 
Mizrahi, 2008 
 
Psychosis (86) EAB 
Moritz, 2006 
 






Psychosis (35); Depression (18); Healthy (28) EAB 
Palmier-Claus, 2011 
 
Psychosis (256) SEI 
Randall, 2003 
 
Current PDs (18); Remitted PDs (14); Healthy (18) EAB 
Randjbar, 2011 
 
Current PDs (10); Non-PD psychosis (19); Healthy (33) ESE 
Ringer, 2014 
 
Psychosis (88) ESE 
Romm, 2011 
 









Current delusions (19); Non-PGD psychosis (12); Healthy (24) EAB 
Smith, 2005 
 




Current PDs (33); Remitted PDs (10); Healthy (33) ESE 
Thewissen, 2008 
 
Current PDs (30); Non-PD Psychosis (34); Remitted psychosis 













Psychosis (80) ESE 
Vazquez, 2008 
 






Non-depressed PDs (30); Depression (30); Healthy (30) ESE 
Warman, 2011 
 
Psychosis (30) ESE 
Wickham, 2015 
Psychosis (176) ESE 
Wittorf, 2012 
 
Current PDs (20); Depression (20); Healthy (55) 
 
EAB 
Abbreviations: BM, bad me; EAB, externalising attributional bias; ESE, explicit self-esteem; GDs, grandiose 
delusions; ISE, implicit self-esteem; PDs, persecutory delusions; PGDs, persecutory and grandiose delusions; PM, 
poor me; SED, self-esteem discrepancy; SEI, self-esteem instability. 
aA more detailed description of the characteristics of these included studies is provided in Table H.1 in Appendix H.  
bThe participants in the current and remitted delusional groups had psychosis.  
cAdditional data were provided by the authors. 
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3.1. Risk of Bias and Quality Ratings 
The overall AHRQ ratings related to the methodological quality of the studies are presented in 
Table 2 (outcome-specific study quality tables are presented in Table K.1 to Table K.17 in 
Appendix K), and overall GRADE ratings related to the quality of each of the meta-analytical 
outcomes are shown in the second from right-hand column of Table 3.   
Consistent methodological problems were a failure to provide prespecified power calculations 
and to blind researchers from group allocation. Another problem, albeit to a lesser extent, was 
a lack of matching groups on key demographic variables. 
Most of the studies selected their participants in a relatively unbiased way (although 
convenience samples were widely employed), provided adequate information regarding 
sample characteristics, and used valid and reliable measures to establish diagnosis/absence of 
diagnosis and rate PD severity. Measures used to assess the outcomes were also generally 
reliable and valid; however, just over a third of the measures used to assess externalising 
attributional bias were only judged to be partially reliable and valid, primarily because they 
represented the bottom two indices of the data extraction hierarchy (i.e., they failed to 


















  Table 2. Overview of Assessment of Study Methodological Quality 
 








































































Studies Containing Externalising Attributional Bias 
Aakre, 2009 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes  ── Yes Yes 
Bentall, 1991 Unclear Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Unclear ── No Yes 
Bentall, 2005 Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Partial ── No Yes 
Berry, 2015 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Unclear ── Yes ── No Yes 
Candido, 1990 Yes No No Partial Partial Yes ── Yes Partial ── No Yes 
Carlin, 2005 Partial Unclear No No Partial Partial ── ── Partial ── No Yes 
Combs, 2009  Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Diez-Alegria, 
2006 
Partial Partialb No Partial Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes ── No Yes 
Fear, 1996    Unclear Unclear No No Partial Partial Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Fornells-
Ambrojo, 2009 
Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Humphreys, 
2006 
Yes Unclear No  Partial Partial Yes ── ── Partial ── No Yes 












































































Jolley, 2006 Yes Unclear No No Yes Yes ── ── Partial ── Partiald Yes 
Kinderman, 
1997 
Partial Unclear No Partial Partial Yes Partial Partial Yes ── No Yes 
Langdon, 2006 Yes Partialb No Partial Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── Noe Yes 
Langdon, 2010 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
Langdon, 2013 Yes Partial No Yes  Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
Lee, 2004 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Lyon, 1994 Partial  Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Partial ── No Yes 
Martin, 2002 Yes Partialb No Yes  Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── Noe Yes 
McKay, 2005  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── Noe Yes 
Mehl, 2010  Yes  Yes  No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Unclear 
Mehl, 2014 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Partial ── Partiald Yes 
Melo, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Partial ── No Yes 
Melo, 2013 Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Unclear ── No Yes 
Menon, 2013 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 












































































Mizrahi, 2008 Yes ── No  Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Moritz, 2007 Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial ── Noe Yes 
Randall, 2003 Unclear No No Yes Partial Yes Unclear ── Yes ── Noe Yes 
Sharp, 1997 Partial Partialb No Partial Yes Yes Partial ── Partial ── No Yes 
Wittorf, 2012 Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial ── No Yes 
Studies Containing Explicit Self-Esteem 
 
Bentall, 2008 Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Ben-Zeev, 2009 Yes ── No  No Partial Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Candido, 1990 Yes No No Partial Partial Yes ── Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Collett, 2016  Yes Partial Yes Partial Partial Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Combs, 2009  Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Erickson, 2012 Yes ── No  Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Espinosa, 2014 Partial Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Fornells-
Ambrojo, 2009 
Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Freeman, 1998 Yes ── No  Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 












































































Garety, 2013  Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── Partiald Yes 
Humphreys, 
2006 
Yes Unclear No  Partial Partial Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Jones, 2010 Yes ── Noc  Partial Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── Partiald Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Kinderman, 
1994 
Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Unclear ── No Yes 
Kinderman, 
2003 
Yes Unclear No Partial Unclear Yes Partial Partial Partial ── No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Lyon, 1994 Partial  Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes ── No Yes 
MacKinnon, 
2011 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
McCulloch, 
2006 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
Melo, 2013 Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partialb No Partial Yes Yes Partial Partial Yes ── No Yes 












































































Ringer, 2014 Yes ── No Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Romm, 2011 Yes ── No Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Smith, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
Sundag, 2015 Partial Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes ── No Yes 
Thewissen,  
2008 
Yes ── No Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Udachina, 2012 Yes Partial No Yes Partial Yes Partial ── Yes ── No Yes 
Valiente, 2011   Partial Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Vass, 2015 Yes ── No  Yes Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partialb No Partial Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes ── No Yes 
Vorontsova, 
2013 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── No Yes 
Warman, 2011 Yes ── No Partial Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Wickham, 2015 Yes ── No Partial Yes Yes ── ── Yes ── No Yes 
Studies Containing Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem 
 Espinosa, 2014 Partial Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 
1994 














































































Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes Yes No Yes 
McCulloch, 
2006 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partialb No Partial Yes Yes Partial Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Smith, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ── Yes Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011   Partial Partialb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partialb No Partial Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Studies Containing Self-Esteem Instability 
Erickson, 2012 Yes ── No  Yes Yes Yes ── ── ── Yes No Yes 
Palmier-Claus, 
2011 
Yes ── No Yes Yes Yes ── ── ── Yes Partiald Yes 
Thewissen, 
2008 
Yes ── No Yes Yes Yes ── ── ── Yes No Yes 
Udachina, 2012 Yes Partial No Yes Partial Yes Partial ── ── Yes No Yes 
aGroup comparison studies only.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
bAn overall ‘partial’ rating was assigned when different group comparisons in the study received different ratings but when at least one of these group comparisons received a ‘partial’ or ‘yes’ rating (outcome-
specific study quality tables are presented in Table L.1 to Table L.17 in Appendix L).                                                                                                                                                                                        
cExplicit self-esteem was a secondary outcome so a power calculation would not be expected.                                                                                                                                                                                
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dRaters were blind to treatment allocation, but not clinical status.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
eIndependent judges’ ratings of the participants’ responses on the attributional style measure were blind to clinical status, but these were not applicable (self-ratings were our primary outcome).
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3.2. Meta-Analytic Outcomes 
Table 3 provides a summary of the meta-analytic outcomes. A selection of forest plots for 
outcomes related to externalising attributional bias, discrepancy between implicit and explicit 
self-esteem, and self-esteem instability are presented in Fig.2 to Fig.4, respectively (the forest 
plots related to all of the outcomes are shown in Fig. M.1 to Fig. M.17 in Appendix M).  
 
3.2.1. Externalising Attributional Bias 
The analyses revealed that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had a small-
moderately greater externalising attributional bias than healthy controls (k = 27; N = 1442; g 
= 0.48; 95% CI = 0.23 to 0.73; I2 = 80%; moderate quality evidence) and people with psychosis 
without persecutory delusions (k = 11; N = 480; g = 0.40; 95% CI = 0.12 to 0.68; I2 = 53%; 
moderate quality evidence). A large difference in externalising between people with psychosis 
with persecutory delusions and people with depression was observed (k = 10; N = 421; g = 
1.06; 95% CI = 0.48 to 1.63; I2 = 86%; moderate quality evidence). There was also a small 
positive correlation between paranoia severity and externalising attributional bias in people 
with psychosis (k = 21; N = 1128; r = 0.18; 95% CI = 0.08 to 0.27; I2 = 58%; moderate quality 
evidence). These results are all consistent with the predictions of the paranoia as defence model 
(see Fig. 2). 
 
3.2.2. Explicit Self-Esteem 
Consistent with the paranoia as defence model, people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had significantly greater explicit self-esteem than people with depression (k = 13; N 
= 647; g = 0.89; 95% CI = 0.51 to 1.28; I2 = 80%; moderate quality evidence). However, 
contrary to the model, people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had significantly 
lower explicit self-esteem compared to healthy controls (k = 22; N = 1256; g = -0.88; 95% CI 
= -1.10 to -0.66; I2 = 68%; high quality evidence) and similar explicit self-esteem to people 
with psychosis without persecutory delusions (k = 11; N = 644; g = -0.26; 95% CI = -0.54 to 
0.02; I2 = 58%; moderate quality evidence). Also contrary to the model, a small-moderate 
negative correlation between paranoia severity and explicit self-esteem in people with 
psychosis was observed (k = 23; N = 1866; r = -0.26; 95% CI = -0.34 to -0.17; I2 = 74%; high 
quality evidence).  
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3.2.3. Implicit Self-Esteem 
Consistent with the paranoia as defence model, people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had small-moderately lower implicit self-esteem than healthy controls (k = 10; N = 
593; g = -0.42; 95% CI = -0.72 to -0.11; I2 = 66%; low quality evidence) and similar implicit 
self-esteem to people with depression (k = 7; N = 398; g = -0.13; 95% CI = -0.47 to 0.21; I2 = 
60%; very low quality evidence). However, no significant difference in implicit self-esteem 
between people with psychosis with and without persecutory delusions was observed (k = 4; 
N = 167; g = -0.24; 95% CI = -0.77 to 0.30; I2 = 61%; low quality evidence), nor was there a 
significant correlation between paranoia severity and implicit self-esteem in people with 
psychosis (k = 4; N = 167; r = -0.13; 95% CI = -0.38 to 0.15; I2 = 62%; low quality evidence). 
 
3.2.4. Discrepancy between Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem 
People with psychosis with persecutory delusions had a significantly greater discrepancy 
between their explicit and implicit self-esteem than people with depression (k = 7; N = 398; g 
= 0.54; 95% CI = 0.28 to 0.80; I2 = 33%; moderate quality evidence) (see Fig. 3), which is 
consistent with the paranoia as defence model. However, there was no evidence that people 
with psychosis with persecutory delusions had a greater implicit-explicit self-esteem 
discrepancy than healthy individuals (k = 10; N = 592; g = -0.11; 95% CI = -0.40 to 0.18; I2 = 
63%; very low quality evidence) or people with psychosis without persecutory delusions (k = 
4; N = 165; g = 0.17; 95% CI = -0.19 to 0.53; I2 = 20%; moderate quality evidence), and no 
significant correlation was found between paranoia severity and discrepancy scores in people 
with psychosis (k = 4; N = 165; r = 0.09; 95% CI = -0.09 to 0.26; I2 = 15%; moderate quality 
evidence).     
 
3.2.5. Self-Esteem Instability 
As predicted by the paranoia as defence model, there was a significant positive correlation 
between paranoia severity and self-esteem instability in people with psychosis ((k = 4; N = 
508; r = 0.23; 95% CI = 0.11 to 0.34; I2 = 38%; high quality evidence) (see Fig. 4). Group 




3.3. Moderator Analyses 
The results of the moderator analyses are presented in the right-hand column of Table 3. Only 
one moderator was significant: differences in depression significantly influenced the effect size 
for explicit self-esteem (psychosis with persecutory delusions vs healthy controls) (B = -0.70; 
SE = 0.23; P = 0.002). When people with psychosis with persecutory delusions were more 
depressed, they also had lower explicit self-esteem. However, the goodness of fit test was 
significant (Q = 31.71; P = 0.003), which suggests that between-study differences in depression 
did not completely explain the between-group differences in self-esteem.  
 
3.4. Publication Bias 
The LFK indices for the assessment of publication bias for the meta-analytic outcomes are 
presented in the third from right-hand column of Table 3. Potential publication bias (i.e., LFK 
index >2) was indicated for the effect sizes related to externalising attributional bias and 
explicit self-esteem (psychosis with persecutory delusions vs depression), and, as such, the 
‘trim and fill’ method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) was applied for these two effect sizes. This 
method did not identify any potentially missing studies; thus, the point estimates remained the 
same. This could suggest that any publication bias was not likely to affect the overall magnitude 
of the effect sizes, although caution should be exercised in this interpretation as the ‘trim and 
fill’ method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) is known to perform poorly in the presence of substantial 





  Table 3. Summary of Meta-Analyses and Meta-Regression Moderator Analyses 
 
Outcome 






Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   




        
Difference in EAB: 
psychosis with 
persecutory delusions 
(PDs) vs healthy 
controls 
27 732 710 g = 0.48 
(0.23, 0.73) 
80%, P < 0.001 0.99 Moderate                  
-1 inconsistency 
Matching of 
groups:a N = 16/25; 
B = 0.45; SE = 0.29; 
P = 0.113 
Depression 
differences:b N = 17; 
B = 0.05; SE = 0.22; 
P = 0.833 
 
Difference in EAB: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
10 221 200 g = 1.06 
(0.48, 1.63) 
86%, P < 0.001 2.15 Moderate                    
-1 inconsistency                      
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations)        
+1 large effect  
                    
── 
Difference in EAB: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
11 232 248 g = 0.40 
(0.12, 0.68) 












Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   
N, B, SE, P-value 
Correlation between 
EAB and paranoia 
severity in people with 
psychosis 
21 1128 ── r = 0.18 (0.08, 
0.27) 





        
Difference in ESE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
healthy controls 
22 576 680 g = -0.88 (-
1.10, -0.66) 
68%, P < 0.001 0.18 High Matching of 
groups:a N = 12/21; 
B = -0.03; SE = 
0.24; P = 0.910 
Depression 
differences:b N = 15; 
B = -0.70; SE = 
0.23; P = 0.002 
 
Difference in ESE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
13 355 292 g = 0.89 
(0.51, 1.28) 
80%, P < 0.001 2.05 
 
Moderate                    
-1 inconsistency                        
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations)        
+1 large effect 
Matching of 
groups:a N = 3/12; B 
= -0.49; SE = 0.50; 
P = 0.326 
Difference in ESE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
11 411 233 g = -0.26 (-
0.54, 0.02) 












Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   
N, B, SE, P-value 
Correlation between 
ESE and paranoia 
severity in people with 
psychosis 
23 1866 ── r = -0.26 (-
0.34, -0.17) 
74%, P < 0.001 0.87 High ── 
Implicit self-esteem 
(ISE) 
        
Difference in ISE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
healthy controls 
10 270 323 g = -0.42 (-
0.72, -0.11) 
66%, P = 0.002 -0.23 Low                           
-1 imprecision             




Matching of groups:a       
N = 5/10; B = -0.30; 
SE = 0.32; P = 0.338 
Difference in ISE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
7 224 174 g = -0.13 (-
0.47, 0.21) 
60%, P = 0.02 ── Very low                    
-1 inconsistency        
-1 imprecision              
-1 quality (lack of 
matching, blinding 
& power 
calculations)    
 
── 
Difference in ISE: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
4 91 76 g = -0.24 (-
0.77, 0.30) 
61%, P = 0.054 ── Low                           
-1 inconsistency        
-1 imprecision               
── 
Correlation between ISE 
and paranoia severity in 
people with psychosis 
4 167 ── r = -0.13 (-
0.38, 0.15) 
62%, P = 0.049 ── Low                           
-1 inconsistency        











Hedges’ g or 
r (95% CI) 
Heterogeneity: 
I2, Chi2 P-value  
Publication bias: 
LFK index Quality (GRADE) 
Moderator:                   




        
Difference in DS: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
healthy controls 
10 269 323 g = -0.11 (-
0.40, 0.18) 
63%, P = 0.004 -1.28 Very low                    
-1 inconsistency        
-1 imprecision           





groups:a N = 5/10; B 
= 0.14; SE = 0.31; P 
= 0.663 
Difference in DS: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
depression 
7 224 174 g = 0.54 
(0.28, 0.80) 
33%, P = 0.176 ── Moderate                                      





Difference in DS: 
psychosis with PDs vs 
psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, GDs) 
4 90 75 g = 0.17 (-
0.19, 0.53) 
20%, P = 0.287 ── Moderate                  
-1 imprecision 
── 
Correlation between DS 
and paranoia severity in 
people with psychosis 
4 165 ── r = 0.09 (-
0.09, 0.26) 





        
Correlation between SEI 
and paranoia severity in 
people with psychosis 
4 508 ── r = 0.23 (0.11, 
0.34) 
38%, P = 0.186 ── High ── 
Abbreviations: GDs, grandiose delusions; PDs, persecutory delusions. 
a‘Matching of groups’ was a binary moderator (0 = unmatched, 1 = matched). N represents the number of studies where the moderator =1. 
b‘Depression differences’ (quantified using the SMD, d) was a continuous moderator. N represents the number of studies in the analysis. 
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    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.54  ( -1.04, -0.03)      4.0
  -0.41  ( -0.73, -0.09)      4.4
  -0.34  ( -0.84,  0.17)      4.0
  -0.21  ( -0.73,  0.30)      4.0
  -0.17  ( -0.88,  0.54)      3.5
  -0.15  ( -0.82,  0.51)      3.6
  -0.12  ( -0.75,  0.50)      3.7
  -0.11  ( -0.72,  0.50)      3.7
  -0.02  ( -0.67,  0.64)      3.6
   0.05  ( -0.65,  0.76)      3.5
   0.07  ( -0.49,  0.64)      3.8
   0.43  ( -0.19,  1.05)      3.7
   0.46  ( -0.02,  0.94)      4.1
   0.48  (  0.23,  0.73)    100.0
   0.55  ( -0.01,  1.11)      3.9
   0.70  (  0.12,  1.27)      3.8
   0.71  (  0.22,  1.20)      4.0
   0.77  (  0.18,  1.37)      3.8
   0.81  (  0.34,  1.28)      4.1
   0.85  (  0.20,  1.50)      3.6
   0.85  (  0.24,  1.47)      3.7
   0.89  (  0.43,  1.36)      4.1
   0.96  (  0.25,  1.68)      3.4
   1.07  (  0.21,  1.94)      3.1
   1.09  (  0.28,  1.89)      3.2
   1.14  (  0.47,  1.82)      3.6
   2.11  (  1.22,  2.99)      3.0

















    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.34  ( -0.97,  0.28)     10.5
   0.10  ( -0.47,  0.67)     10.7
   0.38  ( -0.20,  0.95)     10.7
   0.59  ( -0.03,  1.22)     10.5
   0.68  (  0.21,  1.15)     11.1
   0.81  (  0.11,  1.51)     10.2
   1.06  (  0.48,  1.63)    100.0
   1.41  (  0.57,  2.25)      9.5
   1.86  (  1.11,  2.61)      9.9
   2.15  (  1.22,  3.07)      9.2










Fig. 2. Forest plots for analyses of externalising attributional bias (EAB). (A) Forest plot for comparison of EAB 
between people with psychosis with persecutory delusions (PDs) and healthy controls. (B) Forest plot for comparison 
of EAB between people with psychosis with PDs and people with depression. (C) Forest plot for comparison of EAB 
between people with psychosis with PDs and people with psychosis without PDs [and, if specified, grandiose 






















    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.16  ( -0.84,  0.52)      8.6
  -0.14  ( -0.94,  0.66)      7.2
   0.00  ( -0.49,  0.48)     11.4
   0.02  ( -0.68,  0.72)      8.4
   0.06  ( -0.65,  0.78)      8.2
   0.40  (  0.12,  0.68)    100.0
   0.50  ( -0.17,  1.17)      8.8
   0.51  ( -0.06,  1.07)     10.2
   0.63  (  0.12,  1.14)     11.0
   0.66  (  0.11,  1.22)     10.4
   0.76  (  0.12,  1.41)      9.1




























    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.19  ( -0.56,  0.24)      3.3
  -0.17  ( -0.37,  0.04)      6.4
  -0.08  ( -0.41,  0.27)      4.2
  -0.08  ( -0.47,  0.33)      3.4
  -0.01  ( -0.38,  0.36)      3.8
   0.00  ( -0.24,  0.24)      5.8
   0.01  ( -0.34,  0.36)      4.1
   0.01  ( -0.43,  0.45)      2.9
   0.03  ( -0.33,  0.39)      3.9
   0.10  ( -0.02,  0.22)      8.0
   0.11  ( -0.23,  0.43)      4.3
   0.18  (  0.08,  0.27)    100.0
   0.25  ( -0.03,  0.49)      5.2
   0.25  ( -0.09,  0.53)      4.4
   0.27  (  0.04,  0.48)      5.9
   0.29  (  0.05,  0.50)      5.8
   0.30  (  0.06,  0.51)      5.8
   0.33  (  0.05,  0.56)      5.1
   0.37  (  0.13,  0.57)      5.6
   0.39  ( -0.03,  0.69)      3.3
   0.51  (  0.25,  0.70)      4.9





Fig. 3. Forest plot for comparison of discrepancy scoresa between people with psychosis with persecutory delusions 
(PDs) and people with depression. 
 









































    g (95% CI)          % Weight
   0.20  ( -0.50,  0.89)     10.7
   0.20  ( -0.19,  0.59)     22.4
   0.37  ( -0.38,  1.12)      9.5
   0.50  ( -0.07,  1.08)     14.0
   0.54  (  0.28,  0.80)    100.0
   0.70  (  0.23,  1.16)     18.3
   0.83  (  0.34,  1.31)     17.3











    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
   0.14  (  0.02,  0.26)     40.2
   0.19  ( -0.12,  0.47)     12.2
   0.21  ( -0.05,  0.45)     16.1
   0.23  (  0.11,  0.34)    100.0





4.1. Summary of Findings 
The current study provided, to our knowledge, the first robust meta-analytical investigation of 
the widely-studied paranoia as defence model proposed by Bentall et al. (2001). Specifically, 
we conducted a meta-analysis and systematic review of 63 studies to test key predictions of 
this model.  
We found a number of findings which were either consistent, inconsistent or inconclusive in 
relation to the paranoia as defence model and its predictions. With regard to model-consistent 
findings, moderate quality meta-analytical evidence showed support for the predictions 
regarding externalising attributional bias. Specifically, people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had a greater externalising attributional bias – in the large range – than people with 
depression. People with psychosis with persecutory delusions also had a small-moderately 
greater externalising attributional bias than healthy controls and people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions. Moreover, there was a small positive correlation between paranoia 
severity and externalising attributional bias in people with psychosis. A particularly noteworthy 
finding was the moderate quality evidence that people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had a moderately greater discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem (with 
the latter being higher) than people with depression. Consistent with this finding, people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions had similar implicit self-esteem and greater explicit self-
esteem – in the large range – compared to people with depression. People with psychosis with 
persecutory delusions also had small-moderately lower implicit self-esteem than healthy 
controls. While the evidence for this explicit self-esteem comparison was of moderate quality, 
the evidence for these implicit self-esteem comparisons was less reliable. Finally, there was 
high quality evidence of a small-moderate positive correlation between paranoia severity and 
self-esteem instability in people with psychosis.  
In regards to model-inconsistent findings, high quality meta-analytical evidence showed that 
people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had lower explicit self-esteem – in the large 
range – than healthy controls. There was also high quality evidence of a small-moderate 
negative correlation between paranoia severity and explicit self-esteem in people with 
psychosis. Moreover, there was moderate quality evidence that people with psychosis with 
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persecutory delusions had similar explicit self-esteem to people with psychosis without 
persecutory delusions.  
Regarding model-inconclusive findings, low quality meta-analytical evidence did not reveal a 
significant difference in implicit self-esteem between people with psychosis with and without 
persecutory delusions or a significant correlation between paranoia severity and implicit self-
esteem in people with psychosis. However, only four studies with a relatively small number of 
participants (N = 167) reported data on these outcomes, thereby limiting any conclusions that 
might be drawn. Similarly, no significant difference in implicit-explicit self-esteem 
discrepancy between people with psychosis with and without persecutory delusions was 
observed, nor was there a significant correlation between paranoia severity and discrepancy 
scores in people with psychosis, but, once again, only four studies – with an even smaller 
number of participants (N = 165) – reported data on these outcomes. Moreover, there was no 
significant difference in implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy between people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions and healthy controls, although the evidence for this 
comparison was very low in quality.   
The results of the moderator analyses indicated the importance of considering the role of 
depression in the likelihood that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions 
demonstrated low explicit self-esteem compared to healthy controls. Indeed, when people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions were more depressed, they also had lower explicit self-
esteem. However, the between-study differences in depression did not completely explain the 
between-group differences in explicit self-esteem. Moreover, there was no evidence for the 
contribution of other tested moderators.  
 
4.2. Discussion of Findings 
We will now consider the merit of four different possible explanations for the findings above. 
The first possible explanation we will consider is that these findings are consistent with the 
‘strong’ version of the paranoia as defence model. The strong version proposes that persecutory 
delusions successfully fulfil their defensive function and, as such, not only should people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions have an externalising attributional bias but they should 
also have normal or high explicit self-esteem and low implicit self-esteem (Garety & Freeman, 
1999). The second possible explanation we will consider is that these findings are consistent 
with the ‘weak’ version of the paranoia as defence model. In contrast to the strong version, the 
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weak version proposes that persecutory delusions only partially fulfil their defensive function 
and, as such, people with psychosis with persecutory delusions should simply have an implicit-
explicit self-esteem discrepancy in addition to an externalising attributional bias (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999), which only partially protects explicit self-esteem. The third possible 
explanation we will consider is that these findings are consistent with the model by Freeman 
et al. (2002) which incorporates the attributional bias element of the paranoia as defence model 
but which suggests that persecutory delusions are a direct reflection of low self-esteem and 
associated emotional processes of the individual and not a defence. As such, people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions should have both low implicit and explicit self-esteem 
without having an implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy. The fourth possible explanation 
we will consider is that both the weak version of the paranoia as defence model and the model 
by Freeman et al. (2002) are supported to varying degrees by these findings, and, as such, both 
models are required to make sense of them.     
We do not believe that the findings above support the strong version of the paranoia as defence 
model. This explanation is refuted by the finding that people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had lower explicit self-esteem than healthy controls. This explanation is further 
contradicted by the findings that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had lower 
explicit self-esteem than people with psychosis without persecutory delusions, and that there 
was a negative correlation between paranoia severity and explicit self-esteem in people with 
psychosis. These findings indicate that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions do 
not have normal or high explicit self-esteem, thereby refuting a central prediction of the strong 
version. It is worth noting that this conclusion is largely consistent with those of three previous 
systematic reviews (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 2014) 
and provides clear evidence that explicit self-esteem is skewed towards the negative in people 
with psychosis with persecutory delusions.  
However, we believe our findings do provide support for the weak version of the paranoia as 
defence model. First, the findings that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had a 
greater externalising attributional bias compared to healthy controls, people with depression 
and those with psychosis without persecutory delusions, as well as the finding of a positive 
correlation between paranoia severity and externalising attributional bias in people with 
psychosis, confirm the presence of the externalising attributional bias in people with psychosis 
with persecutory delusions, which is necessary to support the weak version. This is also 
particularly important given a previous systematic review concluded the evidence on such a 
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bias existing was inconsistent and divergent (Garety & Freeman, 2013). Second, people with 
psychosis with persecutory delusions had a greater implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy 
than people with depression, which is also necessary to support the weak version. Indeed, while 
people with psychosis with persecutory delusions had lower implicit and explicit self-esteem 
than healthy controls, they had similar implicit self-esteem and greater explicit self-esteem 
compared to people with depression. This is also particularly important given that three 
previous systematic reviews failed to identify such a discrepancy in people with psychosis with 
persecutory delusions (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 
2014). Unlike these reviews, however, we were able to apply meta-analysis to this question, 
thus overcoming the power limitations of the individual studies. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with the weak version, which provides for scenarios where persecutory delusions 
only partially fulfil their defensive function. Indeed, given that people with psychosis with 
persecutory delusions had lower explicit self-esteem than healthy controls, it appears that 
persecutory delusions, which reflect an externalising attributional bias, do not fully preserve 
explicit self-esteem. However, it appears that they prevent explicit self-esteem from sinking to 
the even lower level of implicit self-esteem, as evidenced by the aforementioned implicit-
explicit self-esteem discrepancy finding. Moreover, the finding that self-esteem instability was 
positively correlated with paranoia severity in people with psychosis also appears to be 
consistent with the weak version, as this provides a plausible explanation for some of the 
failures of the defence. It also provides a plausible explanation for the inconsistent results on 
the relationship between self-esteem and paranoia previously reported (Bentall et al., 2001; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999).   
We also believe that the findings above support the model by Freeman et al. (2002). In 
particular, the findings that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions were 
characterised by both low implicit self-esteem (compared to healthy controls and people with 
depression) and low explicit self-esteem (compared to healthy controls and people with 
psychosis without persecutory delusions), as well as the finding of a negative correlation 
between paranoia severity and explicit self-esteem in people with psychosis, at least partially 
support the idea that persecutory delusions are a direct reflection of low self-esteem and 
associated emotional processes of the individual (Freeman et al., 2002). In addition, the results 
of the moderator analyses, which indicated that people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions had lower explicit self-esteem if they were more depressed, may also lend partial 
support to this idea. Indeed, it has been argued that where depression and explicit self-esteem 
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are related in this way, this favours an account which invokes the role of ‘normal emotional 
processes’ (Freeman et al., 1998). However, the aforementioned implicit-explicit self-esteem 
discrepancy finding challenges the idea that no defence processes are activated, as proposed 
by the model of Freeman et al. (2002). Therefore, these findings, when considered in their 
totality, do not provide full support for Freeman et al. (2002), who claim that self-esteem has 
only a direct effect on paranoia. Perhaps, as with the paranoia as defence model, they support 
a ‘weaker’ version of this model. 
In summary, we conclude that both the weak version of the paranoia as defence model and the 
model by Freeman et al. (2002) are required to make full sense of the findings above. While 
the weak version of the paranoia as defence model explains the externalising attributional bias 
findings, the low implicit self-esteem findings, the implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy 
finding and the self-esteem instability finding, the model by Freeman et al. (2002) has added 
explanatory power in terms of accounting for the low implicit and explicit self-esteem findings; 
these are not inconsistent with the weak version of the paranoia as defence model, but they are 
specifically predicted by the model of Freeman et al. (2002).  
 
4.3. Strengths and Limitations 
This study has a number of strengths. First, we conducted a meta-analysis of 63 studies, which 
enabled us to overcome the power limitations of individual studies and therefore reconcile 
inconsistent and divergent findings. Systematic reviews, which generally provide an overall 
picture of trends in significant and non-significant findings, are very limited in this respect, 
since many individual studies lack the power to detect small to moderate effects (due to 
resource constraints, etc.) (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). Second, we 
employed a method for calculating the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem 
that allowed for the analysis of both within and between group differences. It has been argued 
that this is necessary to adequately test the hypothesis of discrepancy (Kesting et al., 2011; 
Vazquez et al., 2008), but the results of studies on discrepancies between implicit and explicit 
self-esteem reported in previous systematic reviews have been primarily based on the 
comparison of the results between groups for each type of self-esteem separately (Garety & 
Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 2014). Third, we pre-registered our 
protocol in the public domain. As noted elsewhere (Booth et al., 2011; Quintana, 2015), 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses are susceptible to risks of selective reporting bias and 
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hypothesising after the results are known. While we made some changes to our protocol after 
registering it (largely due to new information and increasing quality and robustness), pre-
registration ensures complete transparency about these, thereby allowing readers to judge for 
themselves whether they were driven by issues relating to new information, quality, robustness 
or bias. Fourth, our protocol was approved in advance by exponents of both the paranoia as 
defence model (RB) and the model by Freeman et al. (2002) (DF). This increased the likelihood 
of accurately testing the predictions of the paranoia as defence model, ensured a balanced 
perspective and reduced the risk of bias. Finally, we obtained unpublished data from 6 authors, 
thereby reducing the risk of publication bias. Inclusion of unpublished data is particularly 
important for systematic reviews and meta-analyses of observational studies given the greater 
threat of publication bias with observational research than other types of research (e.g., 
treatment effectiveness research) (Easterbrook, Berlin, Gopalan, & Matthews, 1991).    
This study also has some limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, resource 
constraints meant that we were limited to English language studies. However, given the 
substantial number of studies included in the meta-analysis, we believe that it is unlikely that 
data excluded for this reason would have had a substantial impact upon the reported effect 
sizes. Second, our assessment of study methodological quality revealed that just over a third of 
the measures used to assess externalising attributional bias were only partially reliable and 
valid, primarily because they failed to distinguish between external-personal and external-
situational attributions. This distinction is important because Bentall et al. (2001) postulated 
that people with psychosis with persecutory delusions make many external-personal 
attributions for negative events but few external-situational ones. Indeed, they hypothesised 
that external-personal attributions for negative events lead to paranoia but that external-
situational ones are psychologically benign (Bentall et al., 2001). However, we decided, a 
priori, to adopt a deliberately inclusive approach for this meta-analysis, as has been 
recommended (Bernan & Parker, 2002). We adopted this inclusive approach because we 
believe the greater transparency, informational value and external validity justifies the potential 
disadvantages of increased conceptual and statistical heterogeneity. Third, there was an 
insufficient number of studies to carry out some of the planned moderator analyses and tests 
of publication bias. However, in many instances, we were able to check for publication bias 
and test for moderators of effect size including matching of groups on demographics and group 
differences in depression. Finally, while the meta-analytical evidence was of reasonable quality 
for most of the analyses, the evidence for the analyses regarding implicit self-esteem was less 
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reliable. This may have been influenced by the methodological problems related to the 
measurement of implicit self-esteem, as previously noted (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 
2000; Kesting & Lincoln, 2014; Tiernan et al., 2014).     
 
4.4. Recommendations 
The attributions relevant to the paranoia as defence model that were explored in this study were 
external attributions for negative events. However, there are other arguably relevant 
attributions to the paranoia as defence model, specifically internal attributions for positive 
events (i.e., attributing positive events to oneself) (Bentall et al., 1994). Previously, it was 
argued that external attributions for negative events, especially when combined with internal 
attributions for positive events (i.e., self-serving bias), act to defend against the effects of low 
implicit self-esteem (Bentall et al., 1994) in the context of persecutory delusions. While 
previous systematic reviews found less evidence that people with persecutory delusions make 
internal attributions for positive events in comparison to external attributions for negative 
events (Garety & Freeman, 1999, 2013), meta-analytical investigation of the effect sizes related 
to internal attributions for positive events in people with persecutory delusions may now be 
useful to overcome the limitations of the reduced power of individual studies to detect effects.  
A topic that has gained attention has been the hypothesis of two distinct types of paranoia: 
‘poor-me’ and ‘bad me’ (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler, & Maguire, 2005; Trower & 
Chadwick, 1995). While people from both subgroups feel persecuted, they differ in their 
perceived deservedness of persecution. People with bad-me paranoia blame themselves and 
believe that their persecution is deserved, whereas those with poor-me paranoia believe that 
their persecution is undeserved and perceive others as bad. Relating to the paranoia as defence 
model, investigators have suggested that paranoia is a defence against low self-esteem reaching 
consciousness among people with poor-me rather than bad-me paranoia (Chadwick et al., 2005; 
Trower & Chadwick, 1995). While we were not able to test for the moderating effect of 
perceived deservedness of persecution, future meta-analyses may be useful to address this 
question. Preliminary evidence suggests that the externalising attributional bias is stronger 
among people with poor-me rather than bad-me paranoia (Melo, Taylor, & Bentall, 2006). 
Importantly though, the central test of the two types of paranoia has not been carried out: an 
examination of the difference in implicit-explicit self-esteem discrepancy between people with 
poor-me and bad-me paranoia. It would be important that such an examination employs a 
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method for calculating the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem that allows 
for the analysis of both within and between group differences, as per previous research (Kesting 
et al., 2011).  
 
4.5. Clinical Implications 
The finding of an externalising attributional bias in people with psychosis with persecutory 
delusions highlights a key target for psychological interventions. Different techniques can 
potentially modify the externalising attributional bias. Whereas Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) takes a ‘front door approach’ by attempting to directly challenge this bias (Beck 
& Rector, 2000), Metacognitive Training (MCT) takes a ‘back door approach’ by attempting 
to indirectly alter the metacognitive infrastructure related to this bias (Moritz & Woodward, 
2007). Importantly though, studies have yet to confirm whether CBT, MCT or another 
psychological therapy can specifically modify the externalising attributional bias and whether 
such modification can reduce persecutory delusions and improve other treatment outcomes.  
The finding that persecutory delusions can have a defensive function for people with psychosis 
suggests consideration about the optimal sequencing of interventions. Indeed, interventions 
which are designed to modify the externalising attributional bias, but do not first address the 
underlying low self-esteem, may risk causing a worsening of mood. To avoid causing harm, 
we recommend to improve self-esteem first before any attempt to modify the externalising 
attributional bias. 
Surprisingly, we do not yet have brief focused interventions that are clearly effective in 
improving self-esteem in psychosis, let alone persecutory delusions. Although a number of 
trials have examined the effect of specifically targeting self-esteem in psychosis, change in this 
mechanism has either not been achieved (e.g., Lecomte et al., 1999; McCay et al., 2007; 
Schrank et al., 2015; Yanos, Roe, West, Smith, & Lysaker, 2012) or methodological problems 
with the trial has made interpretation difficult (e.g., lack of rater blinding; Hall & Tarrier, 
2003). Although some trials of multi-component treatments have shown positive effects on 
self-esteem, lack of blinding (e.g., Gumley et al., 2006; Lysaker, Bond, Davis, Bryson, & Bell, 
2005; O’Connor et al., 2007) and/or provision of a complex intervention which addresses a 
range of possible change mechanisms in addition to self-esteem (Barrowclough et al., 2006; 
Fung, Tsang, & Cheung, 2011; Leclerc, Lesage, Ricard, Lecomte, & Cyr, 2000; Tania Lecomte 
et al., 2008; Tarrier et al., 2014) makes it difficult to know what accounted for this change.  
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One recent single-blind trial (N = 30) did find a moderate to large benefit of a brief (8-week) 
focused intervention on the self-esteem of people with persecutory delusions, when compared 
to usual care alone at end of treatment. The intervention involved keeping a positive data log, 
reviewing strengths, normalising and challenge of negative thoughts and increasing positive 
activities. Although the effect of this on self-esteem was not significant when reassessed a 
month later, this may have been because this small trial had sufficient power to detect only 
large effects (Freeman et al., 2014).  
Moreover, our findings suggest that we need to develop interventions that successfully modify 
implicit self-esteem in addition to explicit self-esteem. Trials of such interventions might 
consider measuring both implicit and explicit self-esteem as outcomes. 
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A.        Protocol 
 
Title: Persecutory delusions and the attribution–self-representation cycle: protocol for a systematic review and 
meta-analysis. 
 
Reviewers: Philip Murphy, Richard Bentall, Daniel Freeman, Paul Hutton 
 
Review question(s) 
Magnitude of externalising attributional bias: 
1) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions have a greater externalising 
attributional bias than individuals with non-psychotic mental health problems?  
2) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions have a greater externalising 
attributional bias than healthy individuals?  
3) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions have a greater externalising 
attributional bias than individuals with non-affective psychosis without delusions?  
4) Is there a positive correlation between persecutory delusion severity and the degree of externalising 
attributional bias?  
Magnitude of explicit self-esteem: 
5) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions have greater explicit self-esteem 
than individuals with non-psychotic mental health problems?  
6) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions have greater explicit self-esteem 
than healthy individuals?  
7) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions have greater explicit self-esteem 
than individuals with non-affective psychosis without delusions?  
8) Is there a positive correlation between persecutory delusion severity and explicit self-esteem?  
Magnitude of discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem: 
9) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions demonstrate a greater discrepancy 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem than individuals with non-psychotic mental health problems?  
10) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions demonstrate a greater 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem than healthy individuals?  
11) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions demonstrate a greater 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem than individuals with non-affective psychosis 
without delusions?  
12) Is there a positive correlation between persecutory delusion severity and the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem?  
Magnitude of fluctuation in self-esteem: 
13) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions show greater self-esteem fluctuation 
than individuals with non-psychotic mental health problems?  
14) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions show greater self-esteem fluctuation 
than healthy individuals?  
15) Do individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory delusions show greater self-esteem fluctuation 
than individuals with non-affective psychosis without delusions?  
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16) Is there a positive correlation between persecutory delusion severity and self-esteem fluctuation?  
 
Searches 
A librarian experienced in database searches will be consulted on the search strategy which is yet to be 
finalised but will include the following databases: PsycINFO, MEDLINE, EMBASE and Web of Science. 
Hand searches of references in eligible articles and key review articles will also be undertaken. 
As a final step, all corresponding authors of included articles will be contacted and asked if they are aware 
of any further studies potentially meeting our criteria, including both recently published and unpublished 
studies. 
Only English language studies will be included. 
 
Types of study to be included 
Case-control, cross-sectional correlational and prospective designs will be included. Baseline data from 
experimental designs and intervention trials may also be included; however, outcome data or data that has been 
manipulated in these types of studies will be excluded. 
 
Condition or domain being studied 
Non-affective psychosis, persecutory delusions and the attribution–self-representation cycle. 
 
Participants/ population 
Group comparison studies will be required to recruit a sample of individuals with non-affective psychosis (e.g., 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, schizophreniform disorder, psychosis NOS) where at least half of the 
sample have persecutory delusions. Correlational studies will also be required to recruit a sample of individuals 
with non-affective psychosis and to report correlational data between a measure of paranoia/persecutory 
ideation and the construct of interest. 
Exclusion criteria include studies where over half of the sample have co-morbid diagnoses of an intellectual 
disability, bipolar disorder, a primary diagnosis of substance-induced psychosis or psychosis that is secondary 






Both psychiatric and non-clinical controls will be included. 
 
Context 







1) The first primary outcome is the magnitude to which external attributions for negative events are made. 
Attributions are typically measured via questionnaires such as the Internal, Personal, and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) and the Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) but they have also been measured in other ways such as by coding the natural 
speech of participants (Craig et al., 2004). Included studies will be required to measure attributions in one of 
these ways or to employ a conceptually equivalent measure. In the event that a study contains more than one 
index of attributions, the following hierarchy will be used to decide on the order of preference for inclusion of 
indices of attributions: IPSAQ > ASQ. If a study does not contain one of these indices but contains a 
conceptual equivalent, this will be used as long as it meets minimal criteria for reliability and validity. 
2) The second primary outcome is the magnitude of explicit self-esteem. (It is worth noting that a broad 
concept of self-esteem will be used, with self-esteem referring to views - positive or negative - about the self.) 
The most common explicit measure of self-esteem appears to be the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; 
Lyon et al., 1994). Other explicit indices of self-esteem include the Multidimensional Self-Esteem Inventory 
(MSEI; O'Brien & Epstein, 1998), the Self-Concept Questionnaire (SCQ; Robson, 1989) and the 'positive self' 
and 'negative self' subscales of the Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006). Included studies will 
be required to include one of these explicit indices or a conceptual equivalent. In the event that a study 
contains more than one explicit index of self-esteem, the RSES will be the preference. If a study does not 
contain the RSES but contains a conceptual equivalent, this will be used as long as it meets minimal criteria 
for reliability and validity.  
3) The third primary outcome is the magnitude of the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem. A 
variety of indices of implicit and explicit self-esteem have been employed. Some of the explicit indices of self-
esteem are referred to above including the RSES. Commonly used implicit indices of self-esteem include the 
Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), the Emotional Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935; Williams et 
al., 1996) and the go/no-go association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Included studies will be required 
to include one of these implicit indices (or a conceptual equivalent) and one of these explicit indices (or a 
conceptual equivalent) for a comparison to be made. In the event that a study contains more than one implicit 
index and/or more than one explicit index of self-esteem, the RSES will once again be the preference for the 
explicit indices whereas the following hierarchy will be used for the implicit indices: IAT > Emotional Stroop 
Task > GNAT. As above, conceptually equivalent variants, which meet minimal criteria for reliability and 
validity, will be used should a study not contain these indices.  
4) The fourth primary outcome is the magnitude of fluctuation in self-esteem. To assess this, studies have 
primarily used the Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) or have repeated 
the application of a self-esteem measure such as the RSES. Included studies will be required to assess self-
esteem fluctuation in one of these ways. If an alternative method comes to light, it will be considered. Cross-
sectional correlational studies, which have employed measures such as the Self-Esteem Instability Scale (SEIS; 





Data extraction, (selection and coding) 
Selection of studies for the review will be conducted by the first author (Philip Murphy) against the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. Decision-making will be recorded and checked with the study supervisor, 
Dr Paul Hutton. 
Extracted data will include sample characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, clinical diagnosis, stage of 
illness, sample source and location), study design, measure/s of externalising attributional style or self-
esteem, and outcome data (e.g., means, standard deviations, proportions, correlations and regression weights 
where applicable). 
If data is not reported in usable format, the relevant authors will be contacted initially. If they do not 
reply, effect sizes will be attempted to be derived from other statistics (e.g., t test values, P-values, F-
values) using equations specified in the Cochrane Handbook or by Borenstein and colleagues. 
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The extraction of data where depression is adequately controlled for will be prioritised. Therefore, the 
following hierarchy will be used to decide on the order of data to be prioritised in the analyses: data of 
estimates involving a non-depressed persecutory-deluded group and a non-depressed control group > data of 
estimates involving a persecutory-deluded group (with varying or unspecified levels of depression) which have 
been adjusted for depression scores > data of estimates involving a depressed persecutory-deluded group and a 
depressed non-persecutory-deluded group > data of estimates involving a persecutory-deluded group (with 
varying or unspecified levels of depression) which have not been adjusted for depression scores. Any 
moderator analysis could then examine whether the estimates belonging to the last category are different from 
the estimates belonging to the first three categories. 
 
Risk of bias (quality) assessment 
A methodological quality assessment tool for observational research, adapted from one used by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ; Williams, Plassman, Burke, Holsinger, & Benjamin, 2010) will be 
used. In addition, the GRADE approach will be used to provide an assessment of quality at the outcome level. 
The GRADE approach will be adapted so that observational studies will not automatically be marked down for 
quality. This is because all studies included in the proposed review will be observational. 
The reviewer carrying out the quality assessments will complete the GRADE online training 
(http://cebgrade.mcmaster.ca). Quality assessments will be presented descriptively to guide the interpretation 
of findings. In addition, specific aspects of methodology will be tested as moderators of effect sizes. These 
will include blinding and the matching of participants on demographics. 
 
Strategy for data synthesis 
Hedge's g will be used to determine effect sizes for group differences on continuous outcomes. Where studies 
provide multiple comparisons between a group of individuals with non-affective psychosis with persecutory 
delusions and two or more control groups, a single weighted effect size, taking into account the non-
independence in the data, will be calculated and used in the meta-analyses. However, control groups will only 
be combined if it is reasonable to do so (e.g., if both groups are non-psychotic clinical groups, or both groups 
are non-clinical control groups). It would not be reasonable to combine certain control groups (e.g., a psychotic 
control group with a non-psychotic clinical control group, or a non-psychotic clinical control group with a non-
clinical control group). In addition, comparisons with either psychiatric controls and non-clinical controls will 
be explored separately. 
For the correlational analyses, Pearson's correlations will be converted into Fisher's Z. Spearman's 
correlations will first be converted into approximate Pearson's correlations. 
Every effort will be made to transform any other reported data into usable metric, following procedures 
outlined in the Cochrane Handbook or by Borenstein and colleagues. For all effects, 95% confidence intervals 
will be calculated and statistical significance will be set at P = 0.05. 
Publication bias will be tested for using funnel plots and applying the Trim and Fill method. Heterogeneity 
will be assessed via the Q-statistic and quantified via the I-squared statistic. 
Random-effects meta-analyses will be undertaken as some degree of heterogeneity is expected across studies. 
Nonetheless, when there is less than moderate heterogeneity (i.e., I-squared statistic < 40%), a sensitivity 
analysis will be carried out to examine the difference between fixed-effects and randon-effects models. 
Where it is not possible to perform a meta-analyses because of limited studies, a narrative review will be 
undertaken of the studies identified. 
 
Analysis of subgroups or subsets 
Depending on statistical power and number of studies, the moderators of effect size intended to be tested 
are as follows: 
1) The stage of the psychosis (early psychosis vs. chronic psychosis);  
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2) Whether depression was controlled for;  
3) The blinding of the researcher during the administration of the measure/s;  
4) The matching of participants on demographics.  
 
Dissemination plans 
The completed review will be submitted for publication to a peer-reviewed journal. 
 
Contact details for further information 
Philip Murphy 
Grampian Forensic Mental Health Service 
Blair Unit 





Organisational affiliation of the review 
The University of Edinburgh 
 
Review team 
Mr Philip Murphy, University of Edinburgh 
Professor Richard Bentall, University of Liverpool 
Professor Daniel Freeman, University of Oxford 
Dr Paul Hutton, University of Edinburgh 
 
Anticipated or actual start date 
25 March 2016 
 
Anticipated completion date 















Subject index terms status 
Subject indexing assigned by CRD 
 
Subject index terms 
Delusions; Humans; Paranoid Disorders; Self Concept; Self Psychology; Social Perception 
 
Stage of review 
Ongoing 
 
Date of registration in PROSPERO 
16 March 2016 
 
Date of publication of this revision 
16 March 2016 
 
Stage of review at time of original submission Started Completed 
Preliminary searches Yes No 
Piloting of the study selection process No No 
Formal screening of search results against eligibility criteria No No 
Data extraction No No 
Risk of bias (quality) assessment No No 
Data analysis No No 
 




B.        Changes from Protocol and Further Specifications 
The review protocol was registered in advance with the PROSPERO International Prospective Register of 
Systematic Reviews (registration number: CRD42016032782). A subsequent change was the decision to 
compare people with psychosis with current persecutory delusions (PDs) to people with psychosis without PDs 
(and, if specified, grandiose delusions; GDs) rather than to people with psychosis without delusions in general. 
We made this decision on the basis that most of the research in this area had compared people with psychosis 
with current PDs to people with psychosis without PDs, irrespective of whether or not they had other current 
delusions; thus, restricting our analyses to what we had originally planned would have meant that we would 
have had to exclude data from many group comparisons. However, we felt that it was important to exclude data 
from group comparison analyses when it was specified that 50% or more of the people with psychosis without 
PDs had GDs, given queries whether different aspects of the paranoia as defence model (Bentall et al., 2001) 
including the externalising attributional bias may be attributable to unassessed grandiosity (Garety & Freeman, 
2013).    
Another change was the decision to restrict non-psychotic psychiatric controls to people with depression, as the 
predictions of the paranoia as defence model relate to, among others, group differences between people with 
psychosis with PDs and people with depression; indeed, predictions have not been made about group 
differences between people with psychosis with PDs and other non-psychotic psychiatric controls (e.g., people 
with anorexia nervosa or an anxiety disorder). It should be noted that only two studies in total (both of which 
belonged to the externalising attributional bias domain) contained both people with depression and another 
non-psychotic psychiatric control group (i.e., all the non-psychotic psychiatric control groups in the other 
studies contained people with depression) and this change made no substantive difference to the results.  
Additional changes included abandoning the ‘data extraction hierarchy’ that was intended to prioritise the 
extraction of data where depression was adequately controlled and instead using meta-regression to assess 
whether group differences in depression (the standardised mean difference, d, was computed from group means 
and associated SDs related to depression to quantify the degree to which groups differed in depression) 
moderated the different effect sizes. However, we still decided that we would prioritise data from certain group 
comparisons for the analyses. Specifically, if a study contained both a depressed PD group and a non-depressed 
PD group, we decided the non-depressed PD group would take precedence over the depressed PD group for the 
relevant analysis. This enabled us to remove the potential confounding effect of depression from this analysis, 
and is consistent with our decision specified in our protocol to prioritise the extraction of data where depression 
was adequately controlled.  
Moreover, another change was our decision to check for publication bias using Doi plots as these are more 
sensitive than funnel plots (Barendregt & Doi, 2016).   
Further specifications included examining group differences and correlations in implicit self-esteem and 
developing the data extraction procedures with regard to externalising attributional bias and explicit self-
esteem; none of these specifications were inconsistent with our original protocol.  
Our subsequent planned analyses regarding implicit self-esteem were consistent with our hypotheses related to 
the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem as per our protocol. However, they allowed us to 
highlight the direction of any discrepancies (e.g., whether implicit self-esteem was lower or higher than explicit 
self-esteem) as well as, more specifically, the magnitude of any implicit self-esteem differences. 
Regarding externalising attributional bias, we have specified and justified our ‘data extraction hierarchy’ 
elsewhere (Appendix E). We also provided a rationale for prioritising participants’ self-ratings over independent 
judges’ ratings as to the extent to which participants’ attributional statements represented an 
externalising/internalising attributional bias. Moreover, we provided a rationale for prioritising negative explicit 
self-esteem over positive explicit self-esteem if a total explicit self-esteem score was not reported or easily 
calculated. 
Finally, we abandoned two planned moderator analyses (namely, the blinding of the outcome assessor and the 
stage of psychosis) and the group comparisons in relation to self-esteem instability due to insufficient data. We 






C.        Search Strategy 
We started by assessing for eligibility studies identified in three previous systematic reviews of the relevant 
literature published in 2013 and 2014 (Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 2014). 
In relation to the 2013 systematic review by Garety and Freeman (2013), they reported using three search 
techniques for studies related to delusions and the paranoia as defence model (Bentall et al., 2001). First, they 
searched the Web of Science and PubMed databases using the following search terms: “attribution bias” AND 
(“delusions” or “paranoia” or “schizophrenia”); (“self esteem” or “overt self esteem” or “covert self esteem” or 
“explicit self esteem” or “implicit self esteem” or “brief core schema scale”) AND (“delusions” or “paranoia” or 
“schizophrenia”). Second, they consulted three widely cited review articles on delusions (Bell, Halligan, & 
Ellis, 2006; Freeman, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999). Third, they manually searched early view articles in the 
following journals: Schizophrenia Bulletin; Schizophrenia Review; British Journal of Clinical Psychology; 
Behaviour Research and Therapy; Journal of Behavioural Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry; 
Psychological Medicine; Journal of Abnormal Psychology; Psychiatry Research.  
With regard to the 2013 systematic review by Kesting and Lincoln, they reported using two main search 
strategies for studies related to self-esteem and persecutory delusions (PDs). First, they searched the PsycINFO 
and Ovid MEDLINE(R) databases in March 2012 using the following search terms: (“self-esteem” or “self-
worth” or “self-concept” or “schema*”) AND (“paranoia*” or “delus*” or “delud*” or “persecut*” or 
“suspicious*”). Second, they consulted three widely cited review articles on delusions (Bentall et al., 2001; 
Freeman, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999).  
In the 2014 systematic review by Tiernan et al., they searched for studies related to self-esteem and PDs. 
Specifically, they searched the PsycINFO, Web of Science and MEDLINE databases from 2001-2012 using 
Boolean operators (“AND” and “OR”) and combinations of the following search terms: “parano*”, “persecut*”, 
“psychosis”, “psychotic”, “schizophrenia”, “delusion*”, “self*”, “schema*”, “belief*”, “self-esteem”, “self-
representation”, “self-concept”, “self-consciousness”, “representation” and “concept”. 
We then searched PsychINFO, MEDLINE, EMBASE and Web of Science for studies published between 2012 
and 10th September 2016 using the following terms: 
(“attribution bias*” or “attributional bias*” or “externalising bias*” or “externalizing bias*” or “personalising 
bias*” or “personalizing bias” or “self-serving bias*” or “self-esteem” or “self-worth” or “self-concept” or 
“schema”) AND (“psychosis” or “psychotic” or “schizo*” or “delusion*” or “paranoi*” or “persecut*”). 
We subsequently searched the reference lists of all included full-text articles to identify any studies missed in 
the initial search. In every case where useable but unpublished data were thought to exist we contacted the 




  D.        Excluded Studies 
 
The following table (Table D.1) details studies or reports excluded after inspection of the full-text report, or via 
correspondence with authors. Studies or reports excluded on basis of title or abstract alone are not detailed as 
these are too numerous and the vast majority were of different conditions or were otherwise unrelated to the 
review question.  
 
Study Ref Reason for Exclusion 
Addington & Tran, 2009 
 
An et al., 2010 
 
Barrowclough et al., 2003 
 
Beese & Stratton, 2004 
 
Bentall & Kaney, 1996 
  
Bentall et al., 2009      
 
Bowins & Shugar, 1998                                                           
 
Cantero, Duque, Valiente, Fuentenebro, & 
Villavicencio, 2012 
 
Cella, Swan, Medin, Reeder, & Wykes, 2014 
 
Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler, & Maguire, 2005 
 
Ciufolini et al., 2015 
 
Craig, Hatton, Craig, & Bentall, 2004 
 
Drake et al., 2004 
 
Ellett, Freeman, & Garety, 2008 
 
Fowler et al., 2006 
 
Fowler et al., 2012 
 
Fraguas et al., 2008 
 
Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001 
 
Harris, Oakley, Reichenberg, Murphy, & Picchioni, 
2012 
 
Kaney & Bentall, 1989 
 
Katsura et al., 2012 
 
Kinderman, Kaney, Morley, & Bentall, 1992 
 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996 
 
Krstev, Jackson, & Maude, 1999 
 
 
Sample not suitable 
 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 
Sample not suitable 
 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
Useable data not provided or made available upon 
request 
No full-text available 
 
 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 
Sample not suitable 
 
Sample not suitable 
 
Useable data not provided or made available upon 
request 
No useable cross-sectional data 
 
No useable cross-sectional data 
 
Sample not suitable 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
Useable data not provided or made available upon 
request 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 
No full-text available 
 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
No full-text available 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem 




Study Ref Reason for Exclusion 
Kumar, & Mohanty, 2016 
 
Ludtke, Kriston, Schroder, Lincoln, & Moritz (in 
press) 
 
Moorhead, Samarasekera, & Turkington, 2005 
 
Nakamura et al., 2015 
 
Paget & Ellet, 2014 
 
Sitko et al., 2016 
 
Smith et al., 2006 
 
So, Tang, & Leung, 2015 
 
Stowkowy & Addington, 2012 
 
Taylor et al., 2014 
 
Thewissen et al., 2011 
 
Udachina, Varese, Myin-Germeys, & Bentall, 2014 
 
Valiente, Cantero, Sanchez, Provencio, & 
Wickham, 2014 
 
Valiente, Provencio, Espinosa, Duque, & Everts, 
2015 
 
Weinberg et al., 2012 
 
Young & Bentall, 1997 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem 
 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem 
Sample not suitable 
 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 
No useable index of externalising attributional bias or 
self-esteem 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
Sample not suitable 
 
Sample not suitable 
 
Sample not suitable 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
No useable cross-sectional data 
 
Cannot be used in analyses due to re-use of same 
sample/participants 
 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 
 
No useable index of paranoia/ persecutory ideation for 
correlational analysis 







E.        Data Extraction Hierarchies/Procedures 
Our first primary outcome was the magnitude to which negative events were attributed to external 
causes, especially other people (i.e., externalising attributional bias). With regard to this, the following 
‘data extraction hierarchy’ (which specifies what data is preferable, and what data would be used if this 
could not be acquired) was chosen: (a) the external-personal attribution score for negative events (a 
measure of the tendency to attribute negative events to other people – rather than to oneself or 
situational factors) > (b) the personalizing bias score (PB) (a measure of the tendency to attribute 
negative events to other people rather than to situational factors) > (c) the internality attribution score 
for negative events (a measure of the tendency to attribute negative events to oneself – rather than to 
other people or situational factors) > (d) the externalising bias score (EB) (a measure of the tendency to 
attribute negative, as opposed to positive events, to external causes – either to other people or 
situational factors). 
We chose the data extraction hierarchy above because we wanted to extract data as closely related as 
possible to the prediction of the paranoia as defence model that people with psychosis with current 
persecutory delusions (PDs), compared with the various controls, are more likely to make external-
personal attributions for negative events in preference for either internal attributions or external-
situational attributions (Bentall et al., 2001).   
The rationale for deciding A and B should take precedence over C and D was that C and D fail to 
distinguish between external-personal and external-situational attributions. This distinction is 
particularly important because Bentall et al. (2001) postulate that people with psychosis with current 
PDs make many external-personal attributions for negative events but few external-situational ones. 
Indeed, they hypothesize that external-personal attributions for negative events lead to paranoia but that 
external-situational ones are psychologically benign – “neither priming negative self-representations 
nor negative perceptions of others’ attitudes toward the self” (Bentall et al., 2001, p. 1169).  
We decided A should take precedence over B because if a group scored higher on A we can be certain 
that their sum of both internal attributions and external-situational attributions for negative events was 
less – this increased tendency to make external-personal attributions for negative events (in preference 
for either internal attributions or external-situational attributions) is consistent with the prediction of 
the paranoia as defence model above. Regarding B, we can be certain that if a group scored higher on 
B they made more external-personal rather than external-situational attributions for negative events, 
but we cannot be certain that their sum of both internal attributions and external-situational attributions 
for negative events was less. 
We decided C should take precedence over D because our focus was on the magnitude to which 
negative events were attributed to external causes (especially to other people) and, as noted by Garety 
and Freeman (1999), D (which is a composite difference score calculated by subtracting attributional 
style for negative events from attributional style for positive events) does not permit inferences 
separately on internality/externality for positive and negative events – indeed, it is actually possible for 
a group to score higher on D (i.e., externalise negative events to a greater degree than positive events) 
but still make fewer external attributions for negative events. Moreover, D has been criticised on the 
grounds that attributional styles for positive and negative events show a low degree of correlation and 
therefore it has been argued that attributions for positive and negative events should be treated 
separately (Byrne & MacLeod, 1997).   
In our original protocol, we had also made the decision to choose the Internal, Personal, and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) (which can be used to calculate all 
four indices in the hierarchy above) over the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 
1982) (which can only be used to calculate the bottom two indices in the hierarchy above) if a study 
contained both of these measures. The rationale for this decision was based on the superior reliability 
of the subscales of the IPSAQ over the ASQ (Bentall et al., 2001).  
Moreover, we decided to prioritise participants’ self-ratings over independent judges’ ratings as to the 
extent to which participants’ attributional statements represented an externalising/internalising 
attributional bias. 
Bentall et al. (2001, p. 1157).  had previously stated the following on this matter: “Unfortunately, it is 
not obvious which type of rating – by the individual who makes the attributional statement or by an 
independent judge – is most meaningful, as self-ratings may reflect self-presentation biases and 
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independent ratings may be adversely affected by the failure to take into account background 
information known but not articulated by the participant.” 
In the absence of guidance by Bentall et al. (2001), we decided to prioritise self-ratings over 
independent judges’ ratings, as the attributional style measures including the ASQ and IPSAQ were 
originally designed so that participants’ attributional statements would be self-rated, and the 
psychometric properties of independent judges’ ratings have not been subsequently tested. Our 
decision also took into account that, unlike self-ratings, independent judges’ ratings were often blind to 
participant group status. In other words, we felt that a lack of support for the psychometric properties 
of independent judges’ ratings was a more serious violation/limitation than the lack of blinding with 
regard to self-ratings.  
Our second primary outcome was the magnitude of explicit self-esteem, which was assessed in the first 
instance by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965); if data from this scale were 
not available, we used a conceptually equivalent variant. We prioritised the RSES as this is the most 
commonly used measure of explicit self-esteem and has been shown to have good internal consistency 
in individuals with serious mental health problems (Corrigan, Rafcaz, & Rusch, 2011; Corrigan, 
Watson, & Barr, 2006). Moreover, it is worth noting that we used a broad concept of self-esteem, with 
self-esteem referring to views – positive or negative – about the self.  
We had also made the decision to prioritise negative explicit self-esteem over positive explicit self-
esteem if a total explicit self-esteem score was not reported or easily calculated. Our rationale for this 
decision was based on the prediction of the paranoia as defence model that, if PDs are truly successful, 
they would prevent negative thoughts about the self from entering consciousness (Bentall et al., 2001) 
(thus, negative explicit self-esteem would be expected to be low). Moreover, if negative explicit self-
esteem is high, it has been argued that this would be salient regardless of high positive explicit self-
esteem (Garety & Freeman, 1999).  
Our third primary outcome was the magnitude of implicit self-esteem, which was derived using a 
measure pertaining to the following ‘data extraction hierarchy’: the Implicit Association Task (IAT; 
Greenwald et al., 1998); the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; Stroop, 1935; Williams et al., 1996); the 
Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). If data from one of these measures were 
not available, we used a conceptually equivalent variant. We decided the IAT would take precedence 
over the EST and the GNAT because it is considered to be the best measure of implicit self-esteem 
currently available (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). We decided the EST would take precedence 
over the GNAT because it has been more commonly used and its psychometric properties have been 
more fully explored (Bosson et al., 2000).  
Our fourth primary outcome was the magnitude of the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-
esteem (i.e., discrepancy score). This was calculated from the choice of implicit and explicit self-
esteem indices above using a novel method (reported in Appendix F), unless this was already reported. 
Finally, our fifth primary outcome was the magnitude of self-esteem instability, which was assessed by 
the Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) or the repeated application 
a self-esteem measure such as the RSES. We had not prespecified which one of these methods would 
take precedence over the other in our original protocol, nor did we subsequently have to make this 










F.        Method for Calculating Discrepancy Scores 
The results of studies on discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem have been based on 
the comparison of the results between groups for each type of self-esteem separately, with two notable 
exceptions (Kesting et al., 2011; Vazquez et al., 2008). However, it has been argued that to adequately 
test the hypothesis of discrepancy, it is necessary to analyze the difference between implicit and 
explicit self-esteem within each group as well as differences between groups (Kesting et al., 2011; 
Vazquez et al., 2008).     
Only one of the eligible studies (Kesting et al., 2011) adequately reported scores on discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem for each group (i.e., discrepancy scores) that we could use for 
our group comparison analyses. In this study, Kesting et al. (2011) firstly z-standardised levels of 
implicit and explicit self-esteem for each participant (to a mean of 0 and SD of 1) so these would be 
directly comparable. To explore whether the groups differed in their discrepancy scores, they then 
subtracted z-scores in implicit self-esteem from z-scores in explicit self-esteem for each participant 
following which group means and associated SDs were calculated (positive scores indicated higher 
explicit than implicit self-esteem). 
As we considered the approach that Kesting et al. (2011) adopted to be optimal, we firstly contacted 
the authors of the other eligible studies for their individual study data so we could calculate 
discrepancy scores accordingly. Only McKay et al. (2007) were able to provide the requested data. 
However, we were able to develop a method for calculating discrepancy scores from the group means 
and associated SDs related to implicit and explicit self-esteem (as well as some other related statistics if 
reported) in the other studies, which allowed us to explore within and between group differences. Two 
of us (PM and PH) independently calculated these discrepancy scores following which any 
disagreements were resolved. We subsequently tested our method for calculating discrepancy scores 
against the discrepancy scores derived from the individual study data of Kesting et al. (2011) and 
McKay et al. (2007): the standardised mean differences (SMDs) (d) in discrepancy scores for each 
group comparison were either identical or almost identical when comparing both approaches, which we 
believe attests to the validity of our method. Below we describe our method followed by our 
aforementioned tests.   
Method 
1. As implicit and explicit self-esteem were generally measured on different scales we firstly had to 
make the means and SDs for implicit and explicit self-esteem onto the same scale. To do this, we took 
advantage of the assumptions that underlie the SMD (i.e., the ratio of mean to SD is meaningful if the 
underlying distribution is normal) and did the following: 
1.1. We referred to the mean explicit self-esteem for each group as E-M and the associated SD as E-
SD. We then referred to the mean implicit self-esteem for each group as I-M and the associated SD as 
I-SD.  
1.2. Using the method described in the Cochrane Handbook (Higgins & Green, 2011), we calculated 
the weighted mean of E-M across all groups (mean E-Ms). We also calculated the weighted mean of E-
SD across all groups (mean E-SDs). We then calculated the ratio of mean E-Ms to mean E-SDs. E.g., if 
mean E-Ms was 20 and mean E-SDs was 4, then the ratio was 5.  
1.3. We calculated the weighted mean of I-M across all groups (mean I-Ms). We also calculated the 
weighted mean of I-SD across all groups (mean I-SDs). We then calculated the ratio of mean I-Ms to 
mean I-SDs. E.g., if mean I-Ms was 1 and mean I-SDs was 0.5, then the ratio was 2. 
1.4. We calculated what value of mean I-Ms would be required to change the mean I-Ms: mean I-SDs 
ratio to match the mean E-Ms: mean E-SDs ratio, keeping mean I-SDs the same [i.e., what value of 
mean I-Ms (or X) would mean (X/mean I-SDs) = (mean E-Ms/mean E-SDs). In this case, (X/0.5) = 
(20/4); 0.5 multiplied by 20 = 10; 10 divided by 4 = 2.5; X = 2.5. 
1.5. We calculated the ratio of mean E-Ms to the value of mean I-Ms calculated in Step 1.4. In this 
case, 20/2.5 = 8.  
1.6. Separately, for each group, we multiplied the original I-M by the ratio calculated in Step 1.5, as 
well as the original I-SD by the ratio calculated in Step 1.5. This yielded the rescaled values of I-M and 
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I-SD for each group. We then checked that the ratio between the rescaled I-M and I-SD values were the 
same as the ratio between the original ones.  
2. Having made the means and SDs for implicit and explicit self-esteem onto the same scale, we then 
computed the mean discrepancy score for each group by simply subtracting the mean implicit self-
esteem score from the mean explicit self-esteem score.  
3. In the next step, we calculated the SD that was associated with each mean discrepancy score using 
the following approach:  
3.1. We calculated the SD by following the calculations listed in part 2 of the instructions 
available here from the Cochrane Handbook (Higgins & Green, 2011), (replacing 'baseline' and 'final' 
with our two variables – i.e.., explicit and implicit self-esteem). 
3.2. As part of Step 3.1 we needed to find or estimate the value of 'Corr'. Corr was just the correlation 
between explicit and implicit self-esteem within the group. It did not tell us anything about the 
differences in means of explicit and implicit self-esteem, but rather it quantified the degree to which 
the pattern of responses to both measures were similar, or whether there was a lot of variance. If the 
pattern was similar, Corr was high; if dissimilar, then Corr was low. As Corr was only reported in four 
of the eligible studies, we ran a meta-analysis of the reported correlations between explicit and implicit 
self-esteem and then replaced any missing estimates of Corr with the meta-analytical estimate, which 
was 0.17; see below.  
 
Having completed the above, we had a mean discrepancy score and associated SD for each group. We 
were then able to enter these into the meta-analyses to test our different hypotheses. 
 
Tests 
As mentioned, we subsequently tested our method for calculating discrepancy scores against the 
discrepancy scores derived from the individual study data of Kesting et al. (2011) and McKay et al. 
(2007).  
1. Regarding Kesting et al. (2011), they reported the following discrepancy scores for acute deluded 
(AD), remitted deluded (RD), healthy (HC) and depressed (DC) participants using their method 
described above: 
 AD (n = 28) RD (n = 31) HC (n = 59) DC (n = 21) 
Discrepancy 
scores (Z-RSES – 
Z-IAT); mean 
(SD) 
–0.24 (1.21) –0.23 (1.47) 0.55 (1.17) –0.84 (1.12) 













    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.04  ( -0.22,  0.14)     43.5
   0.16  ( -0.18,  0.46)     12.9
   0.17  (  0.05,  0.29)    100.0
   0.19  ( -0.14,  0.47)     14.1
   0.45  (  0.25,  0.61)     29.4
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The SMDs (d) in discrepancy scores for each group comparison were as follows:  
 D 95% CI 
AD vs RD 
AD vs HC 




–0.52 to 0.50 
–1.13 to –0.21  
–0.06 to 1.09 
 
Using our method, we then calculated discrepancy scores from the reported group means and 
associated SDs related to implicit and explicit self-esteem as well as Corr:a   
 AD (n = 28) RD (n = 31) HC (n = 59) DC (n = 21) 
RSES; mean (SD) 
IAT; mean (SD) 
Corr1 
Discrepancy 

















Abbreviations: IAT, Implicit Association Task; RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. aCorr was the correlation between explicit 
and implicit self-esteem, which was used for the calculation of the SD associated with the mean discrepancy score. As it was not 
reported in this study, we used the meta-analytical estimate. 
 
The SMDs (d) in discrepancy scores for each group comparison were as follows:  
 D 95% CI 
AD vs RD 
AD vs HC 




–0.53 to 0.49 
–1.15 to –0.23  
–0.06 to 1.09 
 
As can be seen above, the SMDs (d) in discrepancy scores for each group comparison were either 
identical or almost identical when comparing both approaches.  
 
2. Regarding McKay et al. (2007), as they provided us with their individual study data, we were able to 
calculate the following discrepancy scores for patients with current PDs, patients with remitted PDs, 
and healthy controls (HCs) using the method adopted by Kesting et al. (2011):  
 Current PDs (n = 9) Remitted PDs  
(n = 9) 
HCs (n = 19) 
Discrepancy scores 




0.09 (0.99) 0.01 (1.30) 







The SMDs (d) in discrepancy scores for each group comparison were as follows:  
 D 95% CI 
Current PDs vs 
Remitted PDs 




–1.04 to 0.81 
–0.84 to 0.75 
 
Using our method, we then calculated discrepancy scores from the group means and associated SDs 
related to implicit and explicit self-esteem as well as Corr:a   
 Current PDs  
(n = 9)b 
Remitted PDs  
(n = 9)b 
HCs (n = 19)b 
RSES; mean (SD) 
















Abbreviations: IAT, Implicit Association Task; RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. aCorr was the reported correlation between 
explicit and implicit self-esteem, which was used for the calculation of the SD associated with the mean discrepancy score. bOnly 
participants who completed both measures were included in the analyses.   
 
The SMDs (d) in discrepancy scores for each group comparison were as follows:  
 D 95% CI 
Current PDs vs 
Remitted PDs 




–1.06 to 0.79 
–0.84 to 0.75 
 
Once again, as can be seen above, the SMDs (d) in discrepancy scores for each group comparison were 







G.        Moderators: Operational Definitions 
We examined two prespecified methodological moderators of effect size: (a) matching of groups on 
demographics; (b) group differences in depression.  
With regard to the first moderator, we used the ratings in relation to the second criterion of our study 
quality assessment tool; see below. 
2. Selection minimizes baseline differences in prognostic factors? 
○ Is the comparison group matched with the clinical group on key demographics [age, gender, 
education (or IQ or a measure of intelligence if education is not reported), ethnicity]? 
No = a standardised mean difference (SMD)(d) of  ≥ 0.3 on at least 2; Partial = d of  ≥ 0.3 on 1; Yes = 
d of < 0.3 on 4 or 3 excluding ethnicity 
Specifically, if a group comparison received a ‘no’ rating on this criterion, we categorised the groups as 
unmatched on demographics (as this moderator was binary, 0 = unmatched), whereas if a group 
comparison received a ‘partial’ or ‘yes’ rating on this criterion, we categorised the groups as matched 
on demographics (1 = matched). If a group comparison received an ‘unclear’ rating on this criterion, 
we excluded this from the moderator analysis.  
Regarding the second moderator, the SMD (d) was computed from group means and associated SDs 










   H.        Table H.1. Summary of Characteristics of the 63 Included Studies 
Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 




1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
with PDs 
2. Outpatients with 
psychosis (as above) with 







score for negative events 
(speech samples were coded 
using LACS) 













3. Outpatients with 
psychosis (as above) with 
remitted delusions which 
were non-persecutory 






















1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia or delusional 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Mostly patients with 
depression (major 
depressive disorder) 










score for negative events 
(when presented with low 
DCC information) (SAQ) 























1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia or delusional 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
affective disorder) 









Internality attribution score 
for negative events 
(Expanded ASQ) 


















Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 












1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
delusional disorder) with 
PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder) with remitted PDs 
3. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
depression without PDs) 















Negative explicit self-esteem 
score (SERS negative 
subscale) 
 
Paranoia score (FPS) 
 
































1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
194 Explicit self-esteem score 
(SERS-SF) 
 
Paranoia score (PS) 




1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(paranoid schizophrenia) 
with PDs 






score for negative events 
(IPSAQ) 
 










Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 














1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia or paranoid 
disorder) with PDs and no 
concomitant signs of 
depression 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (as above) 
with PDs and significant 
depressive symptoms (this 
group was just used for the 
correlational analysis) 
3. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
unipolar depression) with 















Internality attribution score 
for negative events (ASQ; 
60-item version) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(CSEI) 
 
Paranoia score (Paranoia 
Scale of the MMPI) 


























Carlin, 2005 1. Forensic inpatients with 
psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Forensic inpatients with 






External attribution score  
for negative events    (BAI-
R) 





1. Patients with non-
affective psychosis with 
PDs 





Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 










Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 









1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Inpatients with psychosis 
(as above) with non-
persecutory delusions 
(>50% grandiose delusions; 
thus, this group was just 
used for the correlational 
analysis) 











PB attribution score for 
negative events (IPSAQ) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 

































1. Mostly patients with 
psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
brief psychotic disorder) 
with PDs 
2. Mostly inpatients and 
outpatients with psychosis 
(paranoid schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
with remitted PDs 
3. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
depressive disorder or 
dysthymia) 


















score for negative events 
(IPSAQ) 
 


































Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 









1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
57 Explicit self-esteem score 
(mean of RSES across time 
points) 
 
Self-esteem instability score 
(SD of RSES across time 
points) 
 
Paranoia score (mean of 
PANSS P6 across time 
points) 







1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Mostly outpatients with 
depression (depressive 
disorder) 








Negative explicit self-esteem 




esteem score (GNAT self 
index) 























1. Patients with psychosis 
(delusional disorder) with 
PDs 
2. Patients with psychosis 
(delusional disorder) with 
non-persecutory delusions 
(>50% grandiose delusions; 
thus, this group was just 
used for the correlational 
analysis) 












Internality attribution score 
for negative events (ASQ) 
 
























Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 












with ‘poor me’ PDs 
2. Patients with depression 
(unipolar depression) 










score for negative events 
(ARAT) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
















Freeman, 1998 1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia or delusional 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, delusional 
disorder or schizoaffective 
disorder) of whom most had 
non-persecutory delusions 
(reference to grandiose 
delusions; thus, this group 






Explicit self-esteem score 
(SCQ) 













1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder) of whom most had 
PDs 
130 Negative explicit self-esteem 
score (BCSS ‘negative self’ 
subscale) 
 
Paranoia score (using visual 
analog scales) 
UK 41.1 (11.6) 82/130 (63.08%) 
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Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 











1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
delusional disorder) with 
PDs alone 
2. Patients with psychosis 
(as above) with persecutory 
and grandiose delusions 
3. Patients with psychosis 
(as above) with neither 











Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 































2. Patients with recent onset 








EB attribution score 
(IPSAQ) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Negative explicit self-esteem 
score (SESS-sv NES 
dimension) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 






1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
unspecified functional 
psychosis) 
23 EB attribution score 
(IPSAQ) 
 
Paranoia score (PSE item) 
Netherlands 31.8 (9.3) 17/23 (74%) 
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Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 







1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective psychosis or 
delusional disorder) with 
PDs alone 
2. Patients with psychosis 
(as above) with persecutory 
and grandiose delusions 
3. Patients with psychosis 











Internality attribution score 
for negative events (ASQ) 






1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) 
87 Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Paranoia score (CPRS ‘ideas 
of persecution’ item) 










1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) with PDs 




3. Inpatients with 
depression (depressive 
disorder) 












Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Implicit self-esteem score 
(IAT D-measure) 




























1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia or delusional 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression 








Negative explicit self-esteem 
score (endorsement of 




esteem (EST ‘negative 
interference’ index) 
















Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 







1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia or delusional 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Patients with depression 
(major depressive episode) 








score for negative events 
(IPSAQ) 
 
















1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with PDs of whom most 
had psychosis 
(schizophrenia and paranoid 
psychosis) 
2. Inpatients with 
depression 









Explicit self-esteem score 
(SCC ‘self-actual’ index) 





















1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia) 
with PDs 
2. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia) 
without PDs 








PB attribution score for 
negative events (self ratings) 
(IPSAQ) 
 


















1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia) 
of whom most have current 
PDs 






PB attribution score for 
negative events (IPSAQ) 
 
Paranoia score (PS) 















1. Patients with early 
psychosis (mostly paranoid 
schizophrenia) of whom 
most had current PDs 







score for negative events 
(IPSAQ) 
 
Paranoia score (BPRS 
suspiciousness item) 












Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 






1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
delusional disorder) with 
PDs 









score for negative events 
(interview transcripts were 
rated using CAVE and the 
‘core’ attribution dataset was 
chosen) 

























1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
delusional disorder) with 
PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (as above) 
with remitted PDs 
3. Healthy controls with 
high levels of subclinical 
paranoia 
4. Healthy controls with 
















score for negative events 
(IPSAQ) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 






























1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia or delusional 
disorder of the paranoid 
type) with PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
depressive episode or 
depressive disorder) 











Internality attribution score 
for negative events (ASQpf) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 






















Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 





1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia) with PDs 





Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Implicit self-esteem score 
(IAT D-measure, improved 
algorithm) 













1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia) 
with PDs 
2. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia) 
without PDs 









score for negative events 
(self ratings) (IPSAQ) 
 





















1. Older patients with late-
onset psychosis with 
delusions (all but one of 
these patients had delusions 
that were primarily 
persecutory) 
2. Older patients with 
depression (affective 
disorder) 
















esteem score (EST 
‘depression interference’ 
index, calculated by 
subtracting response time to 
neutral words from response 
time to depression-related 
words) 


























1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Outpatients with 
psychosis (as above) with 
remitted PDs 









score for negative events 
(self ratings) (IPSAQ) 
 
Paranoia score (SAPS 
persecution item) 
















Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 






1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Outpatients with 
psychosis (as above) with 
remitted PDs 








Explicit self-esteem score 
(raw mean) (RSES) 
 
Implicit self-esteem score 
(raw mean) (IAT index) 





















1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis 
(schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder) with PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (as above) 
with remitted PDs 










score for negative events 
(IPSAQ) 
 




















2. Subgroup of these 
patients with PDs 









score for  negative events    
(IPSAQ-R) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 

























with ‘poor me’ PDs 
2. Inpatients with psychosis 
(as above) with ‘bad me’ 
PDs 










Internality attribution score 
for negative events (ASQ) 




















Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 












with ‘poor me’ PDs 
2. Inpatients with psychosis 
(as above) with ‘bad me’ 
PDs 










Internality attribution score 
for the most negative event 
(SDEI) 
 
Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 

























1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
with delusions of reference 
of whom 50% had mixed 
referential and persecutory 
delusions 









PB attribution score for 
negative events (IPSAQ) 
 























1. Inpatients and outpatients 




2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
depressive disorder) 











score for negative events 
(modified inductive 
reasoning task using items 
from IPSAQ) 
 


























schizoaffective disorder)  
86 PB attribution score for 
negative events (IPSAQ) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 
Canada 31.9 (11.5) 71/86 (83%) 
98 
 
Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 








1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Inpatients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) without 
PDs 
3. Inpatients with 
depression (major 
depressive disorder) 










Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Implicit self-esteem score 
(IAT D-measure) 



























1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) of 
whom more than 50% had 
current PDs 
2. Inpatients with 
depression (major 
depressive disorder) 










Internality attribution score 

































1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with first-episode psychosis 
256 Negative self-esteem 
instability score (SD of 
negative scores of RSES 
across time points) 
 
Positive self-esteem 
instability score (SD of 
positive scores of RSES 
across time points) 
 
Paranoia score (mean of 
PANSS P6 across time 
points) 
UK Not reported 177/256 (69.14%) 
99 
 
Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 











2. Patients with psychosis 
(as above) with remitted 
PDs 










score for negative events 
(self ratings) (IPSAQ) 
 





















1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) without 
PDs 







Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 















1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
88 Explicit self-esteem score 
(MSEI) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 




1. Patients with first-
episode psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia  
spectrum disorder) 
113 Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 










1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (delusional 
disorder) with persecutory 
(N = 14) or grandiose 
delusions (N = 5) 

















Internality attribution score 
for negative events (ASQ) 
























Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 







1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
with grandiose delusions of 
which more than half have 
current PDs 













esteem score (EST 
‘depression interference’ 
index) 






















1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia, delusional 
or schizoaffective disorder) 
with PDs 
2. Inpatients with psychosis 
(as above) with remitted 
PDs 









Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
































2. Patients with psychosis 
(as above) with other 
positive symptoms 
3. Patients with psychosis 
(as above) with remitted 
psychotic symptoms 
4. High schizotypy non-
psychiatric controls 














Explicit self-esteem score 
(mean of the ESM 
momentary self-esteem 
reports for each person) 
 
Self-esteem instability score 
(SD of ESM momentary 
self-esteem reports for each 
person) 
 
Paranoia score (PS) 




























Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 
















delusional disorder) with 
‘poor me’ PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (as above) 
with ‘bad me’ PDs 
3. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (as above) 
with remitted PDs 














Explicit self-esteem score 
(ESM self-esteem) 
 
Self-esteem instability score 
(mean moment-to-moment 
change in ESM self-esteem 
reports for each person)  
 
 































1. Inpatients with psychosis 
(mostly schizophrenia 
spectrum disorder) with 
PDs 
2. Mostly outpatients with 
depression (depressive 
disorder) 









Explicit self-esteem score 
(E-SEI) 
 
Implicit self-esteem score 
(GNAT index) 



















1. Patients with psychosis 
(schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder) 
80 Explicit self-esteem (SERS) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 
UK 39.15 (11.56) 49/80 (61%) 
102 
 
Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 











1. Patients with psychosis 
(mostly schizophrenia 
spectrum disorder) with 
PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (as above) 
with remitted PDs 
3. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
depressive disorder or 
dysthymia) 













Explicit self-esteem score 
(RSES) 
 
Implicit self-esteem score 
(indicated by the recall of 
positive versus negative 
words on the SRIRT) 

































1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or 
delusional disorder) with 
PDs and no comorbid 
depression 
2. Outpatients with 
depression (major 
depressive episode) and no 
PDs 












Negative explicit self-esteem 
score (BCSS ‘negative self’ 
subscale) 
 

























1. Outpatients with 
psychosis (schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder) 
30 Explicit self-esteem score 
(MSEI) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 








1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (mostly 
schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder) 
176 Negative explicit self-esteem 
(SERS negative subscale) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 
UK Not reported 123/176 (69.87%) 
103 
 
Study Ref (First 
Author, Year) 




Variable/s Used in 
Analysis 










1. Inpatients and outpatients 
with psychosis (paranoid 
schizophrenia) with PDs 
2. Inpatients and outpatients 
with depression (major 
depressive episode) 








PB attribution score for  
negative events    (IPSAQ-
R) 
 
Paranoia score (PANSS P6) 














Abbreviations: ARAT, Attributional style: Achievement and Relationships Attributions Task; ASQ, Attributional Style Questionnaire; ASQ-B, ASQ modified by Brunstein; ASQpf, ASQ parallel form; 
BCSS, Brief Core Schema Scale; BAI-R, Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory-Revised; BPRS, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; CAVE, Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations; CPRS, 
Comprehensive Psychopathological Rating Scale; CSEI, Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory; DCC, distinctiveness, consistency and consensus. EB, Externalising Bias; EBS, Evaluative Beliefs Scale; 
E-SEI, Composite of self-worth subscale of World Assumption Scale and Spanish version of self-acceptance subscale of the Scales of Psychological Wellbeing; ESM, Experience Sampling Method; 
EST, Emotional Stroop Task; FPS, Feningstein Paranoia Scale; GNAT, Go/No-go Association Task; IAT, Implicit Association Task; IPSAQ, Internal, Personal, and Situational Attributions 
Questionnaire; IPSAQ-R, IPSAQ-Revised; LACS, Leeds Attributional Coding System; MMPI, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; MSEI, Multidimensional Self-Esteem Inventory; PANSS 
P6, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scales ‘suspiciousness/persecution’ item; PB, Personalizing bias; PDs, persecutory delusions; PPQ, Personal Profile Questionnaire; PS, Paranoia Scale; PSE, 
Present State Examination; RSCQ, Robson Self-Concept Questionnaire; RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; SAPS, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms; SAQ, Social Attributions 
Questionnaire; SCC, Self-Concept Checklist; SCQ, Self-Concept Questionnaire; SDEI, Significant Daily Events Interview; SESS-sv NES, Self-Evaluation and Social Support interview-schizophrenia 





I.        Data Used for Each Meta-Analysis 
 
Table I.1. Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Healthy Controls   
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Aakre, 2009 18 33.98 16.44 29 21.82 12.32 47 
Bentall, 1991 17 4.65 1.97 17 2.47 2.43 34 
Bentall, 2005 16 -35.37 8.38 16 -50 4.64 32 
Berry, 2015 22 4.05 2.13 25 2.36 2.16 47 
Combs, 2009 32 0.75 0.19 50 0.55 0.24 82 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 40 7.35 3.65 36 4.75 2.58 76 
Fear, 1996 20 -20.5 6 20 -24.6 2.9 40 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 2009 20 2.45 1 32 1.71 1.07 52 
Kinderman, 1997 20 7.55 2.93 20 4.25 2.73 40 
Langdon, 2006 19 0.64 0.23 21 0.67 0.24 40 
Langdon, 2010 35 70 30 34 57 26 69 
Langdon, 2013 23 28.33 8.01 19 29.17 7.28 42 
Lee, 2004 12 3.33 2.23 12 1.33 1.23 24 
Lincoln, 2010 25 6.56 5.62 50 3.62 3.1 75 
Lyon, 1994 14 -15.07 4.48 14 -23 8.97 28 
Martin, 2002 15 6.7 2.9 16 6.5 4.2 31 
McKay, 2005 13 6.08 1.8 19 6.58 3.4 32 
Mehl, 2010 20 4.89 3.97 21 3.33 3.18 41 
Mehl, 2014 142 37.65 14.18 51 43.68 15.63 193 
Melo, 2006 35 -19.28 8.56 20 -23.65 6.1 55 
Melo, 2013 40 -3.73 2.39 25 -2.92 2.33 65 
Menon, 2013 18 0.63 0.37 17 0.68 0.26 35 
Merrin, 2007 24 1.71 1.37 24 1.63 0.65 48 
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 Psychosis With PDs  Healthy Controls   
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Moritz, 2007 35 -3.89 0.68 28 -3.49 0.8 63 
Randall, 2003 18 5.28 3.43 18 5.33 2.74 36 
Sharp, 1997 19 -16.21 3.9 24 -24.41 2.6 43 






Table I.2. Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Depression 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Depression  
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Bentall, 1991 17 4.65 1.97 17 3 2 34 
Bentall, 2005 16 -35.37 8.38 16 -65.75 6.1 32 
Candido, 1990 15 -3.95 1.12 15 -5.91 0.57 30 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 40 7.35 3.65 35 5.22 2.34 75 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 2009 20 2.45 1 21 1.76 1.26 41 
Kinderman, 1997 20 7.55 2.93 20 2.45 2.42 40 
Lyon, 1994 14 -15.07 4.48 14 -23.33 6.66 28 
Merrin, 2007 24 1.71 1.37 24 1.58 1.18 48 
Moritz, 2007 35 -3.89 0.68 18 -4.22 1.14 53 






Table I.3. Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias: Psychosis with Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and,    
if Specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Psychosis Without PDs 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Aakre, 2009 18 33.98 16.44 47 23.65 14.96 65 
Carlin, 2005 31 6.13 4.05 34 6.14 3.57 65 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 40 7.35 3.65 25 5.12 3.27 65 
Jolley, 2006 14 -3.85 1.00 34 -4.8 1.3 48 
Langdon, 2006 19 0.64 0.23 15 0.68 0.27 34 
Lincoln, 2010 25 6.56 5.62 25 4.08 3.82 50 
Martin, 2002 15 6.7 2.9 15 6.5 3.1 30 
McKay, 2005 13 6.08 1.8 11 6.45 3.24 24 
Mehl, 2010 20 4.89 3.97 16 3.06 3.02 36 
Randall, 2003 18 5.28 3.43 14 5.21 3.81 32 






Table I.4. Correlation between Externalising Attributional  
Bias and Paranoia Severity in People 
With Psychosis 
 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) Total N R 
Aakre, 2009 65 0.29 
Candido, 1990 45 0.51 
Carlin, 2005 65 0 
Combs, 2009 60 0.37 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 65 0.3 
Fear, 1996 29 -0.01 
Humphreys, 2006 35 0.11 
Janssen, 2006 23 0.39 
Jolley, 2006 48 0.33 
Langdon, 2006 34 -0.08 
Langdon, 2010 69 0.27 
Langdon, 2013 23 -0.19 
Lincoln, 2010 50 0.25 
Martin, 2002 30 0.03 
McKay, 2005 24 -0.08 
Mehl, 2010 36 0.25 
Mehl, 2014 258 0.1 
Mizrahi, 2008 86 -0.17 
Randall, 2003 32 0.01 
Sharp, 1997 31 0.66 






Table I.5. Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Healthy Controls   
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Bentall, 2008 39 -72.53 25.78 33 -45.88 10.72 72 
Collett, 2016 21 11.95 5.63 21 21.1 4.49 42 
Combs, 2009 32 30.9 4.4 50 35 4.5 82 
Espinosa, 2014 79 -2.51 3.46 52 -0.17 0.73 131 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 2009 20 30.15 5.06 32 30.72 4.39 52 
Kesting, 2011 28 18.93 5.21 59 25.12 3.53 87 
Kinderman, 1994 16 -70.44 18.19 16 -50.81 14.67 32 
Kinderman, 2003 13 25.77 28.64 13 41.54 12.53 26 
Lincoln, 2010 25 18.4 7 50 24.05 4.23 75 
Lyon, 1994 14 12.54 5.39 14 11.21 4.26 28 
MacKinnon, 2011 16 16.31 5.97 20 23.05 4.38 36 
McCulloch, 2006 13 -17.85 4.95 15 -17.8 4.43 28 
McKay, 2007 9 -0.8 1.24 19 0.15 0.87 28 
Melo, 2013 41 26.17 6.35 25 31.12 4.3 66 
Moritz, 2006 13 17.58 5.16 41 22.65 4.14 54 
Randjbar, 2011 10 15.7 5.1 33 22.72 5.71 43 
Smith, 2005 20 136.3 28.1 21 132.7 26.9 41 
Sundag, 2015 33 32.5 8.6 33 42.6 4.1 66 
Udachina, 2012 29 4.67 1.5 23 6.21 0.69 52 
Valiente, 2011 35 0.17 0.94 44 0.31 0.71 79 
Vazquez, 2008 40 31.5 4.8 36 35.6 3.9 76 





Table I.6. Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Depression 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Depression  
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Bentall, 2008 39 -72.53 25.78 27 -81.81 21.28 66 
Candido, 1990 15 77.33 11.97 15 27.2 16.37 30 
Espinosa, 2014 79 -2.51 3.46 38 -3.56 3.57 117 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 2009 20 30.15 5.06 21 21.29 4.46 41 
Kesting, 2011 28 18.93 5.21 21 17.57 6.47 49 
Kinderman, 1994 16 -70.44 18.19 16 -67.88 15.95 32 
Kinderman, 2003 13 25.77 28.64 11 24.09 19.39 24 
Lyon, 1994 14 12.54 5.39 14 5.57 3.06 28 
McCulloch, 2006 13 -17.85 4.95 15 -26.33 5.92 28 
Moritz, 2006 13 17.58 5.16 14 14.86 5.97 27 
Valiente, 2011 35 0.17 0.94 35 -0.63 0.67 70 
Vazquez, 2008 40 31.5 4.8 35 24.5 6.02 75 









Table I.7. Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and, if Specified, 
Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Psychosis Without PDs 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Bentall, 2008 39 -72.53 25.78 29 -65.3 22.46 68 
Garety, 2013 170 -24.47 6.15 43 -23.72 6.4 213 
Humphreys, 2006 15 -1.07 1 20 0 1 35 
Kesting, 2011 28 18.93 5.21 31 18.29 5.98 59 
Lincoln, 2010 25 18.4 7 25 20 6.08 50 
McKay, 2007 9 -0.8 1.24 9 0.47 0.51 18 
Moritz, 2006 13 17.58 5.16 10 12.56 5.85 23 
Randjbar, 2011 10 15.7 5.1 19 17.56 7.77 29 
Sundag, 2015 33 32.5 8.6 10 37.3 8.1 43 
Udachina, 2012 29 4.67 1.5 12 5.79 0.98 41 







Table I.8. Correlation between Explicit Self-Esteem and                                                                                                                           
Paranoia Severity in People With Psychosis 
 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) Total N r 
Bentall, 2008 68 -0.43 
Ben-Zeev, 2009 194 -0.5 
Combs, 2009 60 -0.17 
Erickson, 2012 57 -0.57 
Freeman, 1998 53 0 
Freeman, 2012 130 -0.25 
Garety, 2013 213 -0.05 
Humphreys, 2006 35 -0.4 
Jones, 2010 87 -0.23 
Kesting, 2011 59 0.06 
Lincoln, 2010 50 -0.12 
McKay, 2007 18 -0.55 
Moritz, 2006 23 0.41 
Randjbar, 2011 29 -0.13 
Ringer, 2014 88 -0.23 
Romm, 2011 113 -0.3 
Sundag, 2015 43 -0.23 
Thewissen, 2008 154 -0.32 
Udachina, 2012 41 -0.35 
Vass, 2015 80 -0.35 
Vazquez, 2008 65 0.1 
Warman, 2011 30 -0.37 





Table I.9. Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Healthy Controls   
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Espinosa, 2014 79 9.88 95.48 52 42.57 49.9 131 
Kesting, 2011 28 0.5 0.33 59 0.6 0.4 87 
Kinderman, 1994 16 -7.69 8.5 16 0.19 8.5 32 
MacKinnon, 2011 16 0.93 1.01 20 0.48 0.45 36 
McCulloch, 2006 13 -2.86 0.79 15 -2.86 0.71 28 
McKay, 2007 10 -0.75 0.78 19 0.15 0.99 29 
Moritz, 2006 13 -0.03 0.72 41 0.84 0.67 54 
Smith, 2005 20 -12 95 21 -32 49 41 
Valiente, 2011 35 -3.25 81.35 44 40.48 57.6 79 







Table I.10. Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Depression 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Depression  
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Espinosa, 2014 79 9.88 95.48 38 18.47 72.8 117 
Kesting, 2011 28 0.5 0.33 21 0.64 0.29 49 
Kinderman, 1994 16 -7.69 8.5 16 -4.63 5.25 32 
McCulloch, 2006 13 -2.86 0.79 15 -3.57 0.8 28 
Moritz, 2006 13 -0.03 0.72 14 0.61 0.67 27 
Valiente, 2011 35 -3.25 81.35 35 18.46 75.65 70 











Table I.11. Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and, if          
Specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Psychosis Without PDs 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Kesting, 2011 28 0.5 0.33 31 0.45 0.44 59 
McKay, 2007 10 -0.75 0.78 10 0.47 0.85 20 
Moritz, 2006 13 -0.03 0.72 10 0.1 0.84 23 













Table I.12. Correlation between Implicit Self-Esteem and                                                                                                                        
Paranoia Severity in People With Psychosis 
 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) Total N R 
Kesting (2011) 59 0.06 
McKay (2007) 20 -0.6 
Moritz (2006) 23 -0.08 


















Table I.13. Difference in Discrepancy Scores:a Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Healthy Controls   
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Espinosa, 2014 79 0.34 10.93 52 -1.12 16.48 131 
Kesting, 2011 28 -0.24 1.21 59 0.55 1.17 87 
Kinderman, 1994 16 -53.11 24.07 16 -51.24 22.06 32 
MacKinnon, 2011 16 8.94 9.91 20 19.25 4.73 36 
McCulloch, 2006 13 4.75 7.28 15 4.8 6.53 28 
McKay, 2007 9 -0.05 1.41 19 0.01 1.3 29 
Moritz, 2006 13 17.83 5.85 41 15.73 5.2 54 
Smith, 2005 20 -71.24 22.59 21 -70.73 17.12 41 
Valiente, 2011 35 0.21 1.38 44 -0.17 1.01 79 
Vazquez, 2008 40 29.6 7.27 36 29.52 6.66 76 








Table I.14. Difference in Discrepancy Scores:a Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Depression 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Depression  
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Espinosa, 2014 79 0.34 10.93 38 -1.71 8.39 117 
Kesting, 2011 28 -0.24 1.21 21 -0.84 1.12 49 
Kinderman, 1994 16 -53.11 24.07 16 -57.45 18.17 32 
McCulloch, 2006 13 4.75 7.28 15 1.88 7.89 28 
Moritz, 2006 13 17.83 5.85 14 9.84 6.04 27 
Valiente, 2011 35 0.21 1.38 35 -0.85 1.15 70 
Vazquez, 2008 40 29.6 7.27 35 24.35 7.66 75 








Table I.15. Difference in Discrepancy Scores: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and, if Specified, 
Grandiose Delusions) 
 
 Psychosis With PDs  Psychosis Without PDs 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) N1 Mean SD N2 Mean SD Total N 
Kesting, 2011 28 -0.24 1.21 31 -0.23 1.47 59 
McKay, 2007 9 -0.05 1.41 9 0.09 0.99 18 
Moritz, 2006 13 17.83 5.85 10 11.74 6.76 23 
Vazquez, 2008 40 29.6 7.27 25 28.63 6.51 65 





Table I.16. Correlation between Paranoia Severity and  
Discrepancy Scoresa in People With Psychosis 
 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) Total N R 
Kesting, 2011 59 0 
McKay, 2007 18 -0.06 
Moritz, 2006 23 0.43 
Vazquez, 2008 65 0.07 






Table I.17. Correlation between Paranoia Severity and  
Self-Esteem Instability in People With Psychosis 
 
Study Ref (First Author, Year) Total N r 
Erickson, 2012 57 0.21 
Palmier-Claus, 2011 256 0.14a 
Thewissen, 2008 154 0.35 
Udachina, 2012 41 0.19 
ar represents the mean of (a) the correlation between PD severity and negative self-esteem 






J.        Study Quality Assessment Tool 
We adapted a tool for assessing the methodological quality of observational studies that has been successfully 
employed in prior research undertaken by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ; Williams et 
al., 2010). The main methodological quality criteria were retained but the underlying factors related to each 
study quality criterion were adapted in some instances for this specific context. Each study is assessed on a 
number of methodological quality criteria (for example, unbiased selection of groups, sample-size calculations, 
and so on) that are rated as being met, not met, partially met, or being unclear.  
Following the guidance of experts in the field of meta-analysis, we will avoid scale-based or aggregated study 
quality rating. Quality assessments were presented descriptively to guide the interpretation of findings, rather 
than used as a means to weight or adjust aggregated effect sizes. However, as noted, we planned to test whether 
specific aspects of methodology were moderators of effect sizes. These included blinding and the matching of 
participants on demographics. 
The tool we used is reproduced below. 
General instructions: Grade each criterion as ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Partially’, or ‘Can’t tell’. Factors to consider when 
making an assessment are listed under each criterion. Where appropriate (particularly when assigning a ‘No’, 
‘Partially’, or ‘Can’t tell’ score), please provide a brief rationale for your decision (in parentheses) in the 
evidence table. 
1. Unbiased selection of the cohort? 
Factors that help reduce selection bias: 
○ Inclusion/exclusion criteria: 
○ Recruitment strategy: 
▪  Clearly described 
▪  Relatively free from bias (selection bias might be introduced, for example, by recruitment via 
advertisement). 
2. Selection minimizes baseline differences in prognostic factors? 
Factors to consider: 
○ Was selection of the comparison group appropriate? 
○ Is the comparison group matched with the clinical group on key demographics [age, gender, education (or IQ 
or a measure of intelligence if education is not reported), ethnicity]? 
No = a standardised mean difference (d) of  ≥ 0.3 on at least 2; Partial = d of  ≥ 0.3 on 1; Yes = d of < 0.3 on 4 
or 3 excluding ethnicity 
3. Sample size calculated? 
Factors to consider: 
○ Did the authors report conducting a power analysis or describe some other basis for determining the adequacy 
of study group sizes for the primary outcome(s) of interest to us? 
○ Where a power calculation is presented, do the final numbers obtained match up to this (for example, within 
10% of required numbers)? 
4. Adequate description of the cohort? 







○ Diagnosis/clinical status 
No = reported 1 of the above or less; Partial = reported 2 to 4; Yes = reported all 5 or 4 excluding ethnicity 
5. Validated method for ascertaining psychotic disorder? 
Factors to consider: 
○ Was the method used to ascertain exposure clearly described (details should be sufficient to permit replication 
in new studies)? 
○ Was a valid and reliable measure used to ascertain exposure (subjective measures based on self-report tend to 
have lower reliability and validity than objective measures such as clinical interview)? Likewise, relying on 
medical notes is likely to introduce bias due to variation in how assessment is undertaken. 
6. Validated method for ascertaining persecutory delusions or measuring paranoia/persecutory ideation? 
Factors to consider: 
○ Was the method used to ascertain exposure clearly described (details should be sufficient to permit replication 
in new studies)? 
○ Was a valid and reliable measure used to ascertain exposure (subjective measures based on self-report tend to 
have lower reliability and validity than objective measures such as clinical interview)? Likewise, relying on 
medical notes is likely to introduce bias due to variation in how assessment is undertaken. 
○ If appropriate, was the measure implemented consistently across all study participants? 
7. Validated method for ascertaining depression (if relevant)? 
○ Was the method used to ascertain exposure clearly described (details should be sufficient to permit replication 
in new studies)? 
○ Was a valid and reliable measure used to ascertain exposure (subjective measures based on self-report tend to 
have lower reliability and validity than objective measures such as clinical interview)? Likewise, relying on 
medical notes is likely to introduce bias due to variation in how assessment is undertaken. 
8. Validated method for ascertaining absence of diagnosis (if relevant)? 
○ Was the method used to determine absence of diagnosis clearly described (details should be sufficient to 
permit replication in new studies)? 
○ Was a valid and reliable measure used to ascertain exposure (subjective measures based on self-report tend to 
have lower reliability and validity than objective measures such as clinical interview)?  
9. Validated method for measuring externalising attributional bias (if relevant)? 
Factors to consider: 
○ The IPSAQ, the ASQ or a conceptually equivalent variant should be used. 
○ Was the measure implemented consistently across all study participants? 
○ Did the measure meet minimal criteria for reliability/validity? 
Partial = index C or D in the ‘data extraction hierarchy’ (assuming the factors above); Yes = index A or B in 
the ‘data extraction hierarchy’ (assuming the factors above) 
10. Validated method for measuring explicit self-esteem (if relevant)? 
Factors to consider: 
○ The RSES or a conceptually equivalent variant should be used. 
○ Was the measure implemented consistently across all study participants? 
○ Did the measure meet minimal criteria for reliability/validity? 
11. Validated method for measuring implicit self-esteem (if relevant)? 
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Factors to consider: 
○ The IAT, EST, GNAT or a conceptually equivalent variant should be used. 
○ Was the measure implemented consistently across all study participants? 
○ Did the measure meet minimal criteria for reliability/validity? 
12. Validated method for measuring self-esteem instability (if relevant)? 
Factors to consider: 
○ ESM, the repeated application of a self-esteem measure or a conceptually equivalent longitudinal method 
should be used.  
○ Was the measure implemented consistently across all study participants? 
○ Did the measure meet minimal criteria for reliability/validity? 
13. Outcome assessment blind to exposure? 
Factors to consider: 
○ Were the study investigators who assessed outcomes blind to whether participants had persecutory delusions 
and/or a psychotic disorder (this criterion will not apply in the case of Internet-based or automated designs 
where a researcher is not present)? 
14. Adequate handling of missing data? 
Factors to consider: 
○ Are the details of missing data clearly reported, including how missing data was handled in the analyses? If 
not, is there any reason to believe missing data was present (for example, lower N in analysis than initially 
reported in the participants section). 
○ Did missing data from any group exceed 20%?  
○ If missing data was present and substantial, were steps taken to minimize bias (for example, sensitivity 










K.        Outcome-Specific Study Quality Tables 
 
Table K.1. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias: Psychosis With Persecutory 
Delusions (PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 














































Aakre, 2009 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bentall, 1991 Unclear Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Unclear No Yes 
Bentall, 2005 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial No Yes 
Berry, 2015 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes No Yes 
Combs, 2009 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Diez-Alegria, 
2006 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Fear, 1996 Unclear Unclear No No Partial Partial Partial Yes No  Yes 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 
2009 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1997 Partial Unclear No Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Langdon, 2006 Yes No No Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes Nob Yes 
Langdon, 2010 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Langdon, 2013 Yes Partial No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
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Lee, 2004 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Lyon, 1994 Partial  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial No Yes 
Martin, 2002 Yes No No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Nob  Yes 
McKay, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Nob Yes 
Mehl, 2010 Yes  Yes  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Unclear 
Mehl, 2014 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Melo, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No  Yes 
Melo, 2013 Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Unclear No Yes 
Menon, 2013 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Merrin, 2007 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes 
Moritz, 2007 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Nob Yes 
Randall, 2003 Unclear No No Yes Partial Yes Unclear Yes Nob Yes 
Sharp, 1997 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Partial No Yes 
Wittorf, 2012 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 







Table K.2. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias: Psychosis With Persecutory 
Delusions (PDs) vs Depression 
 













































Bentall, 1991 Unclear Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Unclear No Yes 
Bentall, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Candido, 1990 Yes No No Partial Partial Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Diez-Alegria, 
2006 Partial No No Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 
2009 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1997 Partial Unclear No Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Lyon, 1994 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Merrin, 2007 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes 
Moritz, 2007 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Nob Yes 
Wittorf, 2012 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 










Table K.3. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias: Psychosis With Persecutory 
Delusions (PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and, if Specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs)  
 








































Aakre, 2009 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Carlin, 2005 Partial Unclear No No Partial Partial Partial No Yes 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes No  Yes 
Jolley, 2006 Yes Unclear No No Yes Yes Partial Partialb Yes 
Langdon, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes Noc Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Martin, 2002 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Noc Yes 
McKay, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Noc Yes 
Mehl, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Unclear 
Randall, 2003 Unclear No No Yes Partial Yes Yes Noc Yes 
Sharp, 1997 Partial No No Partial Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
aGroup comparison studies only. bRaters were blind to treatment allocation, but not clinical status. cIndependent judges’ ratings of the participants’ responses on the attributional style measure were blind to clinical status, 












Table K.4. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Correlation between Externalising Attributional Bias and Paranoia 
Severity in People With Psychosis 
 









































Aakre, 2009 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Candido, 1990 Yes No  Partial Partial Yes Partial No Yes 
Carlin, 2005 Partial No No Partial Partial Partial No Yes 
Combs, 2009 Partial No  Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No 
Diez-Alegria, 2006 Partial No  Partial Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Fear, 1996 Unclear No  No Partial Partial Yes No Yes 
Humphreys, 2006 Yes No  Partial Partial Yes Partial No Yes 
Janssen, 2006 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Jolley, 2006 Yes No  No Yes Yes Partial Partiala Yes 
Langdon, 2006 Yes No  Partial Yes Yes Yes Nob Yes 
Langdon, 2010 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Langdon, 2013 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Martin, 2002 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Nob  Yes 
McKay, 2005 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Nob Yes 
Mehl, 2010 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Unclear 
Mehl, 2014 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Partial Partiala Yes 
Mizrahi, 2008 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
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Randall, 2003 Unclear No  Yes Partial Yes Yes Nob Yes 
Sharp, 1997 Partial No  Partial Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Wittorf, 2012 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
aRaters were blind to treatment allocation, but not clinical status. bIndependent judges’ ratings of the participants’ responses on the attributional style measure were blind to clinical status, but these were not 




Table K.5. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs 
Healthy Controls 
 














































Bentall, 2008 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Collett, 2016 Yes Partial Yes Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Combs, 2009 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Espinosa, 2014 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 
2009 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1994 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Unclear No Yes 
Kinderman, 2003 Yes Unclear No Partial Unclear Yes Partial Partial No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Lyon, 1994 Partial  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
MacKinnon, 2011 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McCulloch, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Melo, 2013 Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes No No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Randjbar, 2011 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Smith, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Sundag, 2015 Partial Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
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Udachina, 2012 Yes Partial No Yes Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vorontsova, 2013 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 





Table K.6. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs 
Depression 
 













































Bentall, 2008 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Candido, 1990 Yes No No Partial Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Espinosa, 2014 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 
2009  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1994 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes Unclear No Yes 
Kinderman, 2003 Yes Unclear No Partial Unclear Yes Partial Partial No Yes 
Lyon, 1994 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McCulloch, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial No No Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Vorontsova, 2013 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 







Table K.7. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis with Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs 
Psychosis Without PDs (and, if Specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 










































Bentall, 2008 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Garety, 2013 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes Partialb Yes 
Humphreys, 2006 Yes Unclear No Partial Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Randjbar, 2011 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Sundag, 2015 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Udachina, 2012 Yes Partial No Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes No  Yes 







Table K.8. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Correlation between Explicit Self-Esteem and Paranoia Severity in  
People with Psychosis 
 







































Bentall, 2008 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Ben-Zeev, 2009 Yes No  No Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Combs, 2009 Partial No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Erickson, 2012 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Freeman, 1998 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Freeman, 2012 Yes No  Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Garety, 2013 Yes No  Partial Yes Yes Yes Partialb Yes 
Humphreys, 2006 Yes No  Partial Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Jones, 2010 Yes Noa  Partial Yes Yes Yes Partialb Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Lincoln, 2010 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes No  Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Randjbar, 2011 Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Ringer, 2014 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Romm, 2011 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Sundag, 2015 Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Thewissen, 2008 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
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Udachina, 2012 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vass, 2015 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial No  No Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Warman, 2011 Yes No Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Wickham, 2015 Yes No Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 


















Table K.9. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis with Persecutory Delusions (PDs)    
vs Healthy Controls 
 
Study Ref (First 



















































Espinosa, 2014 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1994 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Partial No Yes 
MacKinnon, 2011 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McCulloch, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes No No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Smith, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 







Table K.10. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Implicit Self-esteem: Psychosis with Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs 
Depression 
 













































Espinosa, 2014 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1994 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
McCulloch, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial No No Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes No Yes 





Table K.11. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem: Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions      
(PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and, if Specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 
Study Ref (First 












































Kesting, 2011 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes No  Yes 




Table K.12. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Correlation between Paranoia Severity and Implicit Self-Esteem in  
People With Psychosis 
 








































Kesting, 2011 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes No  Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
































































Espinosa, 2014 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1994 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Unclear Partial No Yes 
MacKinnon, 2011 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McCulloch, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes No No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Smith, 2005 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011 Partial Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 












Table K.14. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Discrepancy Scores:a Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs)  
vs Depression 
 
Study Ref (First 

























































Espinosa, 2014 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kesting, 2011 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kinderman, 1994 Partial Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes Unclear Partial No Yes 
McCulloch, 2006 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
Valiente, 2011 Partial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial No No Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes 
















Table K.15. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Difference in Discrepancy Scores:a Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs 
Psychosis Without PDs (and, if specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 
Study Ref (First 



















































Kesting, 2011 Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes Partial No Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial Partial No Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes No  Yes 



















Table K.16. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Correlation between Paranoia Severity and Discrepancy Scoresa in People With 
Psychosis 
 













































Kesting, 2011 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
McKay, 2007 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Moritz, 2006 Yes No  Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vazquez, 2008 Partial No  No Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes 














Table K.17. Assessment of Study Methodological Quality – Correlation between Paranoia Severity and Self-Esteem Instability in  
People With Psychosis 
 







































Erickson, 2012 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Palmier-Claus, 2011 Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Partiala Yes 
Thewissen, 2008 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Udachina, 2012 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 










L.        GRADE Assessment Criteria 
All assessments were conducted by PM and checked by PH. We applied the following criteria for downgrading 
to each outcome.  
Study Limitations  
Individual studies were rated for risk of bias/methodological quality using an adapted version of the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality assessment tool (AHRQ) (Williams et al., 2010). We downgraded an outcome 
by 1 point if three of the parameters in our risk of bias assessment had ≥50% studies with at least one ‘no’ or 
‘unclear’ rating, and 2 points if four or more parameters had ≥50% studies with ratings of ‘no or unclear’.  
Imprecision 
We downgraded an outcome for imprecision by 1 point if “a recommendation or clinical course of action would 
differ if the upper versus the lower boundary of the CI represented the truth” and/or the number of events and 
sample size meant the optimal information size was not reached (Guyatt et al., 2011).   
Inconsistency  
We downgraded an outcome for inconsistency by 1 point if the I2 statistic was ≥40% in the context of an unclear 
direction of effect or ≥75% in the context of a clear direction of effect. We downgraded by 2 points if the I2 
statistic was ≥75% in the context of an unclear direction of effect.  
Publication Bias 
We downgraded an outcome for publication bias by 1 point when, for outcomes with at least 10 studies (Higgins 
& Green, 2011), the Doi plot and LFK index suggested major asymmetry (i.e., LFK index >2) and this was not 
better explained by selective reporting bias or some other factor. However, if the ‘trim and fill’ method indicated 
that any publication bias was not likely to affect the overall magnitude of the effect size, we did not downgrade.  
Rating Up the Quality of Evidence 
In the context of a large effect size, we upgraded by 1 point where the effect size calculated was large. Using 




















M.        Forest Plots of Meta-Analyses 
 
Fig. M.1. Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias (EAB): Psychosis With 
Persecutory Delusions (PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 
Fig. M.2. Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias (EAB): Psychosis With 




































    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.54  ( -1.04, -0.03)      4.0
  -0.41  ( -0.73, -0.09)      4.4
  -0.34  ( -0.84,  0.17)      4.0
  -0.21  ( -0.73,  0.30)      4.0
  -0.17  ( -0.88,  0.54)      3.5
  -0.15  ( -0.82,  0.51)      3.6
  -0.12  ( -0.75,  0.50)      3.7
  -0.11  ( -0.72,  0.50)      3.7
  -0.02  ( -0.67,  0.64)      3.6
   0.05  ( -0.65,  0.76)      3.5
   0.07  ( -0.49,  0.64)      3.8
   0.43  ( -0.19,  1.05)      3.7
   0.46  ( -0.02,  0.94)      4.1
   0.48  (  0.23,  0.73)    100.0
   0.55  ( -0.01,  1.11)      3.9
   0.70  (  0.12,  1.27)      3.8
   0.71  (  0.22,  1.20)      4.0
   0.77  (  0.18,  1.37)      3.8
   0.81  (  0.34,  1.28)      4.1
   0.85  (  0.20,  1.50)      3.6
   0.85  (  0.24,  1.47)      3.7
   0.89  (  0.43,  1.36)      4.1
   0.96  (  0.25,  1.68)      3.4
   1.07  (  0.21,  1.94)      3.1
   1.09  (  0.28,  1.89)      3.2
   1.14  (  0.47,  1.82)      3.6
   2.11  (  1.22,  2.99)      3.0

















    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.34  ( -0.97,  0.28)     10.5
   0.10  ( -0.47,  0.67)     10.7
   0.38  ( -0.20,  0.95)     10.7
   0.59  ( -0.03,  1.22)     10.5
   0.68  (  0.21,  1.15)     11.1
   0.81  (  0.11,  1.51)     10.2
   1.06  (  0.48,  1.63)    100.0
   1.41  (  0.57,  2.25)      9.5
   1.86  (  1.11,  2.61)      9.9
   2.15  (  1.22,  3.07)      9.2
   4.04  (  2.78,  5.30)      7.6
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Fig. M.3. Difference in Externalising Attributional Bias (EAB): Psychosis With 




Fig. M.4. Correlation between Externalising Attributional Bias (EAB) and  























    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.16  ( -0.84,  0.52)      8.6
  -0.14  ( -0.94,  0.66)      7.2
   0.00  ( -0.49,  0.48)     11.4
   0.02  ( -0.68,  0.72)      8.4
   0.06  ( -0.65,  0.78)      8.2
   0.40  (  0.12,  0.68)    100.0
   0.50  ( -0.17,  1.17)      8.8
   0.51  ( -0.06,  1.07)     10.2
   0.63  (  0.12,  1.14)     11.0
   0.66  (  0.11,  1.22)     10.4
   0.76  (  0.12,  1.41)      9.1




























    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.19  ( -0.56,  0.24)      3.3
  -0.17  ( -0.37,  0.04)      6.4
  -0.08  ( -0.41,  0.27)      4.2
  -0.08  ( -0.47,  0.33)      3.4
  -0.01  ( -0.38,  0.36)      3.8
   0.00  ( -0.24,  0.24)      5.8
   0.01  ( -0.34,  0.36)      4.1
   0.01  ( -0.43,  0.45)      2.9
   0.03  ( -0.33,  0.39)      3.9
   0.10  ( -0.02,  0.22)      8.0
   0.11  ( -0.23,  0.43)      4.3
   0.18  (  0.08,  0.27)    100.0
   0.25  ( -0.03,  0.49)      5.2
   0.25  ( -0.09,  0.53)      4.4
   0.27  (  0.04,  0.48)      5.9
   0.29  (  0.05,  0.50)      5.8
   0.30  (  0.06,  0.51)      5.8
   0.33  (  0.05,  0.56)      5.1
   0.37  (  0.13,  0.57)      5.6
   0.39  ( -0.03,  0.69)      3.3
   0.51  (  0.25,  0.70)      4.9
   0.66  (  0.40,  0.82)      4.0
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Fig. M.5. Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem (ESE): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 




Fig. M.6. Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem (ESE): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 
































    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -1.76  ( -2.49, -1.04)      4.0
  -1.48  ( -1.99, -0.98)      5.1
  -1.48  ( -2.03, -0.93)      4.8
  -1.30  ( -1.81, -0.78)      5.0
  -1.28  ( -2.01, -0.55)      3.9
  -1.25  ( -1.85, -0.65)      4.6
  -1.23  ( -1.99, -0.48)      3.8
  -1.16  ( -1.91, -0.40)      3.8
  -1.14  ( -1.69, -0.59)      4.8
  -1.14  ( -1.80, -0.47)      4.3
  -1.05  ( -1.56, -0.54)      5.0
  -0.92  ( -1.76, -0.09)      3.5
  -0.92  ( -1.40, -0.45)      5.2
  -0.91  ( -1.38, -0.44)      5.3
  -0.88  ( -1.10, -0.66)    100.0
  -0.86  ( -1.38, -0.34)      5.0
  -0.85  ( -1.22, -0.49)      5.8
  -0.69  ( -1.49,  0.10)      3.6
  -0.17  ( -0.61,  0.28)      5.4
  -0.12  ( -0.68,  0.44)      4.8
  -0.01  ( -0.75,  0.73)      3.9
   0.13  ( -0.48,  0.74)      4.5




















    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.15  ( -0.84,  0.55)      7.6
   0.07  ( -0.74,  0.87)      7.0
   0.23  ( -0.34,  0.80)      8.3
   0.30  ( -0.09,  0.69)      9.2
   0.38  ( -0.11,  0.88)      8.7
   0.47  ( -0.30,  1.24)      7.2
   0.85  (  0.32,  1.38)      8.5
   0.89  (  0.51,  1.28)    100.0
   0.97  (  0.47,  1.47)      8.7
   1.28  (  0.78,  1.78)      8.7
   1.50  (  0.64,  2.35)      6.8
   1.54  (  0.68,  2.40)      6.7
   1.82  (  1.08,  2.56)      7.4
   3.40  (  2.23,  4.57)      5.3
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Fig. M.7. Difference in Explicit Self-Esteem (ESE): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 


























    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -1.28  ( -2.31, -0.24)      5.1
  -1.05  ( -1.76, -0.33)      8.0
  -0.80  ( -1.50, -0.10)      8.3
  -0.55  ( -1.27,  0.16)      8.0
  -0.29  ( -0.78,  0.19)     11.3
  -0.26  ( -0.54,  0.02)    100.0
  -0.26  ( -1.03,  0.51)      7.4
  -0.24  ( -0.80,  0.32)     10.1
  -0.12  ( -0.46,  0.21)     13.6
   0.11  ( -0.40,  0.62)     10.8
   0.21  ( -0.29,  0.71)     11.0






























    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.57  ( -0.72, -0.36)      4.3
  -0.55  ( -0.81, -0.11)      2.3
  -0.51  ( -0.61, -0.39)      5.6
  -0.50  ( -0.60, -0.39)      5.6
  -0.43  ( -0.61, -0.21)      4.5
  -0.40  ( -0.65, -0.08)      3.5
  -0.37  ( -0.64, -0.01)      3.2
  -0.35  ( -0.59, -0.05)      3.8
  -0.35  ( -0.53, -0.14)      4.8
  -0.32  ( -0.46, -0.17)      5.4
  -0.30  ( -0.46, -0.12)      5.2
  -0.26  ( -0.34, -0.17)    100.0
  -0.25  ( -0.40, -0.08)      5.3
  -0.23  ( -0.42, -0.02)      4.9
  -0.23  ( -0.42, -0.02)      4.9
  -0.23  ( -0.50,  0.08)      3.8
  -0.17  ( -0.41,  0.09)      4.4
  -0.13  ( -0.47,  0.25)      3.2
  -0.12  ( -0.39,  0.16)      4.1
  -0.05  ( -0.18,  0.09)      5.7
   0.00  ( -0.27,  0.27)      4.2
   0.06  ( -0.20,  0.31)      4.3
   0.10  ( -0.15,  0.34)      4.5
   0.41  (  0.00,  0.70)      2.7
155 
 
Fig. M.9. Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem (ISE): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 




Fig. M.10. Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem (ISE): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 
































    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -1.26  ( -1.93, -0.59)      9.0
  -0.95  ( -1.75, -0.14)      7.5
  -0.90  ( -1.64, -0.17)      8.3
  -0.66  ( -1.13, -0.20)     11.7
  -0.63  ( -1.08, -0.17)     11.8
  -0.42  ( -0.72, -0.11)    100.0
  -0.40  ( -0.76, -0.05)     13.2
  -0.26  ( -0.71,  0.19)     11.8
   0.00  ( -0.74,  0.74)      8.2
   0.26  ( -0.35,  0.88)      9.7














    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.89  ( -1.69, -0.10)     10.4
  -0.44  ( -1.01,  0.13)     14.5
  -0.42  ( -1.12,  0.28)     12.0
  -0.27  ( -0.74,  0.20)     16.7
  -0.13  ( -0.47,  0.21)    100.0
  -0.10  ( -0.48,  0.29)     18.7
   0.28  ( -0.17,  0.74)     17.1
   0.87  (  0.08,  1.65)     10.6
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Fig. M.11. Difference in Implicit Self-Esteem (ISE): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 
































    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -1.43  ( -2.44, -0.43)     17.0
  -0.24  ( -0.77,  0.30)    100.0
  -0.16  ( -0.99,  0.66)     21.2
   0.00  ( -0.49,  0.50)     31.1











    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.60  ( -0.82, -0.21)     18.4
  -0.13  ( -0.38,  0.15)    100.0
  -0.08  ( -0.48,  0.34)     20.1
   0.00  ( -0.24,  0.24)     31.1
   0.06  ( -0.20,  0.31)     30.3
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Fig. M.13. Difference in Discrepancy Scores (DS):a Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 
(PDs) vs Healthy Controls 
 
 
aDiscrepancy scores = scores on discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem. 
 
 
Fig. M.14. Difference in Discrepancy Scores (DS):a Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 






























    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -1.35  ( -2.08, -0.61)      8.0
  -0.66  ( -1.12, -0.20)     11.8
  -0.11  ( -0.40,  0.18)    100.0
  -0.08  ( -0.77,  0.61)      8.5
  -0.04  ( -0.84,  0.75)      7.4
  -0.03  ( -0.64,  0.59)      9.6
  -0.01  ( -0.75,  0.74)      7.9
   0.01  ( -0.44,  0.46)     11.9
   0.11  ( -0.24,  0.46)     13.5
   0.32  ( -0.13,  0.76)     12.0














    g (95% CI)          % Weight
   0.20  ( -0.50,  0.89)     10.7
   0.20  ( -0.19,  0.59)     22.4
   0.37  ( -0.38,  1.12)      9.5
   0.50  ( -0.07,  1.08)     14.0
   0.54  (  0.28,  0.80)    100.0
   0.70  (  0.23,  1.16)     18.3
   0.83  (  0.34,  1.31)     17.3
   1.30  (  0.46,  2.15)      7.9
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Fig. M.15. Difference in Discrepancy Scores (DS): Psychosis With Persecutory Delusions 
(PDs) vs Psychosis Without PDs (and, if Specified, Grandiose Delusions; GDs) 
 
 
aDiscrepancy scores = scores on discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem. 
 
 

























    g (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.11  ( -1.03,  0.82)     13.6
  -0.01  ( -0.52,  0.50)     35.2
   0.14  ( -0.36,  0.64)     36.3
   0.17  ( -0.19,  0.53)    100.0











    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
  -0.06  ( -0.51,  0.42)     11.4
   0.00  ( -0.26,  0.26)     35.5
   0.07  ( -0.18,  0.31)     38.3
   0.09  ( -0.09,  0.26)    100.0
   0.43  (  0.02,  0.72)     14.8
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Fig. M.17. Correlation between Paranoia Severity and Self-Esteem Instability (SEI) in 







































    Corr (95% CI)          % Weight
   0.14  (  0.02,  0.26)     40.2
   0.19  ( -0.12,  0.47)     12.2
   0.21  ( -0.05,  0.45)     16.1
   0.23  (  0.11,  0.34)    100.0
   0.35  (  0.20,  0.48)     31.5
161 
 
N.        PRISMA Checklist 
 
Section/topic  # Checklist item  Reported 
TITLE   
Title  1 Identify the report as a systematic review, meta-analysis, or both.  Yes 
ABSTRACT   
Structured summary  2 Provide a structured summary including, as applicable: background; objectives; data sources; 
study eligibility criteria, participants, and interventions; study appraisal and synthesis methods; 
results; limitations; conclusions and implications of key findings; systematic review registration 
number.  
Yes 
INTRODUCTION   
Rationale  3 Describe the rationale for the review in the context of what is already known.  Yes 
Objectives  4 Provide an explicit statement of questions being addressed with reference to participants, 
interventions, comparisons, outcomes, and study design (PICOS).  
Yes 
METHODS   
Protocol and registration  5 Indicate if a review protocol exists, if and where it can be accessed (e.g., Web address), and, if 
available, provide registration information including registration number.  
Yes 
Eligibility criteria  6 Specify study characteristics (e.g., PICOS, length of follow-up) and report characteristics (e.g., 
years considered, language, publication status) used as criteria for eligibility, giving rationale.  
Yes 
Information sources  7 Describe all information sources (e.g., databases with dates of coverage, contact with study 




Section/topic  # Checklist item  Reported 
Search  8 Present full electronic search strategy for at least one database, including any limits used, such 
that it could be repeated.  
Yes 
Study selection  9 State the process for selecting studies (i.e., screening, eligibility, included in systematic review, 
and, if applicable, included in the meta-analysis).  
Yes 
Data collection process  10 Describe method of data extraction from reports (e.g., piloted forms, independently, in duplicate) 
and any processes for obtaining and confirming data from investigators.  
Yes 
Data items  11 List and define all variables for which data were sought (e.g., PICOS, funding sources) and any 
assumptions and simplifications made.  
Yes 
Risk of bias in individual 
studies  
12 Describe methods used for assessing risk of bias of individual studies (including specification of 
whether this was done at the study or outcome level), and how this information is to be used in any 
data synthesis.  
Yes 
Summary measures  13 State the principal summary measures (e.g., risk ratio, difference in means).  Yes 
Synthesis of results  14 Describe the methods of handling data and combining results of studies, if done, including 
measures of consistency (e.g., I2) for each meta-analysis.  
Yes 
 
Section/topic  # Checklist item  
Reported           
  
Risk of bias across studies  15 Specify any assessment of risk of bias that may affect the cumulative evidence (e.g., publication 
bias, selective reporting within studies).  
Yes 
Additional analyses  16 Describe methods of additional analyses (e.g., sensitivity or subgroup analyses, meta-regression), 




Section/topic  # Checklist item  
Reported           
  
RESULTS   
Study selection  17 Give numbers of studies screened, assessed for eligibility, and included in the review, with reasons 
for exclusions at each stage, ideally with a flow diagram.  
Yes 
Study characteristics  18 For each study, present characteristics for which data were extracted (e.g., study size, PICOS, 
follow-up period) and provide the citations.  
Yes 
Risk of bias within studies  19 Present data on risk of bias of each study and, if available, any outcome level assessment (see 
item 12).  
Yes 
Results of individual studies  20 For all outcomes considered (benefits or harms), present, for each study: (a) simple summary data 
for each intervention group (b) effect estimates and confidence intervals, ideally with a forest plot.  
Yes 
Synthesis of results  21 Present results of each meta-analysis done, including confidence intervals and measures of 
consistency.  
Yes 
Risk of bias across studies  22 Present results of any assessment of risk of bias across studies (see Item 15).  Yes 
Additional analysis  23 Give results of additional analyses, if done (e.g., sensitivity or subgroup analyses, meta-regression 
[see Item 16]).  
Yes 
DISCUSSION   
Summary of evidence  24 Summarize the main findings including the strength of evidence for each main outcome; consider 
their relevance to key groups (e.g., healthcare providers, users, and policy makers).  
Yes 
Limitations  25 Discuss limitations at study and outcome level (e.g., risk of bias), and at review-level (e.g., 




Section/topic  # Checklist item  
Reported           
  
Conclusions  26 Provide a general interpretation of the results in the context of other evidence, and implications for 
future research.  
Yes 
FUNDING   
Funding  27 Describe sources of funding for the systematic review and other support (e.g., supply of data); role 









A case series examining the feasibility and acceptability of psychological 
assessment and formulation of impaired treatment decision-making 





























Aims: We used a simple case series design to examine the feasibility and acceptability of 
collaborative psychological assessment and formulation of impaired treatment decision-
making capacity (TDMC) among patients with psychosis, and produce preliminary data on 
safety and efficacy.  
Method: A formulation of impaired TDMC for 5 patient participants was developed and shared 
with 13 clinician participants. Acceptability, utility, working alliance and safety were assessed 
through pre and post self-report and interview measures. 
Results: Three of the patient participants collaborated in the development of their formulation. 
They found the intervention safe and acceptable, following which they provided a much richer 
understanding of the factors that may impair their TDMC (Cohen’s d = 2.16). Two patient 
participants only partially adhered to the intervention protocol, but a psychological formulation 
was still feasible to produce and no adverse effects were reported. Clinician participants 
provided a much richer understanding of the factors that may impair the patient participants’ 
TDMC (Cohen’s d = 1.36; 95% CI = 0.63 to 2.07) after the presentation of the case 
formulations. Increases in knowledge, confidence and positive attitudes regarding supporting 
the TDMC of patients were observed. They strongly believed that the formulations cohered 
with their knowledge of the patient participants and were comprehensive and accurate.  
Conclusions: Patients with psychosis, and their clinicians, can be engaged in a collaborative 
psychological assessment and formulation of factors that may impair their TDMC. Initial data 
















Treatment decision-making capacity (TDMC) has become an increasing target of scientific 
inquiry over the past two decades. This is linked to a shift away from the paternalistic role of 
healthcare professionals towards a greater emphasis on an individual’s own treatment decisions 
(Schneider, 1998). Although TDMC has been variously defined, there is general agreement 
that it involves the following abilities in relation to proposed treatment: (1) understanding (i.e., 
comprehending the nature of the consent-relevant information), (2) appreciation (i.e., 
understanding how the information applies to one’s own condition and situation), (3) reasoning 
(with the information provided), and (4) evidencing a choice (about participation versus non-
participation without severe ambivalence) (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, 
1977). It is worth noting that Scotland has incorporated the concept of significantly impaired 
decision-making ability (SIDMA) as one of the grounds for compulsory treatment under the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act 2003 (the 2003 Act), although it does not apply to 
individuals who are treated under the 2003 Act having being accused of, or committed, an 
offence. The notion of SIDMA is hard to separate from impaired TDMC (Owen, Freyenhagen, 
Richardson, & Hotopf, 2009) so, for the purposes of this research, they will not be separately 
classified.    
Based on surveys of clinicians, there appears to be an existing bias that assumes almost 
everyone with psychosis has impaired TDMC (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Ganzini, Volicer, 
Nelson, Fox, & Derse, 2004). A review of empirical studies regarding capacity to consent to 
treatment and research showed that patients with schizophrenia are more likely to have reduced 
capacity relative to other psychiatric disorders and medical problems, although only a minority 
of these patients performed poorly on any one of the four abilities relating to capacity (i.e. 
evidencing a choice, understanding, reasoning, and appreciation) (Sturman, 2005). Another 
review of empirical studies demonstrated a substantial heterogeneity in decision-making 
capacity for treatment and research among patients with schizophrenia, as well as among non-
psychiatric comparison subjects (NPCs) (Jeste, Depp, & Palmer, 2006). One identified source 
of variability in capacity among patients with schizophrenia was whether the sample was drawn 
from inpatient or outpatient settings, as outpatients were much closer to NPCs in performance 
on capacity measures. These reviews suggest that the presence of schizophrenia does not 
necessarily mean that the patient has impaired TDMC although it is a risk factor for such.  
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If a situation causes a clinician to assess TDMC, he or she will usually have difficulty applying 
standards suggested in the literature and will proceed using unstructured professional 
judgement (Markson, Kern, Annas, & Glantz,1994). However, instruments using structured 
professional judgements have recently improved the reliability of such assessments (Cairns et 
al., 2005; Okai et al., 2007). The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment 
(MacCAT-T) is the most widely used of these instruments and has received the most empirical 
support (Dunn et al., 2006). It is a semi-structured interview measuring understanding, 
reasoning and appreciation in relation to proposed treatment. In addition, it records whether 
the patient is able to make a choice or not. The instrument does not give a total score and the 
abilities are considered distinct, nor is it designed to provide, by itself, a simple binary 
(pass/fail) capacity assessment. However, in combination with a clinical interview, the 
MacCAT-T can be used to produce extremely reliable binary judgements of TDMC (Cairns et 
al., 2005). Moreover, it is worth noting that different assessments of TDMC can yield different 
results; for example, in a comparative empirical study, substantially more patients with 
schizophrenia were classified as impaired using the objective MacCAT-T than by clinical 
assessment alone (Vollmann, Bauer, Danker-Hopfe, & Helmchen, 2003).   
In the psychiatric literature, there are four areas that stand out as being particularly relevant in 
the assessment of decision-making capacity: (1) insight and neuropsychological functioning, 
(2) disorder of thinking (which incorporates delusions), (3) disorders of emotion (including 
anxiety, depression and mania), and (4) risk (Owen et al., 2009). Therefore, it stands to reason 
that an assessment of TDMC should incorporate these factors. Indeed, British Psychological 
Society (BPS) guidance on how to assess capacity in general suggests that these factors should 
be evaluated within the assessment of capacity (BPS, 2006). BPS guidance also suggests that 
other aspects of the individual should be considered, including systemic, interpersonal and 
contextual factors (BPS, 2006). Moreover, within the area of delusions and psychosis, 
cognitive and affective processes have been identified as contributing to the delusional 
experience (Garety & Freeman, 2013), and consequently these may affect TDMC. With regard 
to cognitive processes, there is substantial evidence that people with delusional beliefs have a 
“jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias (Dudley, Taylor, Wickham, & Hutton, 2016) as well as 
an externalizing attributional bias (Murphy, Bentall, Freeman, O’Rourke, & Hutton, in 
preparation). Regarding affective processes, worry and low self-esteem in addition to anxiety 
and depression have been shown to be present in individuals with delusions (Garety & 
Freeman, 2013).  
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Psychological formulations provide a framework for drawing together the range of different 
factors that might affect a given problem (Kinderman, 2005). Of note, a cognitive model of 
impaired TDMC in psychosis has just been developed by Hutton et al. (in preparation), which 
can be used to guide formulations. This model, which integrates a number of recent 
developments in our understanding of factors affecting cognition in psychosis, proposes that 
there are 3 semi-independent pathways to impaired TDMC in psychosis: (1) an appraisal-based 
pathway, whereby delusional appraisals (e.g., “hospital staff are trying to control my thoughts”) 
of internal and external experiences directly compromise TDMC via effects on appreciation of 
treatment-related information; (2) a cognitive resources pathway, whereby biased cognitive 
processing and depleted cognitive resources directly compromise TDMC via effects on 
understanding, reasoning and retention of treatment-related information; and (3) an emotion 
pathway, whereby emotional arousal, caused by appraisals and cognitive perseveration, 
directly and indirectly compromise TDMC via effects on understanding, reasoning and 
communication of treatment-related information. Each pathway is influenced by metacognitive 
awareness and beliefs related to cognitive resources (see Figure 1).   
Although reliable assessments of TDMC have been developed (Cairns et al., 2005; Okai et al., 
2007), no attempts have yet been made to develop a structured protocol for both assessing and 
formulating TDMC among patients with psychosis. Such a protocol might be used to construct 
formulations of the factors that help or hinder TDMC in these patients which might in turn 
inform intervention strategies aimed at restoring TDMC. To address this gap in the literature, 
the overall aim of this research was to conduct a case series to develop and pilot test a structured 
protocol for assessing and formulating impaired TDMC among patients with psychosis while 
being guided by the cognitive model of Hutton et al. (in preparation). More specifically, the 
primary aim of this research was to examine the feasibility and acceptability of assessing and 
formulating impaired TDMC among patients with psychosis, and produce preliminary data 
regarding utility/efficacy and safety. The secondary aim of this research was to produce 






















































We used a simple case series design to (a) examine the feasibility, acceptability, utility/efficacy 
and safety of psychological assessment and formulation of impaired TDMC in patients with 




An analysis of the concept of “case series”, which included 586 articles, suggests that a case 
series should have more than 4 patients while 4 patients or less should be reported individually 
as case reports (Abu-Zidan, Abbas, & Hefny, 2012). With this recommendation in mind, our 
aim was to recruit at least 5 patient participants. We also aimed to recruit clinician participants 
involved in their care.  
Our inclusion criteria for patient participants were as follows: (a) aged over 18 years; (b) able 
to be interviewed and complete the measures; (c) diagnosed with a schizophrenia-spectrum 
disorder (verified through patients’ notes); (d) enrolled as a patient (i) in a forensic mental 
health service in North East Scotland (Site 1) or (ii) in the IPCU or one of the other wards in a 
non-forensic mental health hospital in Central Scotland (Site 2); (e) presumed or already judged 
to have impaired TDMC.  
Patient participants were unable to take part if they: (a) had moderate to severe learning 
disability; (b) had psychosis of predominantly organic origin (e.g., brain injury, physical health 
condition, epilepsy) or had a primary diagnosis of substance or alcohol use disorder; (c) could 
not understand English sufficiently to engage in conversation without an interpreter. 
In regards to clinician participants, our inclusion criteria were as follows: (a) aged over 18 years 
and able to provide informed consent; (b) able to complete the measures; (c) working as a 
multi-disciplinary team member in Site 1 or Site 2; (d) familiar with the patient participant in 
the case presentation and have attended at least one of the case presentations. Non-consenting 




Initially, ethical approval was granted by the West of Scotland NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (REC), who could only give us permission to recruit patient participants who had 
research participant capacity as well as clinician participants involved in their care. 
Subsequently, ethical approval was granted by a “flagged” REC, namely the Scotland A REC. 
They also gave us permission to recruit patient participants who lacked research participant 
capacity as well as clinician participants involved in their care. It should be noted that TDMC 
is considered distinct from research participant capacity, and impaired TDMC does not 
automatically imply that the patient lacks research participant capacity. Indeed, in this case, 
research participant capacity was judged by both RECs to represent a lesser cognitive burden 
than TDMC. This is in accordance with other research on TDMC (Fernandez, Kennedy H., & 
Kennedy M., 2017). Nevertheless, we had permission to recruit patient participants with or 
without research participant capacity as well as clinician participants involved in their care.   
 
Outcomes 
We explored a number of outcomes regarding both patient and clinician participants to address 
the research questions.   
 
Feasibility 
The feasibility of including patient participants in the intervention and its evaluation was 
assessed by measuring the recruitment rate of patient participants, the retention rate of patient 
participants once recruited, the degree to which patient participants adhered to the study 
procedures including the intervention protocol (i.e., the assessment and formulation process) 
and post-intervention assessment, and the degree to which it was possible to develop 
collaborative formulations of impaired TDMC.  
Collaboration or alliance between the researcher and patient participants according to the 
patient participants was measured using the Working Alliance Inventory (WAI), an adaptation 
of the WAI – Short Form (Tracey & Kokotovic, 1989), at post-intervention. This is a 9-item 
patient-rated scale, with each item rated on a 7-point Likert scale. It has 3 subscales: the task 
subscale containing 3 items focusing on agreement of the researcher and patient on tasks (e.g., 
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“The researcher and I agreed about the things I did during the sessions”), the goal subscale 
containing 2 items focusing on the goals or outcome of the intervention (e.g., “The researcher 
and I worked towards mutually agreed upon goals”) and the bond subscale containing 4 items 
focusing on the extent to which there was a positive personal attachment or bond in the 
relationship (e.g., “The researcher and I trusted one another”). The rating for one of the goal 
items is reversed. Possible total scale scores can range from 9 to 63, and higher scores are 
indicative of more positive perceptions of the working alliance.    
To assess the feasibility of including clinicians in the intervention and evaluation processes, 
we also assessed the number of case formulation presentations, the number of clinicians who 
attended the presentations, the recruitment rate of clinician participants from those who 
attended the presentations and the degree to which clinician participants completed the research 
measures.     
 
Acceptability 
Acceptability of the intervention to patient participants was measured by the Acceptability 
Questionnaire (AQ), an adaptation of the Treatment Acceptability Rating Scale (Hunsley, 
1992), at post-intervention. This is an 8-item patient-rated scale, with each item rated on a 7-
point Likert scale. The items focus on overall satisfaction with the sessions, involvement in 
planning the sessions, ability to change the plan of the sessions, acceptability of the different 
tasks, negative consequences of the sessions, helpfulness of the formulation, and the 
researcher’s knowledge and trustworthiness. The rating for the negative consequences item is 
reversed and the ratings are then summed to yield an overall score. Possible scores can range 
from 8 to 56, and higher scores are indicative of higher acceptability.   
Acceptability of the case formulation presentations according to clinician participants was 
measured by 3 items on the 9-item post-formulation Case Formulation Scale (post-CFS). These 
items, rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 0, which is “not at all”, to 4, which is “very much”), 
focus on the degree to which the formulation coheres with the clinician participants’ knowledge 
of the patient participant as well as the degree to which the formulation was comprehensive 






For patient participants, utility/efficacy of the intervention was assessed by using the Reasons 
for Incapacity Questionnaire – Patient Version (RIQ-P) at baseline and post-intervention. This 
is a simple patient questionnaire which asks patient participants why they think they were 
presumed or judged to be unable to make their own treatment decisions. The reasons they give, 
and the degree to which they believe these reasons (recorded using a 0-100% conviction rating 
scale) are captured.  
Utility/efficacy of the intervention was measured using the Incapacity Knowledge Impression 
Scale – Patient Version (IKI-P), an adaptation of the Clinical Global Impression Scale (Guy, 
1976), at baseline and post-intervention. This is a 6-point Likert scale (from 1, which is “not at 
all knowledgeable”, to 6, which is “extremely knowledgeable”), where patient participants are 
asked to rate their knowledge of the factors which help or prevent them from making their own 
decisions about their treatment. In addition to the patient version, a researcher version (IKI-R) 
was used at baseline and post-intervention. This captures the researcher’s perception of the 
patient participants’ knowledge/insight of the aforementioned factors. At post-intervention, the 
Incapacity Knowledge Impression – Improvement Scale – Researcher Version (IKI-I-R), an 
adaptation of the Clinical Global Impression – Improvement Scale (Guy, 1976), was also used. 
This is a 7-point Likert scale (from 1, which is “very much worse”, to 7, which is “very much 
improved”) that captures the researcher’s perception of whether the patient participants’ 
knowledge/insight of the aforementioned factors have improved since baseline.     
Utility/efficacy of the case formulation presentations according to clinician participants was 
assessed by using the Reasons for Incapacity Questionnaire – Clinician Version (RIQ-C) at 
pre- and post-formulation. This is a simple clinician questionnaire which asks clinician 
participants why they think the patient participant was presumed or judged to be unable to 
make their own treatment decisions. The reasons they give, and the degree to which they 
believe these reasons (recorded using a 0-100% conviction rating scale) are captured.  
Utility/efficacy of the case formulation presentations was also measured using the pre- and 
post-formulation CFS (pre-CFS and post-CFS). All of the 6 items that consist of the pre-CFS 
are incorporated into the 9-item post-CFS; these 6 items are relevant to utility/efficacy. These 
items, rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 0, which is “not at all”, to 4, which is “very much”), 
focus on: knowledge regarding the aetiology and maintenance of incapacity of the patient 
participant as well as possible interventions/strategies to support the capacity of the patient 
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participant (2 items), confidence regarding supporting the capacity of the patient participant 
(one item), and attitudes regarding supporting capacity – both in general and specifically with 
regard to the patient participant (3 items). 
 
Preliminary Safety 
Safety of the intervention was assessed using widely used measures of depression and global 
illness severity at baseline and post-intervention, as well as a measure of potential adverse 
effects from intervention involvement at post-intervention or point of discontinuation. In 
regards to depression, this was measured using the Calgary Depression Rating Scale for 
Schizophrenia (CDSS; Addington, D. & Addington, J., 1990), which is designed to reflect the 
presence of depression exclusive of other dimensions of psychopathology in people with 
schizophrenia. This is a brief interview administered by the researcher and consists of 8 
structured questions followed by one observation item. Possible scores can range from 0 to 27, 
and higher scores are indicative of higher depressive symptoms.  
In relation to global illness severity, this was assessed using the Clinical Global Impression 
Scale (Guy, 1976) (here called the CGI-R). This is a 7-point Likert scale (from 1, which is 
“normal, not at all ill”, to 7, which is “extremely ill”), that captures the researcher’s perception 
of the severity of the patient participants’ mental health difficulties. In addition to the researcher 
version, a patient version (CGI-P) was used to obtain the patient participants’ perception of the 
severity of their mental health difficulties. At post-intervention, the CGI – Improvement Scale 
(Guy, 1976) (here called the CGI-I-R) was also used. This is a 7-point Likert scale (from 1, 
which is “very much improved”, to 7, which is “very much worse”) that captures the 
researcher’s perception of whether the patient participants’ mental health difficulties have 
improved or deteriorated since baseline.     
With regard to potential adverse effects from intervention involvement, these were assessed 
using the Adverse Effects Questionnaire (AEQ), an adaptation of a measure used in a large 
multi-centre trial of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for clozapine-resistant psychosis 
(Pyle et al., 2016). The version of the AEQ for intervention completers is a 26-item patient-
rated scale, with each item rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 0, which is “not at all”, to 4, 
which is “very much”). The items focus on the following broad categories: worsening 
difficulties; poor engagement (including low motivation); situational change; not getting better; 
stigma; increased conflict with others (care team, family etc.). The version of the AEQ for 
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intervention discontinuers has an extra item related to feeling better, the rating of which is 
reversed. Possible scores for the intervention completer version and the intervention 
discontinuer version can range from 0 to 104 and 0 to 108 respectively, and higher scores are 
indicative of potentially greater adverse effects from intervention involvement.  
 
Development regarding Hypotheses that Help/Hinder TDMC 
A narrative description and summary of the process and outcome of the intervention was also 
provided for each patient participant, as per other case series work in psychosis (e.g., Maddox 
et al., 2013; Morrison, 2001). 
This was planned in order to (a) help readers judge the feasibility, utility and potential 
efficacy/safety of the overall intervention, (b) understand the clinical issues which were 
presented and the processes involved in delivering and evaluating the intervention, and (c) 




Following the recruitment and consent process, the intention was for the primary researcher at 
each site (PM in Site 1 and PH in Site 2) to conduct a baseline assessment with patient 
participants by administering some brief measures. These included a form to collect 
demographic and other clinical information as well as the aforementioned measures of patient 
participants’ reasons for incapacity (RIQ-P), patient participants’ impression of their 
knowledge of incapacity (IKI-P), patient participants’ global illness severity impression (CGI-
P) and depression (CDSS). The researcher reviewed the case notes of patient participants in 
advance of this assessment (having already obtained consent to do so) to avoid asking any 
unnecessary questions. Moreover, just after this assessment, the researcher completed some 
brief measures independently based on his observations of patient participants during the 
assessment; these included the aforementioned measures of patient participants’ 
knowledge/insight of incapacity (IKI-R) and global illness severity (CGI-R), from the 
perspective of the researcher. 
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The intervention then commenced. The intention was for this to be as collaborative as possible, 
and to be conducted over several sessions by the primary researcher using (a) a comprehensive 
cognitive-behavioural interview, and (b) a set of structured assessments (including interviews, 
questionnaires, computer and other tasks). More information about the intervention is provided 
below. 
The information obtained from the cognitive-behavioural interview and set of structured 
assessments was used to collaboratively construct formulations of the factors that may help or 
hinder TDMC for the patient participants. As mentioned, these formulations were guided by a 
cognitive model of impaired TDMC in psychosis (Hutton et al., in prep.), as already outlined 
and depicted in Figure 1. Potential strategies for restoring TDMC were derived from the 
formulations. The formulations, along with the potential strategies for restoring TDMC, were 
then shared with the clinical team if the patient participants agreed to this.  
With the patient participants’ agreement, the primary researcher shared the resulting 
formulations with the clinician participants and the rest of the clinical team during a multi-
disciplinary ‘formulation meeting’. Only one case formulation was presented at each meeting. 
Clinician participants were asked to complete the aforementioned CFS and the measure of 
clinician participants’ reasons for incapacity (RIQ-C) before and after the formulation meeting. 
They were also asked to complete a form so basic demographic information could be collected. 
Finally, the primary researcher invited the patient participants to attend a post-intervention 
assessment, where a number of brief measures could be administered, including the 
aforementioned measures of working alliance (WAI), acceptability (AQ) and adverse effects 
(AEQ), as well as the measures that were administered at baseline: RIQ-P, IKI-P, CGI-P and 
CDSS. Just after this assessment, the researcher completed some brief measures independently 
based on his observations of patient participants during the assessment; these included the 
measures that were completed at baseline (IKI-R and CGI-R) as well as the aforementioned 
measures of improvements with regard to patient participants’ knowledge/insight of incapacity 
(IKI-I-R) and global illness severity (CGI-I-R), from the perspective of the researcher. 
Moreover, the primary researcher invited any patient participants who dropped out of the 





Intervention (i.e., Assessment and Formulation Process) 
The intention was for the primary researcher at each site to conduct the intervention with patient 
participants. The aim was that the intervention would take place for up to six sessions of 
approximately one hour’s duration. A break was scheduled during each session, and patient 
participants were informed that they could request an additional break at any point.   
Each of these sessions consisted of (a) a cognitive behavioural interview and (b) a set of 
structured assessments (including interviews, questionnaires, computer and other tasks) which 
were known or hypothesised to contribute to impaired TDMC. The cognitive-behavioural 
interview allowed: (i) the results from the previous session's structured assessments to be 
interpreted and discussed with the patient participants; (ii) a rationale for those measures 
administered in the current session to be shared; (iii) a collaborative formulation of impaired 
TDMC to be developed (see below). Thus, the assessment and formulation became gradually 
more comprehensive as the sessions progressed. Below is a narrative description of the content 
of each session, detailing which structured assessments were due to be administered. Table 1 




The Personal Beliefs about Experience Questionnaire (PBEQ: Pyle et al., 2015) 
The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment (MacCAT-T: Grisso et al., 1997) 
 
Session 2  
Cognitive-behavioural interview 
The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS: Fowler et al., 2006)       






The Brief Neurocognitive Assessment (BNA: Fervaha et al., 2015) 
The Beads Task (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991; Phillips & Edwards, 1966) 
The Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for psychosis (CBQp: Peters et al., 2014)  
 
Session 4  
Cognitive-behavioural interview 
The abbreviated version of the Scale to assess Unawareness in Mental Disorder (SUMD: 
Michel et al., 2013)  
The short-form version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21: Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES: Rosenberg, 1965) 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ: Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) 
The Brief Strengths Test (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2006) 
 
Session 5  
Cognitive-behavioural interview 
The Attributional Style Questionnare parallel form (ASQpf: Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994) 
The Emotional Stroop Task  





Below is a description of the aforementioned measures that were administered as part of the 
intervention. Only a brief a description of the structured assessments is provided below due to 
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space constraints, although a more detailed description of these assessments is provided in the 
Protocol in the Appendix.    
 
Cognitive-Behavioural Interview 
Patient participants were assessed using a comprehensive cognitive-behavioural interview with 
a strong collaborative focus. Elements of such an interview are well described by Morrison, 
Renton, Dunn, Williams, & Bentall (2004), and detailed guidance on working collaboratively 
in psychosis is provided by Hutton & Morrison (2013). The interview focuses on the role of 
cognitive appraisals of information relevant to the decision which the patient participants have 
been judged to lack capacity to make, and whether these appraisals help or hinder TDMC, and 
the role of affective (e.g., anxiety) and behavioural responses (e.g., avoidance) linked to these 
cognitive appraisals. Whether these affective and behavioural responses serve to maintain 
conviction or preoccupation with key appraisals are examined in collaboration with the patient 
participants.  
The contribution of pre-existing beliefs or “schemata” are also investigated in a collaborative 
manner and included in the formulations, including positive and negative beliefs about 
psychotic phenomena, and positive and negative beliefs about their diagnosis. Relevant beliefs 
about self, others and the world are also examined, as are the potential role and origin of 
cognitive processes, such as worry, rumination and self-criticism. The patient participants’ 
particular strengths are also assessed using the Brief Strengths Test (Peterson & Seligman, 
2004; Seligman, 2006), and incorporated into the formulations where possible.     
The above information, together with information from the set of structured assessments, were 
used to collaboratively construct formulations of the factors that may help or hinder TDMC for 
the patient participants. As mentioned, these formulations were guided by a cognitive model 
of impaired TDMC in psychosis (Hutton et al., in prep.), as already outlined and depicted in 
Figure 1. Potential strategies for restoring TDMC were derived from the formulations. The 
formulations, along with the potential strategies for restoring TDMC, were shared with the 
clinical team if the patient participants agreed to this.  
PM received regular supervision from PH, who has received in-depth training in CBT for 
psychosis as part of his role as trial therapist on clinical trials of CBT for psychosis (Morrison 
et al., 2012; Morrison et al., 2014; Morrison et al., in prep). PH has published a practice guide 
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to collaboration in CBT for psychosis (Hutton & Morrison, 2013), and recently supervised 
several CBT therapists on a large multi-centre trial of CBT for clozapine-resistant psychosis 
(Pyle et al., 2016). 
 
MacCAT-T (Grisso et al., 1997) 
The MacCAT-T was used to assess decisional capacity for treatment in the patient participants. 
This is a semi-structured interview which takes about 40 minutes to administer.  
 
PBEQ (Pyle et al., 2015) 
The PBEQ was used to measure beliefs about psychotic experiences in patient participants. 
This is a brief self-report measure which typically takes less than 5 minutes to complete.  
 
BCSS (Fowler et al., 2006) 
The BCSS was used to assess schemata concerning self and others in patient participants. This 
is a brief self-report scale which typically takes less than 5 minutes to complete. 
 
PANSS (Kay et al., 1987)    
The PANSS was used to measure psychotic symptoms in the patient participants. This is a 
clinician-administered scale which typically takes between 30–40 minutes to administer. The 
intention was for this to be administered with the patient participants. An alternative option 
was to use this to assess patient participants’ symptoms from case notes and speaking with 
clinicians.  
 
BNA (Fervaha et al., 2015) 
The BNA was used to measure cognitive functioning in the patient participants. It only takes 




Beads Task (Garety et al., 1991; Phillips & Edwards, 1966) 
A computerised version of the Beads Task was used to measure the “jumping to conclusions” 
(JTC) bias (a tendency to use fewer data to reach a decision) in the patient participants. It 
typically takes about 5 minutes to complete. 
 
CBQp (Peters et al., 2014) 
The CBQp was used to measure cognitive distortions in the patient participants. It is estimated 
to take no longer than 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Abbreviated Version of the SUMD (Michel et al., 2013) 
The abbreviated version of the SUMD was used to measure insight in the patient participants. 
This is a standardised expert-rating scale based on a patient interview and typically takes 
between 15–20 minutes to administer.  
 
DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
The DASS-21 was used to measure depression, anxiety and tension/stress in the patient 
participants. This is a brief 21-item self-report scale which typically takes about 5 minutes to 
complete. 
 
RSES (Rosenberg, 1965) 
The RSES was used to measure self-esteem in the patient participants. This is a brief self-report 
measure of overt global self-esteem which typically takes less than 5 minutes to complete. 
       
PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990)  
The PSWQ was used to measure worry in the patient participants. This is a brief self-report 




Brief Strengths Test (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2006)  
The Brief Strengths Test was used to measure the strengths of the patient participants so that 
their strengths could be incorporated into the formulations where possible. This is a self-report 
measure which typically takes about 10 minutes to complete. 
 
ASQpf (Lyon et al., 1994)  
The ASQpf was used to measure patient participants’ overt expression of attributional styles. 
The ASQpf typically takes about 20 minutes to complete.  
 
Emotional Stroop Task 
A computerised version of the Emotional Stroop Task using negative and neutral word stimuli 
from a previous study (Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008) was developed for the purposes of the 
present study. This was used to measure covert self-esteem in the patient participants. The task 
typically takes about 5 minutes to complete.    
 
YMRS (Young et al., 1978)  
The YMRS was used to measure mania in the patient participants. This is a widely used 
clinician-administered scale which typically takes about 10 minutes to administer. 
 
Supplementary Assessment 
As we thought that it would be possible that not all patient participants would be able to fully 
adhere to the intervention protocol, we developed a simple method for ascertaining the 
unassessed variables from case notes and speaking with clinicians. The aim was that this 
information could then be used for the development of the formulations. In such cases, we took 
note of: 
1. the degree to which a factor was present (not present/no evidence of presence, minor 
presence, moderate presence, marked presence); 
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2. whether a factor appeared to be associated with judgements of incapacity (no 
association, low association, moderate association, high association); 
3. the strength of evidence for 1 (weak, moderate, high); 
4. the strength of evidence for 2 (weak, moderate, high). 
We also recorded the source of evidence supporting our rating. Moreover, irrespective of 
whether or not patient participants were able to fully adhere to the intervention protocol, we 
took note of any additional factors that were present and might be associated with incapacity 












Table 1. Example of how the intervention might progress 
Session number Content of session 
Session 1 • Rationale and purpose of session 1 – agenda setting. 
• Discussion regarding how the intervention might progress. Address the structured 
nature of the intervention including the structured assessments. Emphasise 
collaboration. 
• Understanding of their goals and reasons for attendance. Identification of their 
current problems in life and their goals related to these. 
• Discussion regarding the capacity issue. 
• Administer PBEQ and explore their responses. 
• Explanation of cognitive formulation. 
• Administer MacCAT-T. 
• Summary and feedback, link to next session. 
• Hometask – read formulation leaflet. 
Session 2 • Rationale and purpose of session 2 – agenda setting. 
• Summary and feedback from session 1.  
• Summary of MacCAT-T results and their perspective. 
• Begin developmental assessment and formulation. 
• Administer BCSS and explore their responses. 
• Administer PANSS. 
• Summary and feedback, link to next session.  
• Hometask – timeline. 
Session 3 • Rationale and purpose of session 3 – agenda setting. 
• Summary and feedback from session 2. 
• Build formulation – incorporate assessment of traumatic treatment experiences. 
• Administer the Beads Task and discussion of JTC bias if present. 
• Administer CBQp and explore their responses. 
• Administer the BNA. 
• Summary and feedback, link to next session.  
• Hometask – any outstanding self-report measures. 
Session 4 • Rationale and purpose of session 4 – agenda setting. 
• Summary and feedback from session 3. 
• Continue building formulation – assess systemic factors. 
• Administer DASS-21, RSES and PSWQ. Then discussion of their responses. 
• Administer abbreviated version of SUMD. 
• Administer the Brief Strengths Test and discuss implications. 
• Summary and feedback, link to next session. 
• Hometask – any outstanding self-report measures.  
Session 5 • Rationale and purpose of session 5 – agenda setting. 
• Summary and feedback from session 4. 
• Continue building formulation. 
• Administer ASQpf, Emotional Stroop Task and YMRS. Then discussion of their 
responses. 
• Summary and feedback, link to next session. 
• Hometask – any outstanding self-report measures.  
Session 6 • Rationale and purpose of session 6 – agenda setting. 
• Summary and feedback from session 5. 
• Finish building formulation. 
• Discussion of intervention implications. 
• Seek consent to share formulation with clinical team. 
• Summary and feedback.  
Abbreviations: ASQpf, Attributional Style Questionnaire parallel form; BCSS, Brief Core Schema Scale; BNA, Brief Neurocognitive Assessment; 
CBQp, Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis; DASS-21, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; MacCAT-T, MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool – Treatment; JTC, Jumping to Conclusions; PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; PBEQ, Positive Beliefs about 
Experience Questionnaire; RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; SUMD, Scale to assess Unawareness in 





In accordance with guidelines for good practice for the analysis of pilot studies (Lancaster, 
Dodd, & Williamson, 2004), our analysis plan did not include the reporting of p values but 
instead focused on the reporting of simple descriptive statistics and effect sizes with their 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Effect sizes were calculated by computing 
Cohen’s d, in which the difference between the means was divided by the pooled standard 
deviation (SD) (Cohen, 1988). Effect sizes are defined as small (0.2), medium (0.5) and large 
(0.8) (Cohen, 1988). These effect sizes were calculated using Exploratory Software for 
Confidence Intervals (ESCI; see Cumming & Finch, 2001). When there were more than 5 
participants, corresponding 95% CIs were also calculated using ESCI. ESCI cannot calculate 
corresponding 95% CIs when there are 5 or less participants; thus, in these cases, effect sizes 
should be considered as preliminary.     
The reasons for impaired TDMC given by patient and clinician participants on the measures of 
patient participants’ reasons for incapacity (RIQ-P) and clinician participants’ reasons for 
incapacity (RIQ-C), pre and post assessment and formulation, were rated by 2 independent 
experts (both of whom were qualified clinical psychologists, each with 10 years of experience 
in research and clinical practice in psychological interventions for psychosis) who were blind 
to the temporal order of the reasons supplied (i.e., whether they were gathered before or after 
the assessment and formulation process). They were asked to rate, using a simple 6-point Likert 
scale (from 1, which is “not at all rich”, to 6, which is “extremely rich”), the extent to which 
they believe the list of reasons demonstrate a rich understanding of the factors that might impair 
TDMC. Inter-rater reliability was then explored by measuring the percent of agreement 
between the 2 expert raters (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Agreement was 
defined as within one point on the Likert scale, and percent of agreement was calculated by 
dividing the number of agreements by the number of agreements plus disagreements and 
multiplying by 100. While one limitation of percent of agreement is its inability to account for 
chance agreement, this is more of a problem when there are just 2 categories in a coding scheme 
(e.g., rich vs not rich) (Lombard et al., 2002). Nevertheless, given this risk, a higher threshold 
of 90% for percent of agreement has been suggested (Lombard et al., 2002). Thus, if percent 
of agreement was 90% or higher, we considered inter-rater reliability to be sufficient, which 
meant that the scores of the 2 expert raters could be averaged together and used in the 
subsequent analyses.   
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Moreover, individual scores on the structured assessments as part of the intervention were 
compared to relevant population norms for each patient participant. The process for selecting 












We received a total of 14 patient referrals across both sites – 11 in Site 1 and 3 in Site 2. In Site 
1, 10 of the referred patients met our study criteria, of whom 5 (50%) agreed to participate and 
5 (50%) refused to participate. The referred patient who was deemed unsuitable in Site 1 had a 
diagnosis other than a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. All of the referred patients in Site 1 
were inpatients in a low-secure forensic mental health ward and had initially been judged by 
the referring psychiatrist to have research participant capacity. The research participant 
capacity of those who agreed to participate was subsequently confirmed by the primary 
researcher. In Site 2, none (0%) of the 3 referred patients who met our study criteria agreed to 
participate. All of the referred patients in Site 2 were inpatients in the IPCU in a non-forensic 
mental health setting and had initially been judged by the referring psychiatrist to have research 
participant capacity. Among the 5 consenting patient participants, 4 (80%) were male and 1 
(20%) was female. Their mean age was 41.6 with a SD of 8.6. Table 2 shows a summary of 
the patient participants’ characteristics. All diagnoses were made by the patient participants’ 
psychiatrists as documented in the case notes. Because the risk of participants being identified 
in a case series is high, we decided not to report the specific sex of the individual patient 
participants. We also reported ranges regarding age and years since first diagnosis of the 
individual patient participants. However, we decided to report the ethnicity of the individual 
patient participants as all patient participants had the same ethnicity. Moreover, we presented 
the patient participants in a random order. 
In regards to clinician participants, 13 clinicians involved in the care of the 5 patient 
participants in Site 1 agreed to participate, all of whom met our study criteria. Only one 
clinician (who also met our study criteria) did not respond to an invitation to participate. The 
13 clinician participants provided 15 datasets in total, as 2 of the clinician participants were 
involved in the care of 2 of the patient participants. Table 3 shows a summary of the clinician 







Table 2. Summary of patient participants’ characteristics (n = 5) 









P2 42-51 Caucasian Consultant 
psychiatrist 
Delusional disorder Over 10  Clozapine 
P3 42-51 Caucasian Consultant 
psychiatrist 
Delusional disorder 1-3  Clozapine 
P4 32-41 Caucasian Locum psychiatrist Schizophrenia 0-1 Paliperidone 
P5 32-41 Caucasian Consultant 
psychiatrist 





Table 3. Summary of clinician participants’ characteristics (n = 13) 
Sex, n (%)  
   Female  
   Male 
10 (76.9%) 
3 (23.1%) 
Age, mean years (SD) 36.3 (10.2) 
Ethnicity, n (%) 
   Caucasian 
   Asian 






   Consultant psychiatrist 
   Locum psychiatrist 
   Trainee psychiatrist 
   Consultant clinical psychologist 
   Clinical psychologist 
   Occupational therapist 
   Mental health nurse 










Length of work in health care,  
mean years (SD) 
11.2 (9.6) 
Length of work in psychosis, 













In the following section, the process and outcome of the intervention for each of the 5 patient 




Participant 1 was referred by their psychiatrist because they were judged to lack the capacity 
to make a decision about hospitalisation. Reasons for such incapacity included being floridly 
psychotic but having limited insight into this and need for treatment as well as having limited 
ability to engage in meaningful discussion regarding treatment which was thought to be related 
to cognitive processing difficulties. Enjoying being manic and therefore not being motivated 
to be fully treated was another reason provided.  
Process 
Participant 1 was seen for 5 sessions lasting no longer than an hour each. The participant fully 
engaged in the process and completed all of the structured assessments. The PANSS had 
recently been administered as part of clinical work so it was decided that this did not need to 
be repeated. Two other assessments which were not part of the assessment battery, namely the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; a measure of implicit self-esteem) (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000) and the Interpretations of Voices Inventory (IVI; a measure of interpretations of voices) 
(Morrison, Wells, & Nothard, 2002) had also recently been administered as part of clinical 
work so the results from these were incorporated into the formulation.    
Background 
As can be seen in Table 2, Participant 1 was aged between 22 and 31, was of Caucasian 
ethnicity, had received a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder within the last year and was 
prescribed clozapine. The participant had a difficult upbringing. The participant’s mother left 
the country shortly after their birth and had very little contact with the participant. This left the 
participant feeling neglected. The participant was reared by their father and step-mother. The 
participant felt treated differently by their step-mother in comparison to their step-siblings and 
as a result once again felt neglected. The participant also received some physical abuse by their 
father. The participant felt isolated growing up in a remote rural area. The participant had 
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moved schools a lot and got in trouble at times due to behavioural difficulties. The participant 
felt that they had not achieved their potential in school. The participant had smoked cannabis 
for several years, had participated in gambling and engaged in binge drinking at times. In more 
recent times, the participant had experienced stress including the death of a friend. The 
participant had also lost jobs as a result of stress. The participant had recently come into contact 
with mental health services due to a non-violent offence which was judged to be related to their 
psychotic symptoms.     
Assessment Results 
Participant 1’s results from the set of structured assessments are provided in the Appendix. The 
MacCAT-T indicated that the participant had high scores across the different domains of 
understanding, appreciation, reasoning and expressing a choice (Grisso et al., 1997; Palmer, 
Dunn, Appelbaum, & Jeste, 2004). Therefore, it appeared that the participant’s capacity had 
improved since the time of the referral (Session 1 took place approximately 3 weeks after the 
referral). This was consistent with the recent report of the referring psychiatrist. However, at 
the time of the referral, it was thought that the participant had difficulties with appreciation, 
especially the ability to appreciate that treatment could be beneficial. The evidence for this 
came from a brief initial appointment with the researcher just after referral as well as the 
psychiatrist’s report. Therefore, we thought that it would be best to try to develop a formulation 
taking into consideration how the participant was at the time of the referral when they had 
difficulties with appreciation. Current difficulties were also taken into consideration as it was 
thought that these would put the participant at risk of being judged to lack capacity again.  
The PANSS indicated that the participant only had positive symptoms of psychosis (Palmer et 
al., 2004). No negative symptoms were detected (Palmer et al., 2004). Notable scores from the 
PANSS include that the participant had severe delusions, primarily delusions of reference, and 
had severe hallucinatory behaviour – both auditory and visual. The BCSS indicated that the 
participant had higher than normal explicit positive beliefs about self (Fowler et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, the Emotional Stroop Task as well as the IAT indicated that the participant had 
lower than normal implicit beliefs about self (Besnier et al., 2011). The ASQpf, YMRS and 
BNA indicated that the participant had an attributional style similar to depressed patients (Lyon 
et al., 1994), had higher than normal symptoms of mania (Berk et al., 2008) and had low 
average global neurocognitive ability (Fervaha et al., 2015). The IVI indicated that the 
participant’s appraisals of voices had a protective function [e.g., “If I were to hear sounds or 
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voices that other people could not hear, I would probably think that: they allow me to help 
others (believes very much); they mean that I am close to God (believes moderately so)]. Other 
information was derived from the cognitive-behavioural interview including metacognitive 
beliefs/awareness.      
Formulation 
A full formulation incorporating the results from the structured assessments and cognitive-
behavioural interview regarding Participant 1 can be seen in Figure 2. The participant’s life 
experiences were characterised by, among others, abandonment, neglect, physical abuse, social 
isolation, substance misuse, academic underachievement and job losses. These experiences 
seem to have contributed to long-standing low self-esteem, including beliefs of being 
unlovable, a failure and a sense of not belonging. Although these beliefs were sometimes 
explicit, they often appeared to be implicit. The participant’s key appraisals appeared to be in 
conflict with each other. On an explicit level, the participant appraised their intrusive 
thoughts/voices and things appearing significant (e.g., receiving a non-verbal message from a 
footballer through the TV) as meaning that they were important, had special powers and were 
close to God. These explicit appraisals appeared to be protective against the effects of low 
implicit self-esteem. On an implicit level, the participant appeared to appraise their life 
experiences as meaning that they were unlovable, a failure and that they did not belong in 
society. The participant’s appraisals – both explicit and implicit – appeared to be influenced by 
their cognitive resources. Indeed, the participant’s low average cognitive functioning and 
depressive attributional style (where they tended to attribute negative events to themselves) 
appeared to contribute to their implicit appraisals. On the other hand, the participant’s tendency 
to over-analyse and their confirmation bias (where they tended to look for evidence consistent 
with their explicit beliefs) appeared to contribute to their explicit appraisals. Moderating the 
negative effect of the participant’s cognitive resources was likely to be metacognitive 
awareness of these resources. For example, the participant’s unawareness of their confirmation 
bias made it less likely that they took steps to mitigate the effects of this confirmation bias. 
Metacognitive beliefs and awareness also appeared to directly affect the participant’s 
appraisals. For example, the participant’s belief that the mind is capable of great things and has 
special powers made it more likely than when the participant experienced intrusive 
thoughts/voices they interpreted these as meaning that they were special. Regarding emotion, 
the participant’s appraisals appeared to lead to very high emotional arousal including 
depression and mania. In regards to capacity, the participant’s appraisals appeared to negatively 
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affect their capacity, specifically their ability to appreciate that treatment could be beneficial. 
Indeed, the participant’s explicit appraisals that they were important, had special powers and 
were close to God may have meant to the participant that they were not ill and therefore did 
not need treatment. The participant’s emotional arousal especially mania also had an impact 
on ratings of appreciation.             
 
 
Figure 2. Case formulation for Participant 1 
 
Further Intervention Implications 
In terms of supporting capacity and autonomy, we made the following recommendations to 
clinician participants involved in the care of Participant 1: 
• Improve the self-esteem of the participant, help them make sense of the past and 
modify their depressive attributional style, as these interventions may reduce their need 




• Do not ‘normalise’ experiences, promote ‘insight’ into symptoms, or modify 
confirmation bias before self-esteem is improved, as reducing the participant’s sense 
of specialness at this stage may risk inducing depression. 
• Once self-esteem and relationships with others are sufficiently strong, 
psychoeducation about trauma-intrusions and trauma-psychosis literature, longitudinal 
formulation and modification of confirmation bias may help the participant develop 
alternative explanations for their experiences, thus improving appreciation further.  
Outcomes and Feedback 
At the end of the intervention, Participant 1 reported enjoying the process. The participant liked 
the computer tasks (including the Emotional Stroop Task and the Beads Task) and discussing 
the interpretation of these. Outcomes regarding feasibility, acceptability, utility/efficacy and 
safety were positive (see Table 4). Regarding feasibility, the WAI indicated that the participant 
had very positive perceptions of alliance or collaboration during the sessions. In regards to 
acceptability, the AQ indicated that the participant found the intervention very acceptable. As 
for utility/efficacy, the pre- and post-RIQ-P scores, which had been blindly rated by 2 
independent experts, indicated that the participant provided a richer understanding of the 
factors that may impair their TDMC at post-intervention in comparison to baseline. Reasons 
for impaired TDMC provided at post-intervention that were not present at baseline include: 
“My experiences might have affected my thinking” and “My capacity might have been affected 
by the way I was thinking about things”. The IKI-P and IKI-R, both of which were administered 
at baseline and post-intervention, also indicated that the participant had become more 
knowledgeable of the factors that may impair their TDMC. Finally, with regard to safety, the 
CDSS, CGI-R and CGI-P, all of which were administered at baseline and post-intervention, 
indicated that the participant’s mental health difficulties including any depressive symptoms 
had not worsened over the course of the intervention. The post-intervention AEQ also indicated 
no adverse effects from intervention involvement.  
   
Participant 2 
Referral 
Participant 2 was referred by their psychiatrist. As the message of the referral was passed 
through another clinician, the researcher was not clear at the outset regarding the specific 
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reasons of the referral other than that the participant was presumed or judged to lack TDMC. 
Subsequently, the researcher was informed that the participant had previously been judged to 
have the capacity to make a decision about anti-psychotic medication but that perhaps the 
participant’s capacity to make other treatment decisions was in question. As the participant had 
unsuccessful periods living in supportive accommodation in the community, whether the 
participant had the capacity to make a decision about hospitalisation vs supportive 
accommodation was explored. Another problem that was identified by the clinical team was 
that the participant frequently asks for excessive quantities of his current medications and for 
additional medications and other treatment (e.g., Valium, electroconvulsive therapy; ECT) for 
indications that are not appropriate. This problem was taken into consideration but it was not 
the specific focus of the formulation.  
Process 
Approximately 10 minutes into the first session, Participant 2 asked whether the session could 
end early following which they left the room. Reflecting on the process of the session, the 
researcher believed that perhaps the participant had felt somewhat defensive about discussing 
the reason for the referral – i.e., that the participant had been presumed to lack TDMC by the 
referring psychiatrist. The researcher also reflected that perhaps the participant had found the 
task of completing one of the questionnaires (PBEQ) too taxing due to cognitive functioning 
difficulties. A couple of days later, the participant requested whether another session could be 
arranged. During this second session, the researcher provided sufficient space for the 
participant to ‘tell their story’ both as a way of engagement and to acquire information that 
would contribute to the formulation. The researcher also advised the participant that he was 
not taking a position on whether the participant lacked TDMC or had a need for care. Rather, 
the researcher emphasised that his role was instead to work with the participant to understand 
why a judgement regarding impaired TDMC had been made and to identify what could be done 
to achieve a judgement of regained TDMC. The participant seemed to enjoy the second session 
and engaged well throughout the session. On discussion between the researcher and participant, 
the participant decided that they would like to have shorter but more frequent sessions. In total, 
the participant attended 10 sessions averaging about 30 minutes each. An agenda was 
established at the start of each session, where the researcher and participant agreed that they 
could complete some structured assessments as well as spend time talking about the general 
interests of the participant (e.g., bible, guitar). The participant completed the majority of the 




As can be seen in Table 2, Participant 2 was aged between 42 and 51, was of Caucasian 
ethnicity, had received a diagnosis of delusional disorder over 10 years ago and was prescribed 
clozapine. The participant had grown up in a stressful home environment. The participant’s 
mother experienced anxiety and both their mother and father had an alcohol problem and 
fought at times (e.g., the participant had a memory of their mother scalding their father with 
boiling water). The participant themselves also experienced anxiety, which affected their 
school performance and achievement and relationships with others. In addition, the participant 
used to abuse their mother’s prescription medication and had a pattern of substance misuse 
since then. The participant’s psychosis emerged in their late teens which resulted in an 
admission to hospital. The participant believed that their psychosis had a significant impact 
early in its development including leading to job losses and self-harm attempts. The participant 
continued to feel guilty about different events and the effect of their psychosis on their parents. 
The participant made sense of many of their life experiences from a religious perspective (e.g., 
the participant believed that many adverse events in their life were due to the Devil taking over 
their soul). The participant had unsuccessful attempts living in supportive accommodation due 
to violent/sexualised behaviour, which was often associated with substance misuse especially 
alcohol misuse. The participant had been hospitalised for several years in a row at the time of 
the referral.  
Assessment Results 
Participant 2’s results from the set of structured assessments are provided in the Appendix. The 
MacCAT-T indicated that the participant had difficulties in relation to their capacity to decide 
between hospitalisation and supportive accommodation. Specifically, some of the participant’s 
scores in relation to understanding, appreciation and reasoning were problematic (Grisso et al., 
1997; Palmer et al., 2004). With regard to understanding, the participant did not appear to fully 
understand the risks of supportive accommodation (i.e., they underestimated the likelihood that 
risks such as substance misuse – which had been associated with their previous disinhibited 
behaviour – would be experienced). Regarding appreciation, the participant did not appear to 
fully appreciate the possibility that hospitalisation could have certain benefits over supportive 
accommodation. In regards to reasoning, the participant appeared to have difficulties 
translating the risks of supportive accommodation into practical, everyday consequences (e.g., 
effect on recreational or interpersonal relations).  
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The PANSS indicated that the participant had primarily positive rather than negative symptoms 
of psychosis (Palmer et al., 2004). Notable scores from the PANSS include that the participant 
had severe delusions, primarily religious and persecutory delusions, and had moderate severe 
auditory hallucinatory behaviour. The PANSS also indicated that the participant had severe 
guilt feelings. The BCSS indicated that the participant had higher than normal negative beliefs 
about self (Fowler et al., 2006). Interestingly, the participant reported that praying and their 
relationship with God could combat these negative beliefs. The PSWQ and DASS-21 indicated 
that the participant had higher than normal worry and anxiety (Crawford & Henry, 2003; 
Fresco, Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2003; Gillis, Haaga, & Ford, 1995; Henry & Crawford, 
2005). The Beads Task and the JTC subscale of the CBQp indicated that the participant made 
decisions on the basis of less evidence compared to normal controls (Dudley et al., 2016; Peters 
et al., 2014). The ASQpf indicated that the participant had a greater than normal tendency to 
attribute negative events to external causes (Lyon et al., 1994). The BNA indicated that the 
participant had lower than normal global neurocognitive ability; in fact, the participant was 
over 2 SDs below normative data (Fervaha et al., 2015). Other information was derived from 
the cognitive-behavioural interview including that the participant identified with the risk-
taking culture of Rock n’ Roll and that they had capacity relevant appraisals and metacognitive 
beliefs/awareness. 
Formulation 
A full formulation incorporating the results from the structured assessments and cognitive-
behavioural interview regarding Participant 2 can be seen in Figure 3. The participant’s life 
experiences were characterised by, among others, a stressful home environment, academic 
underachievement, loneliness (due to difficulties sustaining friendships with peers), job losses 
and substance misuse. These experiences seem to have contributed to long-standing low self-
esteem, including beliefs of being unlovable, unworthy, a failure and an “absolute moron”. The 
participant’s religious beliefs appeared to help them cope with such low self-esteem. Indeed, 
they helped the participant make sense of the world and made the participant feel valued and 
loved. Although very important to the participant, the participant’s religious beliefs also shaped 
their appraisals. On an explicit level, the participant appraised their intrusive thoughts/voices 
as meaning that they had a special relationship with Jesus and that Jesus would keep them on 
the right path, without needing to think carefully about decisions. This may have been a more 
appealing appraisal to the participant than an alternative, perhaps largely implicit appraisal that 
the participant was responsible for their own decisions. The participant’s appraisals appeared 
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to be influenced by their cognitive resources. For example, the participant’s externalising 
attributional bias (where they tend to attribute negative events to others) appeared to contribute 
to their appraisal that Jesus is responsible for their decisions. Moderating the negative effect of 
the participant’s cognitive resources was likely to be metacognitive awareness of these 
resources. For example, the participant’s unawareness of their externalising attributional bias 
and JTC bias made it less likely that they took steps to mitigate the effects of these biases. 
Metacognitive beliefs also appeared to have an impact. For example, the participant’s belief 
that “It’s good to make decisions based on gut instinct” may have influenced why the 
participant formed conclusions quickly. Regarding emotion, the participant’s appraisals 
appeared to lead to very high emotional arousal ranging from joy to guilt, anxiety and sadness. 
In regards to capacity, the participant’s appraisals, cognitive resources (moderated by 
metacognitive awareness/beliefs) and emotional arousal all appeared to affect their capacity. 
Of note, the participant’s belief that Jesus would help them choose, together with their positive 
beliefs about making decisions quickly, all made it more likely that they would jump to 
conclusions quickly, but hold other people or entities (e.g., Jesus, the Antichrist) responsible 
for the decisions they made. Indeed, these factors would have had an impact on the participant’s 
abilities to understand, appreciate and reason, as outlined above. Of course, the participant’s 





Figure 3. Case formulation for Participant 2 
 
Further Intervention Implications 
In terms of supporting capacity and autonomy, we made the following recommendations to 
clinician participants involved in the care of Participant 2: 
• Support from someone with expertise in religion might be useful at an early stage, if 
this helps the participant realise that they still have responsibility for decisions, and that 
careful decision-making is encouraged by religious leaders. 
• The participant’s capacity may also benefit from an intervention that effectively 
improves their self-esteem. This may reduce the degree to which they are reliant on 
their religious beliefs, thus improving their ability to consider whether they have a need 
for care. 
• The participant may also benefit from individualised metacognitive training, as this 
addresses two of the capacity-relevant cognitive biases the participant demonstrates. 
The participant’s minimisation of risks may require an idiosyncratic intervention. 
• A brief intervention to reduce worry may help to reduce the participant’s anxiety, guilt 
and sadness, and improve their cognitive functioning. 
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• Cognitive remediation may also help improve the participant’s cognitive functioning 
and help them to develop strategies to overcome the difficulties they have. 
Outcomes and Feedback 
At the end of the intervention, when the researcher and Participant 2 reflected on the positive 
and any negatives of the process, Participant 2 reported that they found the process 
“comforting” as they had the opportunity to talk about their problems and get things off their 
chest. The participant said that on rare occasions they felt somewhat paranoid but that this 
paranoia did not relate to the researcher and just reflected the paranoia that the participant 
tended to experience (e.g., every couple of days, the participant tended to be distressed by the 
belief that people in the city were thinking about them negatively). Outcomes regarding 
feasibility, acceptability, utility/efficacy and safety were positive (see Table 4). Regarding 
feasibility, the WAI indicated that the participant had very positive perceptions of alliance or 
collaboration during the sessions. In regards to acceptability, the AQ indicated that the 
participant found the intervention very acceptable. As for utility/efficacy, the pre- and post-
RIQ-P scores, which had been blindly rated by 2 independent experts, indicated that the 
participant provided a richer understanding of the factors that may impair their TDMC at post-
intervention in comparison to baseline. At baseline, the participant had not been able to provide 
any reasons, but at post-intervention, the participant’s reasons included: “Making decisions 
based on a gut feeling and my paranoia might affect my decision-making”. The IKI-R, which 
was administered at baseline and post-intervention, indicated that the researcher believed that 
the participant had become more knowledgeable of the factors that may impair their TDMC. 
The participant’s own impression of their knowledge of the factors that may impair their 
TDMC had remained the same, as indicated by their baseline and post-intervention IKI-P 
scores. Indeed, the participant rated their knowledge regarding such as “very knowledgeable” 
at both baseline and post-intervention. However, the participant’s high rating at baseline was 
not surprising given the initial defensiveness of the participant as reflected in the process 
section above. Finally, with regard to safety, the CDSS, CGI-R and CGI-P, all of which were 
administered at baseline and post-intervention, indicated that the participant’s mental health 
difficulties including any depressive symptoms had not worsened over the course of the 







Participant 3 was referred by their psychiatrist because they were judged to lack the capacity 
to make a decision about anti-psychotic medication. Factors contributing to such incapacity 
included having limited insight into past or ongoing mental health difficulties and need for 
treatment. A sealing-over recovery style was also indicated.  
Process 
Participant 3 was seen for just 2 sessions lasting no longer than an hour each. The participant 
completed the structured assessments of these sessions as per protocol but subsequently 
disengaged. Reflecting on the process, the researcher believed that he had focused too soon on 
topics that were emotionally salient or potentially upsetting for the participant. In particular, 
when attempting to gather a developmental history as part of the cognitive-behavioural 
interview, the participant demonstrated a reluctance to talk about the past. Rather than talking 
explicitly about the past, the researcher suggested that perhaps they could reflect on the 
advantages and disadvantages of talking about the past. At this point, the participant said that 
they would rather not continue with the intervention as they did not think that it would be 
beneficial. However, the participant agreed that the researcher could still continue with the 
process without the involvement of the participant. This included reviewing case notes, 
speaking with clinicians and sharing the resulting formulation with the clinical team.    
Background 
As can be seen in Table 2, Participant 3 was aged between 42 and 51, was of Caucasian 
ethnicity, had received a diagnosis of delusional disorder within the last 3 years and was 
prescribed clozapine. The participant had a difficult upbringing. The participant’s mother left 
the country within the first few years of their birth and had little or no contact with them 
throughout the rest of their childhood. This likely left the participant feeling neglected. The 
participant was also subject to physical and emotional abuse by their step-mother afterwards. 
The participant started exhibiting behavioural difficulties in school and had difficulties forming 
peer relationships. Because of these difficulties, the participant spent some time in secure 
schooling. The participant was eventually excluded from their family home in their late teens. 
The participant ended up having a few children with their current partner. Over 10 years ago, 
the participant experienced bereavement due to the death of their father. The participant then 
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became increasingly withdrawn and socially isolated. The participant also engaged in drug and 
alcohol misuse. In more recent times, the participant got involved in online gaming and 
experienced some bullying/harassment in this context. The participant subsequently developed 
persecutory delusions related to online gaming activity. The participant also developed other 
types of delusions including delusions of jealousy and reference. Delusions of jealously were 
reported to be related to the participant’s index offence which consisted of an assault on their 
partner. The participant had been an inpatient for a few years at the time of the referral.     
Assessment Results 
Participant 3’s results from the structured assessments (MacCAT-T, PANSS, PBEQ and 
BCSS) are provided in the Appendix. The MacCAT-T indicated that the participant had an 
impairment in appreciation, in that the participant was judged to lack the ability to appreciate 
the significance of the treatment-related information, including that they had a disorder and 
that anti-psychotic medication could be beneficial (Grisso et al., 1997; Palmer et al., 2004). 
The main result from the PANSS was, unsurprisingly, that the participant had severe lack of 
insight; indeed, the participant denied ever having had a psychiatric disorder or being 
delusional. The PANSS indicated that the participant did not have any significant current 
positive symptoms of psychosis, which was corroborated by the clinical team (Palmer et al., 
2004). The participant’s negative symptoms’ score on the PANSS was relatively low, although 
the participant received moderate scores for blunted affect, emotional withdrawal and poor 
rapport (Palmer et al., 2004). The supplementary assessment (as described in the Intervention 
section in the Method) indicated that the participant had marked belief inflexibility as well as 
moderate externalising attributional bias, confirmation bias and JTC bias. Other information 
was derived from the cognitive-behavioural interview of the first 2 sessions including the 
participant’s views regarding the judgement of impaired TDMC and events that led to their 
index offence (e.g., “They are just trying to do their job but have got it wrong”, “They are 
making a mountain out of a molehill”, “I was drunk and things happened”).    
Formulation 
A full formulation incorporating the results from the assessments regarding Participant 3 can 
be seen in Figure 4. The participant’s life experiences were characterised by, among others, 
abandonment, neglect, physical and emotional abuse, exclusion, bereavements and substance 
misuse; these external experiences likely led to the participant’s previous psychotic symptoms 
especially delusions. The participant’s key appraisals appeared to be in conflict with each other. 
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On a perhaps implicit level, the participant appeared to appraise their experiences – both 
external experiences and internal experiences (i.e., previous intrusive thoughts) – as meaning 
that thinking about the past would lead to their thoughts becoming uncontrollable and that their 
illness was related to a sense of shame. To protect theirself, the participant adopted explicit 
appraisals, specifically that their clinical team were wrong in diagnosing mental illness and 
that thinking about the past would not enable them to progress. The participant’s appraisals 
appeared to be influenced by their cognitive resources. For example, the participant’s belief 
inflexibility meant that the participant was unlikely to change their appraisals in light of 
reflection and evidence. Moderating the negative effect of the participant’s cognitive resources 
was likely to be metacognitive awareness/beliefs of these resources. For example, the 
participant’s unawareness of their cognitive biases made it less likely that they took steps to 
mitigate the effects of these biases. The participant’s cognitive resources not only appeared to 
influence the participant’s appraisals but they also appeared to have a direct effect on capacity. 
For example, the participant’s confirmation bias meant that they sought evidence consistent 
with their belief that they were not ill and likely discounted evidence inconsistent with this 
belief, thereby affecting appreciation. Of course, the participant’s appraisals also would have 
had a direct effect on appreciation. Regarding emotion, the participant’s appraisals appeared to 
lead to high emotional arousal – ranging from irritation, frustration, defeatedness and numbness 
to fear and shame. Fear and shame in particular may have made it difficult for the participant 





Figure 4. Case formulation for Participant 3 
 
Further Intervention Implications 
In terms of supporting capacity and autonomy, we made the following recommendations to 
clinician participants involved in the care of Participant 3: 
• The participant is understandably very reluctant to talk about the past directly, but this 
may maintain their incapacity and increase their risk of relapse. The participant may be 
worried that if they open the floodgates they may not be able to close them again. 
• If the participant fears that talking and thinking about the past will cause them to lose 
control and go mad again, then three approaches may help: (1) Emotion regulation 
training may help the participant in their relationships with others. It is designed to 
show people how they can regulate their emotions. This may help prepare the 
participant for the intense emotion they may feel if they talk about the past. It may also 
help them in their interactions with other people. (2) Metacognitive therapy (not the 
same as metacognitive training) may help the participant, as this is explicitly designed 
to show people how they have control over their thoughts. (3) An intervention to 
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identify and address any internalised stigma the participant has about their diagnosis 
and treatment may be useful to tackle any feelings of shame they may have. This should 
validate and normalise any feelings of shame, and encourage self-compassion. 
• Importantly, none of these 3 interventions will require the participant to talk about their 
past explicitly, or challenge their specific appraisals/ beliefs. 
• If these interventions help the participant improve their sense of control over their 
thoughts and feelings, and reduce their feelings of shame, then further interventions 
focused on identifying and challenging their positive beliefs about hasty decision-
making and improving their ability to reflect and modify their beliefs may be useful.   
• All of this needs to be done within the context of a long-term secure relationship where 
the participant has control over what does and does not happen. 
• At some point, the participant may then be able to engage in the trauma reprocessing 
work, which may be essential to allow them to integrate and make sense of their 
experiences. 
 
Outcomes and Feedback 
As described in the Process section above, Participant 3 disengaged after the first 2 sessions 
due to their reluctance to talk about the past and their belief that the intervention would not be 
beneficial. The participant agreed to complete the AEQ at post-intervention. The participant 
scored only 9 out of 108 on the AEQ and inspection of their individual responses did not 
indicate any concerning adverse effects from intervention involvement. Although broaching 
the past was perceived by the researcher to have been the trigger for disengagement, the 
participant rated only “very little” to “Taking part made me think too much about bad things 
that have happened in the past”. The AEQ did not indicate that the participant had any 
worsening difficulties, increased stigma or conflict with others as a result of the intervention. 
Unsurprisingly, the AEQ did indicate some difficulties with engagement (i.e., the participant 
rated “a little” to “Taking part took up too much of my time”, “Taking part required too much 
energy or motivation” and “Taking part involved too much hard work”). It is also worth noting 
that the participant rated “very much” to “My problems have improved to the point whereby I 







Participant 4 was referred by their psychiatrist because they were judged to lack the capacity 
to make a decision about anti-psychotic medication. Factors contributing to such incapacity 
included having impaired mental state (i.e., acute psychosis), impaired understanding of mental 
illness and effects of illicit drugs and alcohol, low intelligence and cultural factors.  
Process 
Participant 4 was seen for 5 sessions lasting no longer than an hour each. The participant fully 
engaged in the process and completed all of the structured assessments. Initially, the participant 
showed a lack of spontaneity and openness to the researcher’s more open-ended questions 
related to the cognitive-behavioural interview. While this pattern of responding may have been 
related to the participant’s psychosis, the participant’s flow of conversation became more fluid 
as the sessions progressed. Throughout all of the sessions, however, the participant showed a 
particular interest in completing the structured assessments, learning what they assess and 
discussing what their pattern of results might mean.  
Background 
As can be seen in Table 2, Participant 4 was aged between 32 and 41, was of Caucasian 
ethnicity, had received a diagnosis of schizophrenia within the last year and was prescribed 
paliperidone. While currently abstinent, the participant had a long history of substance misuse 
including intravenous heroin use and was receiving methadone treatment. The participant had 
a particularly difficult upbringing. The participant was placed in foster care shortly after their 
birth and spent many of their earlier years in and out of foster care. The participant recalled a 
particularly stressful memory from their childhood when they discovered that their step-mother 
was not their biological mother and their biological mother had in fact been hospitalised due 
to a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The participant’s behavioural difficulties escalated thereafter. 
At another stage in the participant’s childhood, their father was convicted of sexually abusing 
their sisters. This precipitated the participant’s initiation into substance misuse and antisocial 
behaviour. Shortly afterwards, the participant also reported being sexually abused while in a 
children’s home. The participant had several children, all of whom were from previous 
relationships, and up until recently did not have contact with any of them at their mother’s 
requests. More recently, the participant had been living homeless with their partner. The 
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participant was subsequently imprisoned due to assaulting their partner, which appeared to be 
related to delusions of jealousy. An exacerbation of the participant’s psychotic symptoms was 
reported while the participant was in prison. Shortly afterwards, the participant was admitted 
to hospital. The participant continued to have a relationship with their partner while in hospital, 
although their partner had recently been incarcerated.       
Assessment Results 
Participant 4’s results from the set of structured assessments are provided in the Appendix. The 
MacCAT-T indicated that the participant had high scores across the different domains of 
understanding, appreciation, reasoning and expressing a choice (Grisso et al., 1997; Palmer et 
al., 2004). Therefore, similar to Participant 1, it appeared that the participant’s capacity had 
improved since the time of the referral (Session 1 took place approximately 4 weeks after the 
referral). This was consistent with the recent report of the referring psychiatrist. However, at 
the time of the referral or shortly beforehand, it was thought that the participant had difficulties 
across the MacCAT-T domains of understanding, reasoning and appreciation. Retention 
difficulties, also related to impaired TDMC, were thought to be present as well. The evidence 
for these difficulties came from review of case notes as well as speaking to clinicians involved 
in the care of the participant. Therefore, we thought that it would be best to try to develop a 
formulation taking into consideration how the participant was at the time of the referral when 
they had difficulties with understanding, appreciation, reasoning and retention. Current 
difficulties were also taken into consideration as it was thought that these would put the 
participant at risk of being judged to lack capacity again. 
Administration of the PANSS with the participant indicated that the participant currently had 
negative rather than positive symptoms of psychosis, including blunted affect (severe), 
passive/apathetic social withdrawal (severe) and lack of spontaneity and flow of conversation 
(moderate severe) (Palmer et al., 2004). In relation to the general psychopathology subscale of 
the PANSS, the participant scored extreme for tension. This was manifested by extreme 
restlessness (i.e., unable to remain seated for long, pacing). However, retrospectively the 
participant reported that they had experienced positive symptoms of psychosis some weeks 
back. These included delusions of control and persecution as well as auditory hallucinatory 
behaviour, all of which were judged to have been severe. In regards to current deficits, the 
PBEQ indicated that the participant had higher than normal external shame about illness (e.g., 
the participant agreed with “I am embarrassed to talk about my experiences”) (Morrison et al., 
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2015). The ASQpf indicated that the participant had a strong tendency to attribute negative 
events to external causes (Lyon et al., 2015). The BNA indicated that the participant had lower 
than normal global neurocognitive ability, particularly in the area of working memory, where 
the participant was over 2 SDs below normative data (Fervaha et al., 2015). Other information 
was derived from the cognitive-behavioural interview including metacognitive 
beliefs/awareness.  
Formulation 
A full formulation incorporating the results from the structured assessments and cognitive-
behavioural interview regarding Participant 4 can be seen in Figure 5. The participant had a 
lot of bad things happen to them when they were a child, and their freedom had been greatly 
restricted. These may have felt outside of the participant’s control, and the participant may 
have learned that they are at the mercy of events. The participant had also experienced a lot of 
exclusion, abandonment and abuse. These and other external experiences (e.g., substance 
misuse) as well as the participant’s internal experiences (i.e., intrusive thoughts/voices) appear 
to have shaped the participant’s explicit appraisals, specifically that their thoughts were being 
controlled by someone else and their partner would leave them for someone else. Both of these 
explicit appraisals appeared to mean to the participant that they were not ill. Indeed, they 
appeared to be protective against alternative, perhaps largely implicit appraisals related to self-
stigma and guilt about the things the participant had done. Self-stigma in particular may have 
been influenced by the participant’s discovery that their mother had schizophrenia when they 
were a child. The participant’s appraisals appeared to be influenced by their cognitive 
resources. For example, the participant’s externalising attributional bias may have contributed 
to their belief that their mind was being controlled. Moderating the negative effect of the 
participant’s cognitive resources was likely to be metacognitive awareness/beliefs of these 
resources. For example, the participant’s unawareness of their externalising attributional bias 
made it less likely that they took steps to mitigate the effects of this bias. The participant’s 
cognitive resources not only appeared to influence the participant’s appraisals but they also 
appeared to have a direct effect on capacity. For example, the participant’s low working 
memory capacity likely affected the degree to which they could understand, reason with and 
remember treatment-relevant information. Of course, the participant’s appraisals also would 
have had a direct effect on capacity including appreciation. Regarding emotion, the 
participant’s appraisals appeared to lead to very high emotional arousal – ranging from fear 
and jealousy to guilt and shame. Shame in particular may have made it difficult for the 
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Figure 5. Case formulation for Participant 4 
 
Further Intervention Implications 
In terms of supporting capacity and autonomy, we made the following recommendations to 
clinician participants involved in the care of Participant 4:  
• Cognitive remediation may help improve the working memory of the participant and 
help them to develop strategies to overcome the difficulties they have. This could 
increase their cognitive reserve and reduce the risk of them not being able to 
understand, remember or reason about treatment-related information. 
• Identifying and addressing any internalised stigma may help the participant 
communicate about their experiences more, and may make it easier for them to consider 
they have a need for care. 
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• Improving their metacognitive awareness of how social defeat, trauma and substance 
use can cause intrusive thoughts, voices and paranoia may help increase the 
participant’s ability to consider they have a need for care. 
• Addressing the participant’s externalising attributional bias (e.g., through 
metacognitive training) may reduce the risk of their paranoia and jealousy returning, 
and may improve their ability to appreciate, understand and reason with treatment-
relevant information. However, it may also cause trigger guilt and remorse, and may be 
very difficult to do. 
Outcomes and Feedback 
At the end of the intervention, Participant 4 reported enjoying the process. The participant also 
said that completing the computer tasks and discussing the interpretation of these were “fun”. 
If anything, the participant said that they would have liked to have completed more of these. 
Outcomes regarding feasibility, acceptability, utility/efficacy and safety were positive (see 
Table 4). Regarding feasibility, the WAI indicated that the participant had very positive 
perceptions of alliance or collaboration during the sessions. In regards to acceptability, the AQ 
indicated that the participant found the intervention very acceptable. As for utility/efficacy, the 
pre- and post-RIQ-P scores, which had been blindly rated by 2 independent experts, indicated 
that the participant provided a richer understanding of the factors that may impair their TDMC 
at post-intervention in comparison to baseline. Reasons for impaired TDMC provided at post-
intervention were: “I didn’t have knowledge about my illness – I didn’t understand that people 
weren’t controlling my thoughts and that I was ill” and “Feeling shame and fearing my illness 
– I thought that other people would laugh at me if they thought I had an illness”. These reasons 
were clearly richer – and more insightful – than “untreated schizophrenia”, which is the reason 
that the participant provided at baseline. Encouragingly, although the participant’s PBEQ score 
during session 1 indicated that they had higher than normal external shame about illness, the 
participant said the following during the post-intervention assessment: “I no longer feel shame 
because I’ve met other people who have it – who are going through the same thing”. The IKI-
R, which was administered at baseline and post-intervention, indicated that the researcher 
believed that the participant had become more knowledgeable of the factors that may impair 
their TDMC. The participant’s own impression of their knowledge of the factors that may 
impair their TDMC had remained the same, as indicated by their baseline and post-intervention 
IKI-P scores. Indeed, the participant rated their knowledge regarding such as “extremely 
knowledgeable” at both baseline and post-intervention. Finally, with regard to safety, the 
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CDSS, CGI-R and CGI-P, all of which were administered at baseline and post-intervention, 
indicated that the participant’s mental health difficulties including any depressive symptoms 
had not worsened over the course of the intervention. The post-intervention AEQ also indicated 




Participant 5 was referred by their psychiatrist because they were judged to lack the capacity 
to make a decision about anti-psychotic medication. Factors contributing to such incapacity 
included lacking insight into their psychosis and need for treatment. Cognitive deficits were 
also indicated.  
Process 
Participant 5 was seen for just 1 session lasting about 30 minutes during which the participant 
was interviewed by the researcher using the MacCAT-T. The participant was judged to be too 
acutely unwell with psychotic symptoms by their clinical team for the sessions to progress. 
However, the participant was not judged to have lost research participant capacity and agreed 
that the researcher could still continue with the process without their involvement. This 
included reviewing case notes, speaking with clinicians and sharing the resulting formulation 
with the clinical team.   
Background 
As can be seen in Table 2, Participant 5 was aged between 32 and 41, was of Caucasian 
ethnicity, had received a diagnosis of schizophrenia over 10 years ago and was prescribed 
clozapine. The participant had a particularly difficult upbringing. The participant’s parents 
separated within the first couple of years of their birth. Subsequently, the participant lived with 
their mother and step-father, both of whom abused alcohol and were physically and 
emotionally abusive to the participant. At one stage in their childhood, the participant had re-
established contact with their biological father. Although the participant wanted to move in 
with their father, their mother did not permit this. The participant had their first contact with 
psychiatric services before their teens after overdosing on sleeping tablets. The participant’s 
offending behaviour began around this time which included assault, housebreaking and 
shoplifting. The participant also began to abuse substances. The participant was taken into 
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foster care and spent most of their teens in different institutions. The participant’s schooling 
was disrupted and they had been assessed as having low average intelligence. The participant’s 
psychosis emerged in their late teens while in a young offenders’ institution. The participant 
had spent the majority of their adult life in hospital including more than the last 10 years. The 
participant’s periods in the community were marked by substance misuse. The participant also 
had a history of attempted suicides. In recent times, the participant had been engaging in both 
suicidal and self-harming behaviour. The participant had deteriorating physical health and had 
hepatitis B and C.  
Assessment Results    
Participant 5’s results from the MacCAT-T and PANSS are provided in the Appendix. The 
MacCAT-T indicated that the participant had a particular impairment in appreciation but also 
had difficulties with understanding and reasoning (Grisso et al., 1997; Palmer et al., 2004). 
Retention difficulties, also related to impaired TDMC, were thought to be present as well. The 
PANSS, which was administered with clinicians involved in the participant’s care, indicated 
that the participant had a predominantly positive symptom profile (Palmer et al., 2004). 
Notable scores from the PANSS indicated that the participant had extreme persecutory 
delusions as well as severe auditory hallucinatory behaviour and conceptual disorganisation. 
The general psychopathology subscale of the PANSS also indicated that the participant had 
moderate severe anxiety and severe difficulties with tension, depression, uncooperativeness 
and poor attention. The supplementary assessment (as described in the Intervention section in 
the Method) indicated that the participant had marked low self-esteem and self-esteem and 
mood instability. Poor cognitive functioning and an externalising attributional bias were also 
indicated to be present to a marked extent. Other information was derived from the cognitive-
behavioural interview of the first session including capacity relevant appraisals.    
Formulation 
A full formulation incorporating the results from the assessments regarding Participant 5 can 
be seen in Figure 6. The participant had experienced a great deal of neglect, abuse and social 
defeat. The participant had spent the majority of their life in institutions. The participant was 
socially excluded and no doubt very lonely. Influenced by these and other external experiences 
(e.g., substance misuse, poor physical health), the participant’s key appraisals appeared to be 
in conflict with each other. These appraisals seemed to fluctuate from explicit to implicit. On 
an often implicit level, the participant appeared to appraise their experiences – both internal 
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experiences (i.e., intrusive thoughts/voices) and external experiences – as meaning that they 
had no future and were weak, worthless and unlovable; they appeared to associate illness with 
these attributes. To protect against implicit negative thoughts associated with illness, the 
participant often appeared to appraise their experiences as meaning that they were a “hard man” 
and a “survivor” and that staff were trying to kill them with poisoned clozapine. The 
participant’s appraisals appeared to be influenced by their cognitive resources. For example, 
the participant’s belief about the hostile intentions of staff appeared to be influenced by their 
externalising attributional bias. Moderating the negative effect of the participant’s cognitive 
resources was likely to be metacognitive awareness/beliefs of these resources. For example, 
the participant’s self-defeating metacognitive belief about cognitive impairment (i.e., “I’m 
stupid”) made it less likely that they took steps to enhance their cognitive functioning. The 
participant’s cognitive resources not only appeared to influence the participant’s appraisals but 
they also appeared to have a direct effect on capacity. For example, the participant’s poor 
cognitive functioning likely affected the degree to which they could understand, reason with 
and remember treatment-relevant information. Of course, the participant’s appraisals also 
would have had a direct effect on capacity including appreciation. Regarding emotion, the 
participant’s appraisals appeared to lead to very high emotional arousal – ranging from fear, 
anxiety, anger and elation to hopelessness, loneliness and depression. High levels of emotion 
are known to affect people’s ability to think clearly, and may therefore have had a direct effect 
on the participant’s ability to reason clearly or understand information.  
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Figure 6. Case formulation for Participant 5 
 
Further Intervention Implications 
In terms of supporting capacity and autonomy, we made the following recommendations to 
clinician participants involved in the care of Participant 5: 
• The participant may benefit from a sustained period of regular befriending to improve 
their loneliness, mood and self-worth. This could improve their cognitive impairment 
and reduce their fears of staff wanting to get rid of them.  
• All staff need to consider how they can help participant feel more valued, and not 
ignored, and those in charge of care in the ward need to consider carefully how any 
positive change can be sustained. 
• During a period of recovery, the participant may benefit from learning about the 
possible relationship between what has happened to them in their life and their 
cognitive impairment and psychotic symptoms. The participant may also benefit from 




• If the participant’s self-esteem can be improved sufficiently, then they may benefit from 
an intervention designed to address their externalising bias. 
Outcomes and Feedback 
As described in the Process section above, the clinical team judged Participant 5 to be too 
acutely unwell with psychotic symptoms for the participant to continue with the intervention 
beyond the first session. The clinical team did not believe that the participant had been 
adversely affected by the intervention. No post-intervention assessment was scheduled with 
the participant.   
 
Summary of Outcomes 




In terms of feasibility, we were relatively successful in our inclusion of patient participants in 
the intervention and its evaluation. Regarding the recruitment aspect, we reached our minimum 
target of recruiting 5 patient participants, thereby meeting the recommendation of a recent 
concept analysis in relation to the number of patients needed for a case series (Abu-Zidan et 
al., 2012). Indeed, we recruited 5 patient participants from 11 referrals in Site 1; thus, our 
referral:recruitment ratio in Site 1 was approximately 2:1. One of these patient referrals was 
deemed inappropriate, which meant that there were 10 eligible patient referrals in Site 1. Five 
of these 10 eligible patient referrals agreed to participate (50%), therefore suggesting relatively 
good willingness to be recruited. However, we received just 3 patient referrals in Site 2 and we 
were unable to recruit any of these; thus, our recruitment in Site 2 was unsuccessful. It is worth 
noting though that patients in Site 1 were resident for a relatively longer period of time than 
patients in Site 2, which was designed for only short-term ‘intensive’ psychiatric care. 
Retention was good, with no patient participant completely withdrawing from the study. 
Adherence to the intervention protocol was also reasonable, with no patient participant not 
attending any sessions. Indeed, 3 of the patient participants attended all of their sessions, with 
2 of these attending 5 sessions lasting no longer than an hour each and the other attending 10 
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sessions averaging about 30 minutes each. These 3 patient participants also completed all or 
almost all of the structured assessments. Work with these 3 patient participants indicated the 
importance of engagement and some of the difficulties in the process. However, once engaged, 
these 3 patient participants collaborated effectively in the process. Indeed, these 3 patient 
participants had very high perceptions of collaboration or alliance, as indicated by their scores 
on the post-intervention WAI (see Table 4). However, 2 of the patient participants only 
partially adhered to the intervention protocol, with one discontinuing after the second session 
and the other not being able to proceed after the first session. Work with these 2 patient 
participants indicated disengagement due to different reasons. For one of these patient 
participants, it appeared that the interaction had focused too soon on topics that were 
emotionally salient or potentially upsetting, and for the other one, it appeared that they were 
too acutely unwell with psychotic symptoms. Moreover, adherence to the post-intervention 
assessment among the patient participants was also reasonable, with the 3 intervention 
completers completing all of the measures and one of the intervention discontinuers completing 
a measure of adverse effects (AEQ).  
We also found that it was feasible to include clinicians in the intervention and evaluation 
processes. Only one clinician did not respond to an invitation to attend a case formulation 
presentation relating to a patient participant. Thirteen clinicians involved in the care of the 5 
patient participants attended the case formulation presentations and all of these participated in 
the research and completed the research measures. In fact, 2 of these clinician participants 
involved in the care of 2 of the patient participants attended 2 case formulation presentations, 
which meant that the clinician participants provided 15 datasets in total. Therefore, clinicians 
showed a good willingness to be recruited, engage with the intervention process and complete 
the research measures. In total, 6 case formulation presentations were delivered, of which 2 of 
these were for the same patient participant. Six clinicians attended a presentation for (patient) 
Participant 1, 4 clinicians attended a presentation for (patient) Participant 2, 2 clinicians 
attended a presentation for (patient) Participant 3, 2 clinicians attended a presentation for 
(patient) Participant 4 and one clinician attended a presentation for (patient) Participant 5.       
 
Acceptability 
We found that the intervention was acceptable to the 3 patient participants who completed the 
intervention, as indicated by very high scores on the post-intervention AQ (see Table 4). We 
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also found that the case formulation presentations were acceptable to clinician participants, as 
indicated by very high scores on 3 items of the post-formulation CFS (see Table 5). Indeed, 
the clinician participants strongly believed that the formulations cohered with their knowledge 
of the patient participant and were comprehensive and accurate. There was also no evidence 
that the case formulation presentations of the intervention discontinuers (Participant 3 and 
Participant 5) were less acceptable than the case formulation presentations of the intervention 
completers (Participant 1, Participant 2 and Participant 4) according to clinician participants. 
Indeed, all 3 of the clinician participants who attended the case formulation presentations of 
the intervention discontinuers believed “very much” (which is the highest possible rating) that 
the formulations cohered with their knowledge of the patient participant and were 
comprehensive and accurate.    
 
Preliminary Utility/Efficacy 
Preliminary utility/efficacy of the intervention among intervention completers was 
demonstrated by baseline and post-intervention scores on a measure of patient participants’ 
reasons for incapacity (RIQ-P) and a measure of the researcher’s perception of the patient 
participants’ knowledge/insight of the factors regarding incapacity (IKI-R).  
Inter-rater reliability of the RIQ-P and RIQ-C (a measure of clinician participants’ reasons for 
incapacity) was firstly established by measuring the percent of agreement between the 2 expert 
raters. Percent of agreement was high at 91%. As such, the scores of the 2 expert raters were 
averaged together and used in the subsequent analyses.  
The pre- and post-RIQ-P scores indicated that the 3 patient participants who completed the 
intervention provided a richer understanding of the factors that may impair their TDMC at 
post-intervention in comparison to baseline (see Table 4). Indeed, when the 3 patient 
participants were grouped together, there was a very large increase in richness with regard to 
their understanding of the aforementioned factors over the course of the intervention, as 
indicated by a Cohen’s d of 2.16 (see Table 4). The pre- and post-IKI-R scores also indicated 
that the researcher believed that the 3 patient participants had become more 
knowledgeable/insightful of the factors that may impair their TDMC (see Table 4). Indeed, 
among the 3 patient participants, there was a very large increase in their knowledge/insight of 
the aforementioned factors over the course of the intervention from the perspective of the 
researcher, as indicated by a Cohen’s d of 1.54 (see Table 4). Moreover, a measure of the 
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researcher’s perception of whether the patient participants’ knowledge/insight of the 
aforementioned factors had improved since baseline (IKI-I-R), which was just administered at 
post-intervention, also complimented the pre- and post-IKI-R scores (see Table 4). However, 
while one of the 3 patient participants’ own impression of their knowledge of the 
aforementioned factors had increased over the course of the intervention, the other 2 patient 
participants’ own impression of their knowledge of the aforementioned factors had remained 
the same, as indicated by the pre- and post-IKI-P scores (see Table 4). Indeed, the latter 2 
patient participants rated their knowledge of the aforementioned factors highly at both baseline 
and post-intervention.  
Preliminary utility/efficacy of the case formulation presentations according to clinician 
participants was also demonstrated by pre- and post-formulation scores on the aforementioned 
RIQ-C and 6 items of the CFS. The pre- and post-RIQ-C scores indicated that the clinician 
participants as a whole provided a richer understanding of the factors that may impair the 
patient participants’ TDMC after the presentation of the case formulations compared to 
beforehand. Indeed, the size of the change was very large, as indicated by a Cohen’s d of 1.36 
(95% CI = 0.63 to 2.07; N = 15) (see Table 5). Moreover, the pre- and post-CFS scores 
indicated that the clinician participants as a whole had an enhancement across 3 different areas 
after the presentation of the case formulations compared to beforehand. Indeed, they had: 
greater knowledge regarding the aetiology and maintenance of incapacity of the patient 
participant as well as possible interventions/strategies to support the capacity of the patient 
participant, greater confidence regarding supporting the capacity of the patient participant, and 
more positive attitudes regarding supporting capacity – both in general and specifically with 
regard to the patient participant. The size of the changes ranged from small for “I believe that 
supporting capacity is part of my role” (Cohen’s d = 0.40; 95% CI = –0.20 to 0.99; N = 15) to 
very large for “I appreciate possible interventions/ strategies to support the capacity of the 
patient in question” (Cohen’s d = 1.64; 95% CI = 0.82 to 2.44; N = 15) (see Table 5).  
 
Preliminary Safety 
Preliminary safety of the intervention was indicated by baseline and post-intervention scores 
on measures of depression (CDSS) and global illness severity (CGI-R, CGI-I-R and CGI-P), 
as well as post-intervention or point of discontinuation scores on a measure of adverse effects 
(AEQ). The AEQ scores among the 3 patient participants who completed the intervention 
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indicated no adverse effects from intervention involvement (see Table 4). In addition, the 
CDSS, CGI-R, CGI-I-R and CGI-P scores indicated that these patient participants’ mental 
health difficulties including any depressive symptoms had not worsened over the course of the 
intervention (see Table 4). Moreover, the AEQ responses of one of the intervention 
discontinuers (Participant 3) did not indicate any concerning adverse effects from intervention 
involvement. Although broaching the past was perceived by the researcher to have been the 
trigger for discontinuation, this patient participant only rated “very little” to “Taking part made 
me think too much about bad things that have happened in the past” (see Outcomes and 
Feedback section of the case report of Participant 3 for more detail). The clinical team did not 
believe that the other intervention discontinuer (Participant 5) had been adversely affected by 



























Table 4. Individual scores, mean scores and Cohen’s d effect sizes regarding main outcome variables reported at baseline and post-intervention 
among patient participants who completed the intervention (n = 3) 
 
Variable  
Participant 1  Participant 2  Participant 4  Mean (SD)    
























































































































































Abbreviations: AQ, Acceptability Questionnaire; AEQ, Adverse Effects Questionnaire; CDSS, Calgary Depression Rating Scale for Schizophrenia; CGI-P, Clinical Global Impression Scale – Patient 
Version; CGI-I-R, Clinical Global Impression – Improvement Scale – Researcher Version; CGI-R, Clinical Global Impression Scale – Researcher Version; IKI-P, Incapacity Knowledge Impression Scale 
– Patient Version; IKI-I-R, Incapacity Knowledge Impression – Improvement Scale – Researcher Version; IKI-R, Incapacity Knowledge Impression Scale – Researcher Version; RIQ-P, Reasons for 
Incapacity Questionnaire – Patient Version; WAI, Working Alliance Inventory.  
aA positive (+) Cohen’s d value indicates a higher score at post-intervention compared to baseline. 
bPossible scores can range from 9 to 63, with higher scores indicating more positive perceptions of the working alliance. 
cPossible scores can range from 8 to 56, with higher scores indicating higher acceptability. 
dPossible scores can range from 1 (“not at all rich”) to 6 (“extremely rich”), with higher scores indicating a richer understanding of the factors that may impair TDMC. 
ePossible scores can range from 1 (“not at all knowledgeable/insightful”) to 6 (“extremely knowledgeable/insightful”), with a higher score indicating that the patient participant had more knowledge/insight 
of the factors that may impair their TDMC, from the researcher’s perspective.   
fPossible scores can range from 1 to 7 (1 = “very much worse”; 2 = “much worse”; 3 = “minimally worse”; 4 = “no change from baseline”; 5 = “minimally improved”; 6 = “much improved”; 7 = “very 
much improved”), with a higher score indicating a greater improvement in the patient participant’s knowledge/insight of the factors that may impair their TDMC since baseline, from the researcher’s 
perspective.   
gPossible scores can range from 1 (“not at all knowledgeable/insightful”) to 6 (“extremely knowledgeable/insightful”), with a higher score indicating that the patient participant’s own impression of their 
knowledge/insight of the factors that may impair their TDMC was greater.   
hPossible scores can range from 0 to 104, with higher scores indicating potentially greater adverse effects from intervention involvement.  
iPossible scores can range from 0 to 27, with higher scores indicating greater depressive symptoms.  
jPossible scores can range from 1 (“normal, not at all ill”) to 7 (“extremely ill”), with a higher score indicating that the patient participant had more severe mental health difficulties, from the researcher’s 
perspective.   
kPossible scores can range from 1 to 7 (1 = “very much improved”; 2 = “much improved”; 3 = “minimally improved”; 4 = “no change from baseline”; 5 = “minimally worse”; 6 = “much worse”; 7 = “very 
much worse”), with a higher score indicating a more severe deterioration in the patient participant’s mental health since baseline, from the researcher’s perspective.  





Table 5. Mean scores and Cohen’s d effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) regarding main outcome variables reported at pre- and post-
formulation among clinician participants (n = 15)  
 
Variable 
Mean (SD)    
Pre Post  Cohen’s da 95% CI 
Acceptability      
CFS item – I believe that the formulation presented in this session coheres with my 









CFS item – I believe that the formulation was comprehensiveb – 3.73 (0.46)  – – 
CFS item – I believe that the formulation presented in this session was accurateb – 3.80 (0.41)  – – 
Preliminary utility/efficacy      
Reasons for Incapacity Questionnaire – Clinician Version (RIQ-C)c 2.63 (0.83) 3.70 (0.73)  1.36 0.63 to 2.07 
CFS (knowledge) item – I understand what might cause and maintain the incapacity of the 








0.65 to 1.94 
CFS (knowledge) item – I appreciate possible interventions/ strategies to support the 








0.82 to 2.44 









0.29 to 1.21 









0.10 to 0.97 
CFS (attitude) item – I believe that supporting capacity mattersb 3.13 (1.13) 3.67 (0.72)  0.56 0.11 to 1.00 
CFS (attitude) item – I believe that supporting capacity is part of my roleb 3.13 (1.19) 3.53 (0.74)  0.40 –0.20 to 0.99 
Abbreviation: CFS, Case Formulation Scale. 
aA positive (+) Cohen’s d value indicates a higher score at post-intervention compared to baseline. 
bPossible scores can range from 0 to 4 (0 = “not at all”; 1 = “a little”; 2 = “somewhat”; 3 = “quite a lot”; 4 = “very much”).  








Summary of Main Findings 
The findings of this study are promising, both in terms of the feasibility and acceptability of 
the intervention involving assessing and formulating impaired TDMC in patients with 
psychosis, and of the preliminary data regarding utility/efficacy and safety. With regard to 
feasibility, we were relatively successful in our inclusion of patients in the intervention and its 
evaluation: we reached our minimum target of recruiting 5 patient participants; we retained all 
of them in the study; we implemented our intervention protocol (with some modifications) with 
3 of them and partially implemented it with the other 2; we collaborated effectively with 3 of 
them [as indicated by very high scores on the post-intervention working alliance measure 
(WAI)]; we assessed a wide range of outcome measures with 3 of them and administered an 
adverse effects measure (AEQ) with 4 of them. We were also successful in our inclusion of 
clinicians in the intervention and evaluation processes: we recruited 13 clinician participants 
involved in the care of the 5 patient participants and all of these attended the case formulation 
presentations (with 2 of these attending 2 case formulation presentations); we were able to 
arrange 6 case formulation presentations in total (with 2 of these being for the same patient 
participant); we were able to administer outcome measures with all of the clinician participants. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that while 2 of the 5 patient participants only partially adhered to 
our intervention protocol, we were still able to produce psychological formulations of impaired 
TDMC for these intervention discontinuers. In comparison to the formulations of the 
intervention completers, we relied more on data from other sources for the development of 
these formulations, including case note review, observation and interviews with staff. Such 
limited engagement is considered to reflect the reality of working with certain patients with 
psychosis with impaired TDMC and does not necessarily cause concern about the feasibility 
of developing psychological formulations of impaired TDMC. 
In regards to acceptability, we found that the intervention was acceptable to the 3 patient 
participants who completed the intervention, as indicated by very high scores on the post-
intervention acceptability questionnaire (AQ). We also found that the case formulation 
presentations were acceptable to clinician participants, as indicated by their ratings of belief 
strength on 3 items of the post-formulation case formulation measure (CFS); specifically, they 
strongly believed that the formulations cohered with their knowledge of the patient participant 
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and were comprehensive and accurate. Moreover, we found no evidence that the case 
formulation presentations of the intervention discontinuers were less acceptable than the case 
formulation presentations of the intervention completers according to clinician participants.  
The pre and post scores on the measures of patient and clinician participants’ reasons for 
incapacity (RIQ-P and RIQ-C), which had been blindly rated by 2 independent experts, 
revealed some promising findings: when aggregated together, the 3 patient participants who 
completed the intervention provided a much richer understanding of the factors that may impair 
their TDMC (in the very large range) at post-intervention in comparison to baseline, and the 
clinician participants as a whole provided a much richer understanding of the factors that may 
impair the patient participants’ TDMC (in the very large range) after the presentation of the 
case formulations compared to beforehand. Moreover, the pre and post scores on the CFS 
indicated that the clinician participants as a whole had an enhancement across 3 different areas 
after the presentation of the case formulations compared to beforehand. Indeed, they had: 
greater knowledge regarding the aetiology and maintenance of incapacity of the patient 
participant as well as possible interventions/strategies to support the capacity of the patient 
participant (in the very large range), greater confidence regarding supporting the capacity of 
the patient participant (in the moderate range), and more positive attitudes regarding supporting 
capacity – both in general and specifically with regard to the patient participant (in the small 
to moderate range). These findings, and others as described in the Results section, provide 
preliminary data regarding the utility/efficacy of the intervention. 
The AEQ scores among the patient participants who completed the intervention indicated no 
adverse effects from intervention involvement. In addition, the baseline and post-intervention 
scores on measures of depression (CDSS) and global illness severity (CGI-R, CGI-I-R and 
CGI-P) indicated that these patient participants’ mental health difficulties including any 
depressive symptoms had not worsened over the course of the intervention. However, it is 
particularly important to consider the safety of the intervention for intervention discontinuers. 
As mentioned, 2 of the patient participants only partially adhered to the intervention protocol: 
one disengaged after the second session and the other was judged by their clinical team to be 
unable to proceed after the first session. With regard to the first of these patient participants, it 
appeared that the reason for their disengagement was that the interaction had focused too soon 
on topics that were emotionally salient or potentially upsetting, which appeared to be related 
to the past. However, their AEQ responses at point of discontinuation did not indicate any 
concerning adverse effects from intervention involvement. Regarding the second of these 
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patient participants, it appeared that the judgement of their clinical team regarding 
discontinuation was based on the view that they were too acutely unwell with psychotic 
symptoms. However, their clinical team did not believe that they had been adversely affected 
by the intervention. Therefore, when considered in their totality, these findings provide 
preliminary data regarding the safety of the intervention for patients.   
 
Clinical and Theoretical Implications 
One of the advantages of a case series like this study is its ability to inform the development 
and refinement of intervention protocols before they are studied in more advanced trials 
(Bhandari & Joensson, 2009). So what have we learned? Initially, we came across some 
defensiveness by patients when discussing the reason for their referral, which included that 
they had been judged to lack TDMC by their referrer. Reflecting on this, we learned that 
engagement in the intervention is more likely when we take a neutral stance on issues such as 
TDMC and need for care. Therefore, we recommend that clinicians should, if asked, advise 
their patient that they are not taking a position on whether the patient lacks TDMC or has a 
need for care but that their role is instead to work with the patient to understand why such a 
judgement has been made and to identify what could be done to achieve a judgement of 
regained TDMC. Importantly, this focus on understanding why there was a judgement of 
impaired TDMC, rather than impaired TDMC itself, facilitates engagement and allows the 
formulation to be developed. 
We also learned that for some patients it may be necessary to spend time talking with them 
about their general interests and provide sufficient space for them to ‘tell their story’ as a way 
of engagement. However, it is important to be aware that there may be disadvantages to 
spending a long time engaging or befriending patients with psychosis. Indeed, the patient may 
not experience improvement and the clinician may find it difficult to introduce structure and 
focus if this has not been present from the outset (Morrison, Renton, Dunn, Williams, & 
Bentall, 2003).  
On the other hand, we learned that some patients may be less able and/or willing to share their 
story and talk about their general interests. In these cases, we learned that another option to 
engagement may be to gather the required information through the use of structured 
assessments, including self-report questionnaires, structured interviews, psychometric testing 
and reaction-time procedures. We found that the 3 intervention completers were generally 
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interested in completing these assessments, learning what they assess and discussing what their 
pattern of results might mean. Therefore, we recommend that clinicians should administer 
structured assessments if possible. Moreover, this more formal approach to assessment may 
produce more robust evidence, and patients and clinicians may view a formulation derived 
from this evidence as being more ‘objective’ than that derived from the typical (often 
unstructured) clinical assessment.  
As mentioned, we believe that one patient participant disengaged because the interaction had 
focused too soon on topics that were emotionally salient or potentially upsetting. While we did 
not find any evidence of adverse effects from involving this patient participant in the 
intervention, it is possible that they would have been adversely affected if they had felt 
compelled to continue with the sessions. We recommend that clinicians are mindful of the risk 
of patients feeling coerced to attend assessments of TDMC and that proceeding with sessions 
might be unsafe/distressing.  
It is of course highly preferable, for ethical and practical reasons, to work collaboratively with 
the referred patient and to develop a shared understanding. However, we learned that working 
collaboratively with the patient is not always possible. Indeed, we learned that it may be 
necessary to base our assessment and formulation of impaired TDMC mainly on case notes, 
observation and interviews with staff and family. Nevertheless, we believe that it may be 
possible to develop good quality formulations in this way. Indeed, the clinician participants 
who attended the case formulation presentations of the intervention discontinuers very strongly 
believed that the formulations cohered with their knowledge of the patient participant and were 
comprehensive and accurate. 
A secondary aim of this study was to generate hypotheses regarding factors that might help or 
hinder TDMC in patients with psychosis. One of the main patterns we identified in our 
formulations was that delusional appraisals that threaten TDMC can have a protective function 
for the patient, a finding (which if further research finds to be robust) has important 
implications for the design and testing of interventions to support TDMC. This finding is also 
consistent with our recent meta-analytical investigation of the widely studied ‘paranoia as 
defence’ model (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001), which 
proposes that persecutory delusions arise as a way of protecting the individual from the effects 
of low implicit self-esteem. Although this model has been challenged (Garety & Freeman, 
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2013; Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan, Tracey, & Shannon, 2014), we found clear evidence 
to support at least a ‘weak’ version of this model (Murphy et al., in preparation). 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
This study has some important strengths. First, this study, to the best of our knowledge, is the 
first of its kind to develop and pilot-test a structured protocol for assessing and formulating 
impaired TDMC in patients with psychosis. We demonstrated the feasibility and acceptability 
of this protocol and we produced preliminary data regarding utility/efficacy and safety. If the 
efficacy, effectiveness and safety of this protocol is demonstrated through further research, this 
protocol could be widely used by clinicians. Indeed, such a protocol might be used to construct 
formulations of the factors that help or hinder TDMC in patients with psychosis which might 
in turn inform intervention strategies aimed at restoring capacity. Second, we employed a novel 
cognitive model of impaired TDMC in psychosis (Hutton et al., in preparation) to inform the 
development of our formulations. This model appeared to have face validity among clinician 
participants; indeed, they strongly believed that the formulations based on this model cohered 
with their knowledge of the patient participant and were comprehensive and accurate. 
Importantly, this model has key implications for supporting TDMC among patients with 
psychosis (Hutton et al., in preparation). Third, patient and clinician participants’ reasons for 
incapacity, pre and post assessment and formulation, were blindly rated by 2 independent 
experts. We believe that this procedure added rigour to our research methodology; indeed, this 
meant that we were able to some extent control for the potential bias of raters toward perceiving 
results that would confirm any explicit or implicit hypotheses. Finally, we presented detailed 
information about every participating patient. We hope that this provided added value for the 
reader, including a clear rationale for any hypotheses regarding factors that might help or hinder 
TDMC in patients with psychosis.   
Despite these strengths, there were several limitations to this study. First, there were only 5 
patient participants and 13 clinician participants. Although a case series like ours is an essential 
first step in the process of developing and testing new intervention protocols, only an 
adequately powered clinical trial can provide definitive evidence of efficacy and safety. 
Second, data collection regarding the outcome assessments were conducted by the researcher, 
who also carried out the intervention. This may have led to biased feedback and may have 
inflated estimates of effect size (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008). Future research 
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evaluating our intervention protocol should, if possible, employ independent outcome 
collectors. Third, although we attempted to recruit participants from both forensic and non-
forensic mental health settings, we were only successful in recruiting them from the former. 
This meant that we were only able to demonstrate the feasibility and acceptability of our 
intervention protocol in a limited setting. Future research should consider sampling from wider 
and more representative settings. Finally, while we acquired quantitative data from a wide 
range of outcome assessments, we did not employ a systematic approach to obtaining 
qualitative data. Future research might consider incorporating such an approach to allow 
careful assessment of participants’ views regarding our intervention protocol.     
 
Future Research 
Our findings suggest that our intervention protocol, which provides a guidance to assessing 
and formulating impaired TDMC in patients with psychosis, should be evaluated further, while 
taking into consideration our aforementioned lessons learnt and study strengths and limitations. 
A larger case series might be useful to explore whether any further modifications are required 
for this group. Following modifications aimed at improving generalisability and real-life 







Abu-Zidan, F. M., Abbas, A. K. & Hefny, A. I. (2013). Clinical “case series”: a concept 
analysis. African Health Sciences, 12, 557-562. 
Ayala, G. X. & Elder, J. P. (2011). Qualitative methods to ensure acceptability of behavioral 
and social interventions to the target population. Journal of Public Health 
Dentistry, 71, S69-S79. 
Appelbaum, P. S. & Grisso, T. (1988). Assessing patients' capacities to consent to 
treatment. New England Journal of Medicine, 319, 1635-1638. 
Appelbaum, P. S. & Grisso, T. (1995). The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I: 
Mental illness and competence to consent to treatment. Law and Human Behavior, 19, 
105-126. 
Bentall, R. P., Corcoran, R., Howard, R., Blackwood, N., & Kinderman, P. (2001). 
Persecutory delusions: A review and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 21, 1143-92. 
Berk, M., Ng, F., Wang, W.V., Calabrese, JR, Mitchell PB, Malhi GS, et al.  (2008). The 
empirical redefinition of the psychometric criteria for remission in bipolar disorder. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 106, 153–1588. 
Besnier, N., Kaladjian, A., Mazzola-Pomietto, P., Adida, M., Fakra, E., Jeanningros, R., et al. 
(2011). Differential responses to emotional interference in paranoid schizophrenia and 
bipolar mania. Psychopathology, 44, 1–11. 
Bhandari, M. & Joensson, A. (2009). Clinicial research for surgeons. Germany: Thieme 
Publishing Group.  
Birchwood, M., Mason, R., MacMillan, F. & Healy, J. (1993). Depression, demoralization 
and control over psychotic illness: a comparison of depressed and non-depressed 
patients with a chronic psychosis. Psychological Medicine, 23, 387-395.  
Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3, 77-101. 




British Psychological Society (2006). Assessment of capacity in adults: interim guidance for 
psychologists. Leicester: British Psychological Society.  
Cairns, R., Maddock, C., Buchanan, A., David, A. S., Hayward, P., Richardson, G., 
Szmukler, J. & Hotopf, M. (2005). Reliability of mental capacity assessments in 
psychiatric in-patients. The British Journal of Psychiatry,187, 372-378. 
Collett, N., Pugh, K., Waite, F., & Freeman, D. (2016). Negative cognitions about the self in 
patients with persecutory delusions: An empirical study of self-compassion, self-
stigma, schematic beliefs, self-esteem, fear of madness, and suicidal ideation. 
Psychiatry Research, 239, 79–84.  
Crawford, J.R. & Henry, J.D. (2003). The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS): 
Normative data and latent structure in a large non-clinical sample. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 42, 111–131. 
Cumming, G., & Finch, S. (2001). A primer on the understanding, use, and calculation of 
confidence intervals that are based on central and noncentral distributions. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, 61, 532-574. 
Dudley R, Taylor P, Wickham S, Hutton P. (2016). Psychosis, delusions and the “Jumping to 
Conclusions” reasoning bias: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 42, 652–665. 
Dunn, L. B., Nowrangi, M. A., Palmer, B. W., Jeste, D. V. & Saks, E. R. (2006). Assessing 
decisional capacity for clinical research or treatment: a review of 
instruments. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163, 1323-1334. 
Fervaha G, Hill C, Agid O, Takeuchi H, Foussias G, Siddiqui I, et al. (2014). Examination of 
the validity of the Brief Neurocognitive Assessment (BNA) for schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia Research, 166, 304–309. 
Fowler, D., Freeman, D., Smith, B., Kuipers, E., Bebbington, P., Bashforth, H., Coker, S., 
Hodgekins, J., Gracie, A., Dunn, G. & Garety, P. (2006). The Brief Core Schema 
Scales (BCSS): psychometric properties and associations with paranoia and 




Fresco DM, Mennin DS, Heimberg RG, Turk CL. (2003). Using the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire to identify individuals with generalized anxiety disorder: A receiver 
operating characteristic analysis. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 34, 283–291. 
Ganzini, L., Volicer, L., Nelson, W. A., Fox, E. & Derse, A. R. (2004). Ten myths about 
decision-making capacity. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 5, 
263-267. 
Garety, P. A., & Freeman, D. (2013). The past and future of delusions research: from the 
inexplicable to the treatable. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 203, 327-333. 
Garety, P. A., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., Freeman, D. & Bebbington, P. E. (2001). A cognitive 
model of the positive symptoms of psychosis. Psychological Medicine, 31, 189-195. 
Gillis MM, Haaga D a. F, Ford GT. (1995). Normative values for the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory, Fear Questionnaire, Penn State Worry Questionnaire, and Social Phobia 
and Anxiety Inventory. Psychol Assessment, 7, 450–455. 
Grisso, P., Appelbaum, P. & Hill-Fotouhi, C. (1997). The MacCAT-T: a clinical tool to 
assess patients’ capacities to make treatment decisions. Psychiatric Services, 48, 
1415-1419.  
Henry JD, & Crawford JR. (2005). The short-form version of the Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales (DASS-21): construct validity and normative data in a large non-clinical 
sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 227–239. 
Holmes, J. (2002). Acute wards: problems and solutions. The Psychiatrist, 26, 383-385. 
Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A. & Hemsley, D. R. (1988). Probabilistic judgements in deluded and 
non-deluded subjects. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40, 801-
812.  
Hutton, P. & Morrison, A. P. (2013). Collaborative empiricism in cognitive therapy for 
psychosis: a practice guide. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 20, 429-444. 
Jeste, D. V., Depp, C. A. & Palmer, B. W. (2006). Magnitude of impairment in decisional 
capacity in people with schizophrenia compared to normal subjects: an 
overview. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, 121-128. 
232 
 
Kay, S. R., Flszbein, A. & Opfer, L. A. (1987). The positive and negative syndrome scale 
(PANSS) for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, 261-276. 
Kesting ML, Mehl S, Rief W, Lindenmeyer J, Lincoln TM. (2011). When paranoia fails to 
enhance self-esteem: Explicit and implicit self-esteem and its discrepancy in patients 
with persecutory delusions compared to depressed and healthy controls. Psychiatry 
Research, 186, 197–202. 
Kinderman, P. (2005). A psychological model of mental disorder. Harvard Review of 
Psychiatry, 13, 206-217. 
Kuyken, W., Beshai, S., Dudley, R., Abel, A., Görg, N., Gower, P., McManus, F. & Padesky, 
C. A. (2015). Assessing Competence in Collaborative Case Conceptualization: 
Development and Preliminary Psychometric Properties of the Collaborative Case 
Conceptualization Rating Scale (CCC-RS). Behavioural and cognitive psychotherapy, 
28, 1-14. 
Lako IM, Bruggeman R, Knegtering H, Wiersma D, Schoevers RA, Slooff CJ, et al. (2012). 
A systematic review of instruments to measure depressive symptoms in patients with 
schizophrenia. Journal of Affective Disorders,  38–47. 
Lancaster, G. A., Dodd, S., & Williamson, P. R. (2004). Design and analysis of pilot studies: 
recommendations for good practice. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 10, 
307-312. 
Leucht S, Kane JM, Kissling W, Hamann J, Etschel E, Engel RR. (2005). What does the 
PANSS mean? Schizophrenia Research, 79, 231–238.  
Lombard, M., Snyder‐Duch, J., & Bracken, C. C. (2002). Content analysis in mass 
communication: Assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. Human 
Communication Research, 28, 587-604. 
Lovibond, P. F. & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states: 
Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck 
Depression and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour research and therapy,33, 335-343.  
Lyon, H. M., Kaney, S., & Bentall, R. P. (1994). The defensive function of persecutory 




Maddox, L., Jolley, S., Laurens, K. R., Hirsch, C., Hodgins, S., Browning, S., Bravery, L., 
Bracegirdle, K., Smith, P. & Kuipers, E. (2013). Cognitive behavioural therapy for 
unusual experiences in children: a case series. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 41, 344-358. 
Markson, L. J., Kern, D. C., Annas, G. J., & Glantz, L. H. (1994). Physician assessment of 
patient competence. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 42, 1074-1080. 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and 
validation of the penn state worry questionnaire. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 28, 487-495. 
Michel, P., Baumstarck, K., Auquier, P., Amador, X., Dumas, R., Fernandez, J., Lancon, C., 
& Boyer, L. (2013). Psychometric properties of the abbreviated version of the Scale 
to Assess Unawareness in Mental Disorder in schizophrenia. BMC psychiatry, 13, 
229. 
Morrison, A. P. (2001). The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative cognitive 
approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 29, 257-276. 
Morrison, A., Renton, J., Dunn, H., Williams, S., & Bentall, R. (2004). Cognitive therapy for 
psychosis: A formulation-based approach. Routledge. 
Morrison, A. P., Turkington, D., Pyle, M., Spencer, H., Brabban, A., Dunn, G., 
Christodoulides, T., Dudley, R., Chapman, N., Callcott, P., Grace, T., Grace, 
T., Lumley, V., Drage, L., Tully, S., Cummings, A., Byrne, R., Davies, L. & Hutton, 
P. (2014). Cognitive therapy for people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders not 
taking antipsychotic drugs: a single-blind randomised controlled trial. The 
Lancet, 383, 1395-1403. 
Palmer BW, Dunn LB, Appelbaum PS, Jeste D V. (2004). Correlates of treatment-related 
decision-making capacity among middle-aged and older patients with schizophrenia. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 61, 230–236.  
Peters, E. R., Moritz, S., Schwannauer, M., Wiseman, Z., Greenwood, K. E., Scott, J., Beck, 
A. T., Donaldson, C., Hagen, R., Ross, K., Veckenstedt, R., Ison, R., Williams, S., 
234 
 
Kuipers, E., & Garety, P. A. (2013). Cognitive biases questionnaire for 
psychosis. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40, 300-313.  
Okai, D., Owen, G., McGuire, H., Singh, S., Churchill, R., & Hotopf, M. (2007). Mental 
capacity in psychiatric patients Systematic review. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 191, 291-297. 
Owen, G. S., Freyenhagen, F., Richardson, G., & Hotopf, M. (2009). Mental capacity and 
decisional autonomy: an interdisciplinary challenge. Inquiry, 52, 79-107. 
Peterson & Seligman. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: a handbook and 
classification. Washington, DC: APA Press. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Roth, L. H., Meisel, A., & Lidz, C. W. (1977). Tests of competency to consent to 
treatment. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 279-284. 
Schneider, C. (1998). The practice of autonomy. Oxford University Press.  
Sturman, E. D. (2005). The capacity to consent to treatment and research: a review of 
standardized assessment tools. Clinical Psychology Review, 25, 954-974. 
Summers, A. (2006). Psychological formulations in psychiatric care: staff views on their 
impact. The Psychiatrist, 30, 341-343. 
Tarrier, N., & Calam, R. (2002). New developments in cognitive-behavioural case 
formulation. Epidemiological, systemic and social context: an integrative 
approach. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 30, 311-328. 
Vollmann, J., Bauer, A., Danker-Hopfe, H., & Helmchen, H. (2003). Competence of 
mentally ill patients: a comparative empirical study. Psychological Medicine, 33, 
1463-1471.  
Wykes, T., Steel, C., Everitt, B., & Tarrier, N. (2008). Cognitive behavior therapy for 
schizophrenia: effect sizes, clinical models, and methodological rigor. Schizophrenia 
bulletin, 34, 523-537. 
Young, R. C., Biggs, J. T., Ziegler, V. E., & Meyer, D. A. (1978). A rating scale for mania: 
reliability, validity and sensitivity. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 133, 429-435. 
235 
 
Supplementary Appendix to: 
 
Murphy, P., O’Rourke, S., McRitchie, R., Allan, K., Hutton, P. (in preparation). A case series 
examining the feasibility and acceptability of psychological assessment and formulation of 





Content of Supplementary Appendix 
 
A. Protocol 
B. Individual patient participant scores on the structured assessments (as part of the 





Appendix A: Protocol 
 
Research Questions / Objectives 
2) What is the principal research question / objective? (IRAS A10) 
The primary aim of this project is to examine the feasibility and acceptability of assessing and formulating 
impaired TDMC among patients with psychosis, and produce preliminary data regarding utility and safety.  
3) What are the secondary research questions / objectives if applicable? (IRAS A11) 




4) Please give a full summary of your design and methodology. It should be clear exactly what will happen at 
each stage of the project. (Relevant to IRAS A13)  
 
Study setting: 
The research will be carried out across two different sites – NHS Lothian and NHS Grampian. With regard to 
NHS Lothian, the research will take place in the Intensive Psychiatric Care Unit (IPCU) and possibly other units 
at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital. The IPCU provides intensive care psychiatric facilities to Lothian (total 
catchment population approximately 900,000). It is a 12 bedded ward (mixed sex). All the patients are detained, 
usually under civil orders, and are classified as 'low secure' in the matrix of security. Almost all of the patients 
have a diagnosis of a psychotic disorder. Most of the patients are from either general adult wards or 
rehabilitation wards and have been transferred due to concerns about risk: either to themselves or others.  There 
is a high level of staffing: for 12 patients there would be a minimum of 6 nursing staff on shift during working 
hours, plus the rest of the multi-disciplinary team. Moreover, there is one Consultant Psychiatrist, and two 
junior doctors: a psychiatry trainee and a FY2. 
With regard to NHS Grampian, the research will take place in the Grampian Forensic Mental Health Service, 
which includes the Blair Unit at Royal Cornhill Hospital and the Great Western Lodge. Grampian Forensic 
Mental Health Service provides forensic and intensive care psychiatric facilities to Grampian Region, Orkney 
and Shetland (total catchment population approximately 500,000). Within the Blair Unit there are two acute 
wards: one 8 bedded Forensic Ward (male), and one 11 bedded IPCU (mixed sex). There is also a 16 bedded 
Forensic Rehabilitation Ward (male) within the Blair Unit, which provides the opportunity for slow stream 
rehabilitation. Great Western Lodge is an 8 bedded community in-patient unit (male); patients are generally 
admitted to Great Western Lodge following a period of treatment within the Blair Unit. All the patients are 
detained, under a civil or criminal order, and are classified as 'low secure' in the matrix of security. Almost all of 
the patients have a diagnosis of a psychotic disorder. Admissions to the Forensic Ward generally come from the 
Prisons, the Courts, and the State Hospital, Carstairs. Patients admitted for psychiatric assessment from court or 
prison may remain in the Blair Unit for treatment or be returned to the criminal justice system. Patients 
transferred from the State Hospital are generally in a process of slow rehabilitation back into the community 
through progressively lower levels of security. Admissions to the IPCU generally come from other ward settings 
in Aberdeen and Elgin because they require short-term acute containment in a secure environment. Once these 
patients improve, they are returned to their referring catchment area ward. However, the IPCU also accepts 
female forensic patients through the same pathway as those who are admitted to the Forensic Ward. Within 
Grampian Forensic Mental Health Service, there is a multi-disciplinary team of nursing staff, medical staff, 
clinical psychology staff, social workers, occupational therapists and a clinical pharmacist. There is also a nurse 
led outreach team.  
 
Study design: 
A simple case series design incorporating quantitative and qualitative methodology will be used to (a) examine 
the acceptability, feasibility, utility and safety of psychological assessment and formulation of impaired 
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treatment decision-making capacity (TDMC) in patients with psychosis, and (b) generate hypotheses regarding 
psychological and contextual factors that may help or hinder TDMC in this group.  
It is worth noting that there is a distinction between measures that will be administered for research purposes 
(and thus may not benefit the participant, but do involve effort and time on their part) and measures that will be 
administered as part of the ‘intervention’ (i.e., measures administered with the intention of producing 
knowledge that will directly help the participant - and not administered solely for research reasons). The only 
measures that will be administered solely for the purposes of the research are those assessing acceptability, 
feasibility, utility and safety of psychological assessment and formulation of impaired TDMC. These include 
measures of subjective understanding of impaired capacity before and after the assessment and formulation 
process as well as a post-interview assessment (see 'Study procedure' below).   
 
Recruitment & consent procedure:   
The referring psychiatrist will identify the potential patient participant who meets the study criteria and decide 
whether or not they have research participant capacity. If the potential patient participant is judged to have 
research participant capacity, their key worker will meet with them and provide them with an information 
leaflet, written in plain English, describing the study and what will be asked of them should they wish to 
participate. No sooner than 48 hours later, their key worker will ask them whether they are interested in taking 
part and, if so, to sign an opt-in slip to permit the researcher to contact them directly and answer any further 
questions they may have, and to permit the key worker to share with the researcher any important information 
relevant to a proper assessment of risk. If the potential patient participant does not sign this opt-in slip for either 
further contact or the sharing of risk-relevant information, they will be unable to participate further in the 
research.  
If the potential patient participant signs this opt-in slip they will then be contacted by the researcher, who will 
attempt to answer any questions they may have. The researcher will assess their research participant capacity 
[taking into account the advice on assessing capacity in the Code of Practice that accompanies the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000] and verify that the potential patient participant meets the inclusion/exclusion 
criteria. If this capacity is present, and if criteria are met, then they will be asked to sign a written consent form, 
and providing they do, an appointment will be made to begin the sessions. Consent is a continuous process, so 
the patient participant will be regularly reminded that they can withdraw at any time without any adverse 
consequences for them or the care they receive. 
If the potential patient participant is judged to lack research participant capacity, their health care team will 
identify their guardian or welfare attorney or, if there is no such person, their nearest relative. Their key worker 
from their health care team will make a telephone call to this person. Their key worker will explain to this 
person that the potential patient participant has been judged to lack research participant capacity and that there is 
a researcher standing nearby who would like to discuss the possible involvement of the potential patient 
participant in a study. If this person agrees to have this discussion with the researcher, they will be provided 
with information about the study and what it will entail for the potential patient participant. This person will be 
told that they will be asked to give consent on behalf of the potential patient participant, that they are free to 
decide whether they wish to make this decision or not, and that they are being asked to consider what the 
potential patient participant would want, and to set aside their own personal views when making this decision. 
This person will also be sent an information leaflet. No sooner than 48 hours after this telephone call, an 
appointment will be arranged between the researcher and this person. The researcher will ask this person 
whether they would like to give consent on behalf of the potential patient participant and, if so, to sign a written 
consent form. Providing they do, an initial appointment will be arranged between the researcher and potential 
patient participant. During this initial appointment, the researcher will provide the potential patient participant 
with information, according to their understanding, about the study. If the potential patient participant indicates 
unwillingness to participate in the study, they will not be included.    
If a patient participant, who has been judged to lack research participant capacity, regains this capacity during 
the course of the study, they will be provided with an appropriate information sheet and consent form by the 
researcher that explains what has happened so far and what their on-going consent is being sought for. If a 
patient participant, who has been judged to have research participant capacity, loses this capacity during the 
course of the study and does not regain it within a reasonable period of time, an attempt will be made to seek the 
consent of the patient participant’s guardian or welfare attorney or, if there is no such person, their nearest 
relative, as above.  
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It is also worth noting that the researcher will remain in regular contact with the clinical team and, prior to each 
appointment, will request an update about any changes in the patient participants’ condition that may be relevant 
to their continued participation (e.g., if they experience an acute psychotic episode or become violent). If 
research activity needs to be suspended or terminated, this will be sensitively communicated to the patient 
participant by their key worker at an appropriate time. 
Clinicians involved in the care of participating patients will also be invited to take part in the research process. 
Their participation will be limited to providing feedback on the utility and acceptability of the assessment and 
formulation process, and their views on the reasons for the patient’s decisional incapacity. All potential clinician 
participants will be provided with a clinician-tailored participant information form and asked to complete a 
written consent form, and they will also be informed that they are free to withdraw at any point.  
 
Study procedure: 
All patient participants will complete a form to collect demographic and other clinical information. Their notes 
will already have been reviewed (with their consent) to avoid asking any unnecessary questions regarding this 
information. The concept of capacity will be explained, and they will be asked why they think they may have 
been judged to be unable, at present, to make their own treatment decisions. The reasons they give, and the 
degree to which they believe these reasons (recorded using a 0-100% conviction rating scale) will be recorded.  
The assessment and formulation procedure will then commence. This will be as collaborative as possible, and 
will be conducted by the primary researcher over several sessions using (a) a comprehensive cognitive-
behavioural interview guided by the model of formulation proposed by Tarrier and Callam (2001) and other 
cognitive models (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001), and (b) a set of structured assessments (interviews and 
questionnaires). More information about the assessment and formulation procedure is provided in the response 
to question (6), below. 
The information obtained from the cognitive-behavioural interview and set of structured assessments will be 
used to collaboratively construct a cross-sectional formulation of the factors that may help or hinder treatment 
decision-making capacity (TDMC) for the individual patient participant. A shared longitudinal formulation will 
also be developed, incorporating consideration of the origin and development of impaired TDMC. All patient 
participants will receive a written letter documenting the shared formulation in simple, easy to understand 
language. This letter will also contain simple ‘formulation diagrams’ which outline the shared understanding in 
pictorial form. Potential strategies for restoring capacity will be derived from the formulation and highlighted in 
the form of an action plan, and this will be detailed in the letter. This letter, and the diagrams, will be shared 
with the clinical team if the patient participant agrees to this. 
The Collaborative Case Conceptualisation – Rating Scale (CCC-RS: Padesky et al., 2011) will be used to assess 
the feasibility of collaboration in assessing and formulating TDMC, as well as the quality of the formulation 
process. This assessment will be carried out by a named collaborator, who will listen to recordings of the 
interviews. Interviews will only be recorded with the patient participant’s consent.   
With the patient participant’s agreement, the resulting formulations may then be shared with the clinician 
participants and the rest of the clinical team during a multi-disciplinary ‘formulation meeting’, following 
previously described procedures (Holmes, 2002; Summers, 2006). Only one case formulation will be presented 
at each meeting. Consenting clinicians will be asked to specify, before and after the formulation meeting, the 
reasons why they think the individual in question lacks decisional capacity, and the degree to which they believe 
these reasons are true (using a 0-100% rating scale of belief conviction).    
Consenting clinicians will then be interviewed individually by the primary researcher using a semi-structured 
interview format after the presentation of all of the case formulations, and basic demographic information will 
also be collected (e.g. age, gender, profession, years working in mental healthcare). This interview will assess 
perceived utility, safety and acceptability of the formulation process, and will contain both quantitative rating 
scales and open-ended qualitative questions.     
Finally, patient participants will be invited to attend a post-interview assessment, where their views on the 
utility and acceptability of the assessment and formulation process will be assessed, again using a mixture of 
quantitative rating scales and open-ended questions. Careful consideration will be given to the potential patient 
participant for subjectively reported adverse effects of the formulation process, with specific questions probing 
this. They will again be asked why they think they may have been judged to be unable, at present, to make their 
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own decisions. The reasons they give, and the degree to which they believe these reasons (recorded using a 0-
100% conviction rating scale) will again be recorded. 
 
5) Please list the principal inclusion and exclusion criteria. (IRAS A17-1 and A17-2) 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for patient participants 
Inclusion criteria will be as follows: (a) aged over 18 years; (b) able to be interviewed and complete the 
measures; (c) diagnosed with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder (verified through patients’ notes and 
symptomatic assessment); (d) enrolled as a patient (i) in the IPCU or one of the other wards at Royal Edinburgh 
Hospital or (ii) in Grampian Forensic Mental Health Service; (e) presumed or already judged to have impaired 
TDMC.  
Patients will not be able to take part if they: (a) have moderate to severe learning disability; (b) have psychosis 
of predominantly organic origin (e.g. brain injury, physical health condition, epilepsy) or have a primary 
diagnosis of substance or alcohol use disorder; (c) cannot understand English sufficiently to engage in 
conversation without an interpreter. 
 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for clinician participants 
Inclusion criteria will be as follows: (a) aged over 18 years and able to provide informed consent; (b) able to be 
interviewed; (c) working as a multi-disciplinary team member (i) in the IPCU or one of the other wards at Royal 
Edinburgh Hospital or (ii) in Grampian Forensic Mental Health Service; (d) familiar with the patient in the case 
presentation and have attended the case presentations. Non-consenting clinicians will be excluded from the 
study. 
 
6) How will data be collected? 
Assessment and formulation procedure: 
The default number of sessions per patient participant will be five, with each session lasting no longer than one 
hour, so that patient participants do not have to sit for extended periods. Tea, coffee and water will be provided 
by the researcher with a scheduled break during each session. Patient participants will be informed that they can 
request an additional break and refreshment at any point.  
Each of these sessions will consist of (a) a cognitive behavioural interview and (b) a set of structured 
assessments (interviews and questionnaires). The cognitive behavioural interview will allow :(i) the results from 
the previous session's structured assessments to be interpreted and discussed with the participant; (ii) a rationale 
for those measures administered in the current session to be shared; (iii) a collaborative formulation of impaired 
capacity to be developed (see below). Thus, the assessment and formulation will become gradually more 
comprehensive as the sessions progress. The following is a description of the content of each session, detailing 





MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment (MacCAT-T: Grisso et al., 1997) 
 
Session 2:  
 
Cognitive-behavioural interview 







The Brief Neurocognitive Assessment (BNA: Fervaha et al., 2014) 
The Beads Task (Huq et al., 1988) 
The Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for psychosis (CBQp: Peters et al., 2014)  
The Personal Beliefs about Experience Questionnaire (PBEQ: Pyle et al., 2015) 
The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS: Fowler et al., 2006)       
 
Session 4:  
 
Cognitive-behavioural interview 
The abbreviated version of the Scale to Assess Unawareness in Mental Disorder (SUMD: Michel et al., 2013)  
The short-form version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21: Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES: Rosenberg, 1965) 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ: Meyer et al., 1990) 
The Brief Strengths Test (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2006) 
 
Session 5:  
 
Cognitive-behavioural interview 
The Attributional Style Questionnare parallel form (ASQpf: Lyon et al., 1994) 
The Emotional Stroop Task (Kinderman, 1994) 
The Young Mania Rating Scale (YMRS: Young et al., 1978) 
 




Patient participants will be assessed by the primary researcher using a comprehensive cognitive-behavioural 
interview with a strongly collaborative focus. Elements of such an interview are well described by Morrison et 
al. (2004), and detailed guidance on working collaboratively in psychosis is provided by Hutton & Morrison 
(2013). The interview will focus on the role of cognitive appraisals of information relevant to the decision which 
the patient participant has been judged to lack capacity to make, and whether these appraisals help or hinder 
TDMC, and the role of affective (e.g. anxiety) and behavioural responses (e.g. avoidance) linked to these 
cognitive appraisals. Whether these affective and behavioural responses serve to maintain conviction or 
preoccupation with key appraisals will be examined in collaboration with the patient participant.  
The contribution of pre-existing beliefs or “schemata” will also be investigated in a collaborative manner and 
included in the formulation, including positive and negative beliefs about psychotic phenomena, and positive 
and negative beliefs about their diagnosis. Relevant beliefs about self, others and the world will also be 
examined, as will the potential role and origin of cognitive processes, such as worry, rumination and self-
criticism. The patient participant’s particular strengths will also be assessed using the Brief Strengths Test 
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2006), and incorporated into the formulation where possible.    
The above information, together with information from the set of structured assessments, will be used to 
collaboratively construct a cross-sectional formulation of the factors that may help or hinder TDMC for the 
individual patient participant. A shared longitudinal formulation will also be developed, incorporating 
consideration of the origin and development of impaired TDMC. All patient participants will receive a written 
letter documenting the shared formulation in simple, easy to understand language. This letter will also contain 
simple ‘formulation diagrams’ which outline the shared understanding in pictorial form. Potential strategies for 
restoring capacity will be derived from the formulation and highlighted in the form of an action plan, and this 
will be detailed in the letter. This letter, and the diagrams, will be shared with the clinical team if the patient 
participant agrees to this.  
As mentioned, this cognitive-behavioural interview will also be guided by the model of formulation proposed 
by Tarrier and Callam (2001), which emphasises the importance of incorporating systemic and contextual 
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factors. BPS guidance on how to assess capacity in general suggests that this model describes a potential 
representation of the relationships between cognitive and psycho-social elements within decision making, which 
may form the basis for longer-term development of a psychological model (BPS, 2006). This model can be 
utilised to hypothesize a range of psychological aspects of the individual patient participant that could affect 
their TDMC, including culture, context/ systemic issues and interpersonal aspects, factors affecting ability to 
manage change, factors affecting reasoning and problem solving, and mood (BPS, 2006). Moreover, the 
cognitive models of psychosis proposed by Garety et al. (2001) and Morrison (2001) emphasize the central role 
of cognitive factors in the process of reasoning and problem solving so these models will also be used to inform 
the development of the psychological formulations.  
Philip Murphy will receive regular supervision from Dr Paul Hutton, who has received in-depth training in 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for psychosis as part of his role as trial therapist on four clinical trials of 
CBT for psychosis (Hutton et al., 2014; Morrison et al., 2012; Morrison et al., 2014; Morrison et al., in prep). Dr 
Hutton has published a practice guide to collaboration in CBT for psychosis (Hutton & Morrison, 2013), and 
currently supervises several CBT therapists on a large multi-centre trial of CBT for clozapine-resistant 
psychosis, funded by the National Institute for Health Research.    
Supervision will also be provided from Dr Robyn McRitchie, a clinical psychologist based in the Blair Unit. Dr 
McRitchie is also an experienced CBT therapist, and is very familiar with the staff and risk management 
protocols within the Blair Unit, is skilled at communicating case formulations to the clinical team, and is 
proficient at using the measures within the assessment battery. Thus, Philip Murphy will receive high quality 
supervision and training in both collaborative cognitive behavioural case conceptualisation, administration of 
standardised measures, risk management, and effective communication with teams. 
 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment (MacCAT-T: Grisso et al., 1997) 
The MacCAT-T will be used to assess decisional capacity for treatment in the patient participants. This semi-
structured interview measures understanding, reasoning and appreciation in relation to proposed treatment. In 
addition, it records whether the patient is able to make a choice or not. The instrument does not give a total 
score and the abilities are considered distinct, nor is it designed to provide, by itself, a simple binary (pass/fail) 
capacity assessment. The MacCAT-T interview typically requires 40 minutes. Of the instruments assessing 
decisional capacity for treatment, the MacCAT-T has received the most empirical support (Dunn et al., 2006). 
Indeed, numerous lines of evidence across a variety of populations support its reliability and construct validity 
(Dunn et al., 2006).  
 
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay et al., 1987)    
It is important to measure psychotic symptoms to verify diagnoses given to the patient participants and because 
psychotic symptoms such as delusions have been shown to affect decision-making capacity (Owen et al., 2009). 
The PANSS will be used to measure psychotic symptoms in the patient participants. It is a clinician-
administered scale comprising of 30 items with three main domains: the positive subscale (7 items), the negative 
subscale (7 items) and the general psychopathology subscale (14 items). The PANSS is widely used in clinical 
and research settings, and is regarded as a reliable means of symptom assessment (Muller et al., 1998). It 
typically takes between 30–40 minutes to administer.  
 
The Brief Neurocognitive Assessment (BNA: Fervaha et al., 2014)  
It is important to measure cognitive functioning as it is one of the main areas that stands out in the literature as 
affecting decision-making capacity (Owen et al., 2009). The BNA will be used to measure cognitive functioning 
in the patient participants. The BNA includes two cognitive tests: a working memory measure and a test of 
processing speed. It only takes up to 10 minutes to administer and has been shown to be reliable and valid when 
compared with more comprehensive neuropsychological batteries such as the MATRICS Consensus Cognitive 
Battery (MCCB) (Fervaha et al., 2015). 
 
The Beads Task (Huq et al., 1988)  
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The Beads Task will be used to measure a “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias (a tendency to use fewer data to 
reach a decision) in the patient participants. The Beads Task has dominated research into the JTC bias. The 
typical Beads Task has been described in a recent review (Garety & Freeman, 2013). The Beads Task has 
consistently discriminated people with delusional beliefs from those without such beliefs (Garety & Freeman, 
2013). It typically takes about 5 minutes to complete. 
 
The Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for psychosis (CBQp: Peters et al., 2014)  
The CBQp will be used to measure cognitive distortions in the patient participants. It has the advantage of 
capturing the 5 common cognitive distortions within 1 questionnaire (jumping to conclusions, intentionalising, 
catastrophizing, emotional reasoning, and dichotomous thinking) which are considered important for the 
pathogenesis of psychosis. The CBQp consists of 30 vignettes of everyday events. Respondents imagine 
themselves in each situation and choose 1 of 4 possible cognitive responses to the scenario. Six scenarios have 
been generated for each bias. The CBQp has been shown to have good psychometric properties including good 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Peters et al., 2014). It is estimated to take no longer than 15 
minutes to complete. 
 
The Personal Beliefs about Experience Questionnaire (PBEQ: Pyle et al., 2015) 
It is important to measure beliefs about psychotic experiences as these can be hypothesised to affect decision-
making capacity. The PBEQ will be used to measure beliefs about psychotic experiences in patient participants. 
This is a brief 13-item self-report measure of an individual’s beliefs or appraisals of their psychotic experiences, 
adapted from the Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire (PBIQ: Birchwood et al., 1993) for use with those 
at risk of developing psychosis as well as those experiencing frank psychosis. Items relate to the perceived 
causes and consequences of psychosis. As with the PBIQ, items are rated on a 4-point scale. It typically takes 
about 5 minutes to complete.  
 
The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS: Fowler et al., 2006)  
Cognitive models in the area of psychosis suggest that negative beliefs in relation to self and others may 
contribute to the delusional experience (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001) and therefore these beliefs could be 
hypothesized to affect TDMC. The BCSS will be used to assess schemata concerning self and others in patient 
participants. It is a 24-item self-report scale concerning beliefs about self and others that are assessed on a 5-
point rating scale. Four scores are obtained: negative-self (6 items), positive-self (6 items), negative-others (6 
items), and positive others (6 items). The BCSS has good psychometric properties including reliability and 
validity, and has been shown to distinguish psychotic patients from controls (Fowler et al., 2006). It typically 
takes less than 10 minutes to complete. 
 
The abbreviated version of the Scale to Assess Unawareness in Mental Disorder (SUMD: Michel et al., 2013)  
It is important to measure insight as it is one of the main areas that stands out in the literature as affecting 
decision-making capacity (Owen et al., 2009). The abbreviated version of the SUMD will be used to measure 
insight in the patient participants. This is a standardised expert-rating scale based on a patient interview and 
comprises 9 items rated on a 4-point scale. It typically takes between 15–20 minutes to administer. This scale 
has been shown to be a valid and reliable instrument for measuring insight in patients with schizophrenia 
(Michel et al., 2013). 
 
The short-form version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21: Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)  
It is important to measure depression, anxiety and stress as these factors have been shown to affect decision-
making capacity (Owen et al., 2009) and contribute to the delusional experience (Garety & Freeman, 2013). The 
DASS-21 will be used to measure these factors in the patient participants. It is a brief 21-item self-report scale 
of state negative affect, consisting of three 7item subscales measuring depression, anxiety and tension/stress. 
Items are rated on a 4-point scale. The DASS-21 typically takes less than 10 minutes to complete and has been 
shown to be reliable and valid (Clara et al., 2001). 
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The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES: Rosenberg, 1965)  
It is important to measure self-esteem as it has been identified as contributing to the delusional experience 
(Garety & Freeman, 2013) and consequently may also affect TDMC. The RSEQ will be used to measure self-
esteem in the patient participants. This is a widely used 10-item self-report measure of overt global self-esteem. 
Each item is rated on a 4-point scale.. The RSEQ has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties including 
reliability and validity (Dick & Shepherd, 1994). It typically takes less than 5 minutes to complete.     
 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ: Meyer et al., 1990)  
The PSWQ will be used to measure worry in the patient participants. This is the most frequently used 
instrument that assesses pathological worry. The PSWQ is a brief 16-item self-report inventory designed to 
capture the generality, excessiveness, and uncontrollability of pathological worry. Items are rated on a 5-point 
scale. It typically takes about 5 minutes to complete. The PSWQ has been shown to have good psychometric 
properties including reliability and validity in clinical samples (Brown et al., 1992). 
 
The Brief Strengths Test (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2006) 
The Brief Strengths Test will be used to measure the strengths of the patient participants so that their strengths 
can be incorporated into the formulations where possible. This is a shortened version of Seligman's 240-item 
Value in Action Inventory of Strengths. The Brief Strengths Test is a self-report measure containing 24 
statements, each pertaining to one of Seligman's 24 defined strengths. Each statement is rated on a Likert scale 
ranging from one (very unlike me) to five (very much like me). It typically takes about 10 minutes to complete. 
The Brief Strengths Test has demonstrated good psychometric properties including internal reliability (Peterson 
& Seligman, 2004).   
 
The Attributional Style Questionnare parallel form (ASQpf: Lyon et al., 1994)  
The ASQpf will be used to measure patient participants’ overt expression of attributional styles. The ASQpf 
requires subjects to make hypothetical cases for six events and six failure events. The subjects are then required 
to rate this stated cause along a 7-point continuum in relation to: (a) internality vs. externality, (b) stability vs. 
instability, and (c) globality vs specificity. The ASQpf has been used to demonstrate an externalising bias for 
negative events in people with delusional beliefs, although the evidence has been mixed (Garety & Freeman, 
2013). The ASQpf typically takes about 20 minutes to complete.  
 
The Emotional Stroop Task (Kinderman, 1994) 
The Emotional Stroop Task will be used to measure covert self-esteem in the patient participants, as low covert 
self-esteem has been found in patients with delusions (Kinderman, 1994). In this task, participants are required 
to name the colours of various words on a computer screen. Colour-naming is typically slowed for emotionally 
salient words, and thus response speeds can be used as an index of the degree to which the emotional salience of 
a word (or class of words) has interfered with performance. This task typically takes about 5 minutes to 
complete. 
    
The Young Mania Rating Scale (YMRS: Young et al., 1978)  
It is important to measure mania as it has been shown to affect decision-making capacity (Owen et al., 2009). 
The YMRS will be used to measure mania in the patient participants. This is a widely used 11-item clinician-
administered scale measuring various symptoms of mania such as elevated mood, irritability, sleep, behaviour 
and insight. Each item is rated on a 5-point scale. The YMRS has demonstrated adequate psychometric 







7) What sample size is needed for the research and how did you determine this? (IRAS A59 and A60) 
A recent analysis of the concept of “case series”, which included 586 articles, suggests that a case series should 
have more than 4 patients while 4 patients or less should be reported individually as case reports (Abu-Zidan et 
al., 2012). With this recommendation in mind, the aim of this thesis is to recruit between 8 and 10 patient 
participants for assessment and formulation of treatment decision-making capacity.  
The other component of this thesis will be primarily qualitative in nature, as both patient and clinician 
participants will be interviewed using a semi-structured interview to examine the acceptability and feasibility of 
assessing and formulating treatment decision-making capacity. It has been argued that there are no computations 
or power analyses that can be done in qualitative research to determine a priori the minimum number of 
participants required (Sandelowski, 1995). However, recent guidelines for thematic analysis, which will be the 
qualitative approach adopted in this thesis, suggest that 6 to 10 participants are sufficient for interviews (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013). Therefore, for the other component of this thesis, the aim is to follow-up all of the patient 
participants, and to recruit between 6 and 10 clinician participants.       
 
8) Outline reasons for your confidence in being able to achieve a sample of at least this size. 
Initially, the plan was just to recruit participants from wards in NHS Grampian. We are now planning to also 
recruit participants from wards in NHS Lothian. This enhances the likelihood of being able to achieve a sample 
of at least this size.  
 
Analysis 
9) Please describe the methods of analysis (statistical or other appropriate methods, e.g. for qualitative research) 
by which the data will be evaluated to meet the study objectives. (IRAS A62) 
Characterisation of the sample 
Demographic information, clinical characteristics and scores on the structured measures will be presented in 
summary form (mean, median, proportions). Individual scores on the structured measures will be compared to 
relevant population norms, where possible, for each patient participant.  
Quality of the cognitive-behavioural assessment and formulation 
The extent to which collaboration is feasible with this group, and the extent to which it is possible to produce 
good quality formulations of TDMC, will be assessed by a named collaborator using the CCC-RS. The results 
will be presented in summary form, as well as individually for each patient participant.  
Utility of the cognitive-behavioural assessment and formulation 
The reasons for impaired TDMC given by patients and clinicians, pre and post assessment and formulation, will 
be rated by two independent researchers who will be blind to the temporal order of the reasons supplied (i.e. 
whether they were gathered before or after the assessment and formulation process). They will be asked to rate, 
using a simple Likert-scale, the extent to which they believe the list of reasons demonstrate a rich and insightful 
understanding of the factors that impair TDMC. A within-subjects t-test or a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
(depending on whether the data meet parametric assumptions) will be used to examine whether their ratings for 
post-formulation reasons are significantly higher than their ratings for pre-formulation reasons. Standardised 
effect sizes will also be presented for the difference, with 95% confidence intervals.   
A narrative summary of the process and outcome of the assessment and formulation procedure will be provided 
for each patient participant, as per other case series work in psychosis (e.g. Maddox et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 
2001), and will help readers judge the feasibility and utility of the process. Participant descriptions will be 
pseudonymised to ensure confidentiality.  
Development of hypotheses regarding factors that help/hinder TDMC 
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It is hoped that hypotheses regarding factors that help/hinder TDMC in this group will emerge from a thematic 
analysis of both of the transcripts of the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Joffie & Yardley, 2004), the 
formulation letters/diagrams, the multi-disciplinary discussion regarding their findings, and inspection of the 
results of the assessment battery. In relation to the transcripts, the primary researcher will initially read through 
the transcripts and code for certain categories. If a category is maintained more than once they will then be made 
into broader semantic themes. To ensure quality of analysis, the academic supervisor will be asked to read the 
transcripts and qualify the themes. They will then be asked to modify or add any themes they feel have been 
missed.  
Acceptability and safety of the TDMC assessment/formulation process 
Thematic analysis will also be applied to the transcripts of the post-formulation interviews with patients and 
clinicians, with a focus on identifying themes relating to acceptability and safety. Mean acceptability ratings 
will be reported, together with proportions reporting moderate to high acceptability. The number of participants 
leaving the study early will also be reported, together with reasons for discontinuation if available.   
 
Project Management: Timetable 
10) Outline a timetable for completion of key stages of the project. 
  
There are a number of key tasks that are necessary for the success of the project. The following timetable is 
proposed for the completion of each of these key tasks: 
- Start of data collection: October 2016 
- End of data collection: May 2017 
- Data coding and analysis: November 2016 to June 2017 
- Write-up of final paper: June 2017 to July 2017 
- There is no intention of reporting interim results in the study.     
 
Management of Risks to Project 
11)  Please summarise the main potential risks to your study, the perceived likelihood of occurrence of these 
risks and any steps you will or have taken to reduce these risks. Outline how you will respond to identified risks 
if they should occur.  
 
One of the main risks was not being able to recruit enough participants. In order to reduce this risk, we are now 
planning on recruiting participants from wards in NHS Lothian as well – initially, the plan was just to recruit 
participants from wards in NHS Grampian. 
 
Knowledge Exchange 
12) How do you intend to report and disseminate the results of the study?  (IRAS A51) 
 
This study will be written up as part of a thesis for the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, which will be available 
for viewing through the University of Edinburgh library. The thesis will include both a systematic review/meta-
analysis and a journal article based on this study. Both will be submitted to a relevant peer-reviewed journal for 
publication.  
Within the NHS Health Boards in which the study takes place, the findings will be communicated via a 
presentation. As the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland have already expressed interest in this kind of 
research, opportunities to present to them will also be explored. Finally, it is hoped that this research will be 
further disseminated by making presentations at national/international conferences (e.g. BABCP Annual 




13) What are the anticipated benefits or implications for services of the project? (E.g. If this is an NHS based 
project, in what way(s) is the project intended to benefit the NHS?) 
The assessment of treatment decision-making capacity (TDMC) has become increasingly important with the 
move away from the paternalistic role of healthcare professionals towards a greater emphasis on an individual’s 
own treatment decisions (Schneider, 1998). Although reliable assessments of TDMC have been developed 
(Cairns et al., 2005; Okai et al., 2007), no attempts have yet been made to develop a formulation-driven 
assessment of TDMC among patients with psychosis. Such an assessment might be used to explain the factors 
that help or hinder TDMC in these patients which might in turn inform intervention strategies. If this research 
goes as planned, a structured protocol will be developed for assessing and formulating TDMC among patients 
with psychosis. Moreover, this protocol will not be profession-specific – it will be informative to a range of 
healthcare professionals in the NHS who would like to do a more formulation-driven, thorough and 
psychologically informed assessment of TDMC. 
 
14)  Are there any potential costs to this project?  
 
Potential costs for the University 
 
The University may be asked to cover the costs of some of the measures if they are not freely available, such as 
the Beads Task.  
 
Potential costs for the NHS Health Boards 
  
The NHS Health Boards will be asked to cover the costs of stationery and printing for the use of the measures.  
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Appendix B: Individual patient participant scores on the structured assessments (as 





 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
MacCarthur Competence Assessment 
Tool-Treatment 
      
Understanding (0-6) 5.33 4.3*  4.65* 5.33 1.85** 5.6 (0.66),  
Grisso 1997 (Grisso, 
Appelbaum, & Hill-
Fotouhi, 1997);  
5.6 (0.7),  
Palmer 2004 (Palmer, 
Dunn, Appelbaum, & 
Jeste, 2004)  
(both NC) 
Appreciation (0-4) 4 3 0 4 0 - 
Reasoning (0-8) 8* 5 5 8*  4 6.15 (1.69),  
Grisso 1997 (Grisso et 
al., 1997); 
7.1 (1.2), 
Palmer 2004 (Palmer et 
al., 2004)  
(both NC) 
Expressing a choice (0-2) 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 (0.2), Palmer 2004 
(Palmer et al., 2004) 
(NC) 
Total (0-20) 19.33 14.3 11.65 19.33 7.85 - 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale       
Positive (7-49) 25** 33** 11 7 39** 8.9 (2.6), Palmer 2004 
(Palmer et al., 2004) 
(NC) 
Negative (7-49) 7 15** 20** 30** 15** 8.1 (1.8), Palmer 2004 
(Palmer et al., 2004) 
(NC) 
General (16-112) 31 50 25 30 63 - 
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 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
Total (30-210) 63 98 56 67 117 61 = mild illness 
78 = moderate illness 
96 = markedly ill 
118 = severely ill; 
Leucht 2005 (Leucht et 
al., 2005) 
Scale to assess Unawareness in Mental 
Disorder – abbreviated version 
      
Awareness of disease & need for treatment 
(3-9) 
3 - - 3 - - 
Awareness of positive symptoms (3-9) 6 - - N/A - - 
Awareness of negative symptoms (3-9) N/A - - - - - 
Personal Beliefs about Experiences 
Questionnaire 
      
Internal shame & defectiveness (0-18) 16* - 7 9* - 12.27 (2.68); SCZ, 
Morrison 2014 
(Morrison et al., 2014) 
External shame (0-6) 5 - 4 5 - 4.81 (0.84); SCZ, 
Morrison 2014 
(Morrison et al., 2014) 
Negative appraisals (0-12) 10* - 5** 5** - 13.94 (3.12); SCZ, 
Morrison 2014 
(Morrison et al., 2014) 
Total (0-36) 31 - 16** 19** - 33.76 (5.80); SCZ, 
Morrison 2014 
(Morrison et al., 2014) 
Beads Task, N beads 6 1 - 15 - ≤ 2 beads = JTC Dudley 
2016 (Dudley, Taylor, 
Wickham, & Hutton, 
2016) 
Cognitive Biases Questionnaire       
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 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
Jumping to conclusions (6-18) 10* 13** - 9 - 8.5 (1.3) NC; Peters et 
al., 2014 (Peters et al., 
2014) 
Emotional reasoning (6-18) 6* - - 6* - 7.2 (1.1) NC; Peters et 
al., 2014 (Peters et al., 
2014) 
Intentionalising (6-18) 6* - - 8 - 7.3 (1.1) NC; Peters et 
al., 2014 (Peters et al., 
2014) 
Catastrophising (6-18) 6* - - 7 - 7.1 (0.9) NC; Peters et 
al., 2014 (Peters et al., 
2014) 
Dichotomous thinking (6-18) 6 - - 6 - 6.5 (0.7) NC; Peters et 
al., 2014 (Peters et al., 
2014) 
Total (30-90) 34* - - 36 - 36.5 (2.7); NC; Peters et 
al., 2014 (Peters et al., 
2014) 
Brief Neurocognitive Assessment       
Compositive z-score -1.2* -2.1** - -1.85** - 0.0 (0.8); NC; Fervaha 
2015 (Fervaha et al., 
2014) 
Letter-number Span Test 11** 8** - 7** - 15.8 (3.4); NC; Fervaha 
2015 (Fervaha et al., 
2014) 
Symbol Coding Test 47 36* - 45* - 56.7 (10.8); NC; 
Fervaha 2015 (Fervaha 
et al., 2014) 
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 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (0-30) 19 19 - 30* - 21.1 (4.49); Collett 
2016 (Collett, Pugh, 
Waite, & Freeman, 
2016) 
25.12 (3.53); Kesting 
2011 (Kesting, Mehl, 
Rief, Lindenmeyer, & 
Lincoln, 2011); 
(Both NC)  
Brief Core Schema Scale       
Positive self (0-24) 19** 17* 24** 24** - 10.2 (4.23); NC; Fowler 
2006 (Fowler et al., 
2006) 
Negative self (0-24) 4 14** 0 0 - 3.55 (3.55); NC; Fowler 
2006 (Fowler et al., 
2006) 
Positive other (0-24) 19* 16* 24** 20** - 10.43 (4.51); NC; 
Fowler 2006 (Fowler et 
al., 2006) 
Negative other (0-24) 0 17** 0** 0** - 4.07 (4.04); NC; Fowler 
2006 (Fowler et al., 
2006) 
Emotional Stroop       
Reaction time to sad words (ms) 1156.84** 1571.8** - 810.94** - 621.04 (94.75); NC; 
Besnier, 2011 (Besnier 
et al., 2011) 
Reaction time to neutral words (ms) 831.8** 1581** - 819.24** - 614.04 (94.75); NC; 
Besnier, 2011 (Besnier 
et al., 2011) 
Difference score (ms) +325.04** -9.2 - -8.3 - -6.19 (60.02); NC; 
Besnier, 2011 (Besnier 
et al., 2011) 
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 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
Implicit Attitudes Test  -0.19 - - - - - 
Attributional Style Questionnaire       
Internality score, negative events (7-42) 30 17 - 6* - 23 (8.97); NC; Lyon 
1994 (Lyon, Kaney, & 
Bentall, 1994) 
Internality score, positive events (7-42) 26 - - 18* - 29.71 (6.12); NC; Lyon 
1994 (Lyon et al., 1994) 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (16-80) 35 66** - 16** - 42.22 (11.15); NC; 
Gillis 1995 (Gillis, 
Haaga, & Ford, 1995) 
≥65 = GAD caseness; 
Fresco 2003 (Fresco, 
Mennin, Heimberg, & 
Turk, 2003) 
Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale-21       
Depression (0-21) 2 - 
 
- 0 - 5.55 (7.48); NC; 
Crawford 2003 
(Crawford & Henry, 
2003) 
≥5 = mild 
≥7 = moderate 
≥11 = severe 
≥15 = extremely severe 




 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
Anxiety (0-21) 5 11* - 0 - 3.56 (5.39); NC; 
Crawford 2003 
(Crawford & Henry, 
2003) 
≥3 = mild 
≥5 = moderate 
≥8 = severe 
≥12 = extremely severe 
Henry 2005 (Henry & 
Crawford, 2005) 
Stress (0-21) 2 - - 0 - 9.27 (8.04); NC; 
Crawford 2003 
(Crawford & Henry, 
2003) 
≥8 = mild 
≥10 = moderate 
≥13 = severe 
≥17 = extremely severe 
Henry 2005 (Henry & 
Crawford, 2005) 
Total (0-63) 9 - - 0 - 18.38 (18.82); NC; 
Crawford 2003 
(Crawford & Henry, 
2003) 
≥14 = mild 
≥18 = moderate 
≥28 = severe 
≥38 = extremely severe 




 Participants (raw scores)   
Name of assessment (min-max score) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Data for 
interpretation, mean 
(SD) 
Young Mania Rating Scale (0-60) 22 5 - 0 - 2.5 = Normal, not ill 
5 = Minimally ill 
10 = Mildly ill 
16 = Moderately ill 
25.5 = Markedly ill 
36 = Severely ill 
45 = Very severely ill  
Bipolar Disorder; Berk, 
2008 (Berk et al., 2008) 
 
Calgary Depression Scale (0-27) 2 5 0 0 - ≥5 = Major depressive 
episode 
Lako 2012 (Lako et al., 
2012) 
Brief Strengths Test (24-120) 120 - - 116 - - 
*≥1 SD more or less than comparator sample; **≥2 SDs more or less than comparator sample 
Note: SD = standard deviations; SCZ = schizophrenia; NC = non-clinical sample
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